Breaking the Organized Crime and Counter-Terrorism Nexus: Identifying Programmatic Approaches

MEETING REPORT

INTRODUCTION

Security Council Resolution 2195 (2014), Threats to international peace and security, called upon states to better understand and address the nexus between organized crime and terrorism as a threat to security and development. This resolution comes as the culmination of 15 years of consideration by the United Nations the General Assembly and the Security Council on the interaction of terrorism and cross-border crime and its impact on international peace and security.

In line with this resolution, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and the Thailand Institute of Justice (TIJ) hosted a meeting from 11-13 May 2016, in Bangkok, to examine the nexus between organised crime and terrorism as a threat to security and development and to define better policy and programmatic responses. The meeting brought together representatives of 15 States and international experts with specialised knowledge of organised crime and terror groups in a number of different regional contexts. The participants were challenged to review the current evidence basis and conceptual theories around the nexus, to test them against their own areas of expertise, and to draw from their knowledge of lessons learned and best practices to propose a series of programme priorities.

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

There are a number of challenges in understanding the ‘nexus’ between organised crime and terrorism, that start initially from defining these concepts, both in theory and in practice. There is no universally agreed definition of organised crime or of terrorism, which means that there is no definitive means by which to identify their convergences and divergences.

In common parlance, however, terrorism is defined via the use of violent acts that are intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population in order to influence the policy or conduct of a government by intimidation or coercion. The challenge has been to distinguish acts of terrorism from the legitimate struggles of people in situations of insurgency or asymmetrical warfare. Defining organised crime has been even more profound, given that it encompasses such a wide range of illegal acts, including everything from trafficking to cybercrime. The compromise reached within the framework of the UN Convention on Transnational Organised Crime (UNTOC) was to define an organised criminal group, rather than the act itself: “as a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.”

Security Council Resolution 2195 identified a nexus in which criminal networks and terrorist groups meet, and their objectives, identities and modus operandi overlap. In many theatres, these
lines are becoming blurred, particularly in the cases of protracted sectarian or separatist conflicts, and the definitions used by many policy makers to gauge responses are being challenged. Terrorists are benefiting from transnational organized crime in some regions, including from the trafficking of arms, persons, drugs, and artefacts and from the illicit trade in natural resources including gold and other precious metals and stones, minerals, wildlife, charcoal and oil, as well as from kidnapping for ransom and other crimes including extortion, and bank robbery. Furthermore, terrorist groups benefiting from transnational organized crime may contribute to undermining affected States, specifically their security, stability, governance, social and economic development.¹

While the interest in the relationship between organized crime and terrorism is a relatively new focus of the international community, specialists in the field have developed frameworks depicting crime-terror relationships; specifically, the crime-terror continuum theory put forth by Tamara Makarenko and frameworks developed by Louise Shelley. Of note, both Makarenko and Shelley state that there has been a significant transformation in international terrorism since the end of the Cold War, with the decline of state support pushing terrorist organizations to turn to crime to fund their ideological campaigns. As such, while the crime-terror nexus is a relatively recent phenomenon, largely taking hold since the 1990’s, both of these analysts identify an increasing convergence of the two groups in important ways.

Makarenko predominantly analyses the ideological and operational nature of the convergence. She depicts the relationship between organized crime and terrorism as a continuum, arguing that a single group can slide up and down the scale depending on the environment in which it operates. The two types of relationships that constitute the major components of the nexus are the formation of alliances between criminal and terrorist organisations (alliances) and use of crime by terrorist groups as a source of funding (operational).² However, Makarenko states, the relationship between organised crime and terrorism has evolved into something more complex. As both criminal and terrorist groups incorporated economic and political capabilities into their remit, many groups lost sight of their original motivations and aims. Makarenko argues that the realisation that economic and political power enhance one another and suggests that groups will increasingly become hybrid organisations. This possibility is increased by the fact that criminal and terrorist groups appear to be learning from one another, and adapting to each other’s successes and failures.³

Louise Shelley refined this thesis by observing that it is insufficient to examine organised crime and terror groups in isolation, or only in comparison to each other. They also must be understood in terms of the association with the state, and increasingly they are converging to form the ‘Unholy

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³ Ibid.
Trinity’ where, through corruption and complicity of state actors, criminal and terrorist groups grow in symbiosis with state institutions.⁴

In the keynote address to the conference, Mark Shaw⁵ put forward a third means by which to analyse the nexus between organised crime and terror groups, based upon their strategic use of violence. He argued that while the use of violence often is used as the defining feature of a terrorist group, in fact organised crime groups also use violence as a strategic way, and one that is not dissimilar to terrorist groups. Firstly, they use symbolic violence and killing to send messages about local authority and control; secondly that innocent victims often are subject to criminal violence; and finally, like terrorist groups, the goal of organised crime’s use of violence is often to influence political decision-making around the allocation of resources.

The meeting of experts was thus convened to assess the continuum or convergence along four axes:

i. **Transactional**, where there are operational linkages between the groups, such as financing, procurement of arms and control of territory;

ii. **Ideologies and aims**, where the goals of the group are identified according to their objectives;

iii. **Relationship to and nature of the state**, where the groups can be assessed upon the degree to which they align with or distinguish themselves from the state; and finally,

iv. **Strategic use of violence**, where the nature and use of violence can be used to analyse the nature of the organised crime and terrorism nexus.

These theoretical approaches and frameworks were applied to a series of regional case studies of specific groups through a series of plenary and break-out group discussions.

**REGIONAL CONTEXTS**

The meeting provided the opportunity for four regional discussions, on Africa; Asia and the Pacific; the Middle East and North Africa; and Central Asia. Despite the diversity of the individual groups discussed, including Boko Haram and Al Shabaab, ISIS and Al Qaeda, there was a strong degree of consensus and coherence around a set of key issues.

Firstly, while collectively, the meeting participants acknowledged that interaction between terrorist and transnational organized criminal groups is not straightforward, each case is context specific, rooted in historical conditions but constantly evolving. This evolution depends on events

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⁵ Prof. Mark Shaw is the Director of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, and a Professor at the Centre of Criminology at the University of Cape Town, South Africa. He holds the NRF Chair in Security and Justice.
at the local, national and regional levels, which are interdependent, and thus to make any general statements about how organised crime and terror groups reinforce each other is a challenge. In some cases, groups may take decisions, or make short-term trade offs for longer term sustainability of their identity and operations, and this works both ways. Links between the two exist and there are increasing convergences, but attempts to define the groups either as ‘terrorist’ or ‘criminal’ are increasingly challenging and counterproductive. Regardless, in the current climate, the phenomenon represents an increasing threat to international peace and security.

In almost all cases, territorial control is key to the success of both crime and terror groups, as it allows them to build legitimacy and raise funds through taxation. Examples across all of the four regions discussed suggested that in the domains under their control, organised crime and terror groups are increasingly engaging in exercises of competitive state making. They place themselves as saviours, martyrs or ideologues who champion the marginalised or those under-served by the state. This under-service can manifest in lack of security, justice or economic opportunity. Organised crime groups set themselves up as a dominant provider of livelihoods, and can style themselves as a “Robin Hood” providing incomes where few legitimate alternatives exist. It was observed that both terrorist and criminal groups might be able to offer, in certain cases, a better salary and benefits to the national security institutions or military. Being part of a terrorist or criminal group can provide status to new recruits, and advertising successes and benefits on social media and within the community is a strategy that both groups use to enhance their status. However, with this strategy, the challenge is to make this sustainable over the long term. The groups must continually raise sufficient funding to guarantee the income and prestige for their members, who can quickly become disenfranchised.

It was observed that repeatedly the ideology and targets of groups morph and sharpen around militarised attacks from both national and international audiences. Attacks, particularly those that seem heavy-handed and asymmetrical, can be portrayed as a form of injustice or victimisation, and therefore serve the recruiting strategy, build loyalty to the group amidst their members, and increase the legitimacy of their cause, as the groups style themselves as ‘protectors’ of the underserved or persecuted. This is true both in the cases of terror and crime groups, and can support them in their fundraising and mobilisation efforts. Regrettably, groups also gain in status and legitimacy through diplomatic overtures and attempts to negotiate with them directly around peace agreements. While it was noted that the experience in the Asia Pacific had shown that criminal groups can be positive partners in peace agreements, the risk to policymakers comes in favouring short-term stability or violence reduction over long-term sustainable goals. There remains still much to be learned in how to craft agreements with armed groups that contribute to sustainable peace whilst at the same time not overlooking the positions of financial vested interest.

There were three broad phases identified in the evolution of the crime-terror nexus:

1. **Conflict and instability**: the fragility of the state in this phase is often the period in which crime and terror groups form or take root, and in which the use of violence and financing through illicit flows are less likely to be controlled or suppressed.
ii. **Transition:** where conflict transitions into peace agreements and state consolidation exercises - unless express efforts are made to set norms, standards and counter vested interests - patterns of violence, illicit financing and marginalisation become the status quo.

iii. **Convergence:** where states and institutions are stronger, the levels of violence may have been reduced, but the level of complicity and situations of hybrid governance are entrenched, which may include high levels of corruption.

**Policy Responses**

In examining the implications of the regional analysis for policy responses, several important conclusions were drawn:

- If the distinction between contemporary organised crime and terrorist groups is increasingly hard to draw, then the value of defining these groups as one or the other has less value, and may indeed serve to hinder rather than assist the development of effective responses.

- If the growth and manifestation of the most effective crime and terror groups globally presents more of an alternative governance challenge than a security challenge, then the nature of the response must be re-calibrated accordingly.

- Responses must mitigate not only the transnational dimensions of the threat presented, but also to the local legitimacy that groups garner.

It was noted that the classic strategy for addressing criminal or terrorist groups is a top-down effort to raise the costs of criminal or terrorist enterprises: to deter, to interdict or to raise the risk-return ratio. Instead, however, when the legitimacy and governance dimensions presented by contemporary groups is accounted for, these strategies have demonstrated to be ineffective, if not counter-productive.

In a series of plenary discussions, the expert groups shared best practices, lessons learned and innovations that could contribute to a more effective response to the organised crime and terrorism nexus as they conceptualised and understood it. The discussions focused on two dimensions: appropriate and effective approaches, and the actors and stakeholders which must be engaged to deliver those approaches successfully.

One approach shared was to recognise and try to reduce the level of political capital that groups had garnered. The likelihood of success and the strategy to be taken is determined by three inter-locking dimensions: the size of the group’s illicit activities in relation to the overall size of the economy; whether the industry is labour intensive, and the extent of the interdependence between the criminal and militant arms. In each case, the strategic response is to increase the level of relevance and social service provision by the state, whilst shrinking the proportional size of criminal governance. This is, in effect, building a state that people can relate to and that responds to their needs, providing predictable, sustained and ideally equitable rule of law, security institutions, justice and dispute resolution, plus economic and development opportunities.
It was observed that given the importance of territorial control to the potency of both criminal and terrorist groups, the need to carefully address land ownership, management and conflict must be considered. Many of the terrorist groups discussed had their genesis in dispute over land, and thus how those conflicts and purported rights are addressed has considerable impact on whether the resolution is positive or results in longstanding grievances and criminal governance. Efforts to address areas where criminal governance or terrorist groups are always well entrenched – urban slum communities in gang prevalent areas in Latin America or Africa were cited as examples – were discussed. A key lesson learned was that efforts to pacify or clear these areas cannot only be security focused, but need to reinstitute the presence of the state in a positive manner with a follow-up package of support and engagement.

A clear lesson learned that was shared from past approaches was that focusing only on the financial aspects of illicit trade can have severe consequences for local livelihoods. For example, cutting off the production of illicit drugs without providing sustainable livelihood alternatives causes greater harm than the illicit trade itself, and exacerbated the governance/legitimacy vacuum in which terrorist and crime groups thrive. The expert groups cautioned against unnecessarily criminalising what in fact may be viewed locally as an informal economy rather than an illicit activity.

It was noted however that, in some cases, hoping to return or create the hegemony of the state may be impossible, and instead it would be better to work towards a ‘polyarchy of governance’ or ‘hybrid governance’ where both the state and the crime or terror group can retain its capacity to control certain territories. In this scenario, however, the goal of interventions should be to achieve the best possible delivery of that framework, mitigating to the extent possible the worst expressions and impacts of terrorism and criminality, and to encourage those groups to operate to the maximum extent possible to international principles.

The importance of addressing gender disparities and dimensions in responses was highlighted. Frequently strategies to address terrorist groups or criminal gangs focus on the (young) men who are perceived as the primary protagonists and combatants. Insufficient attention is given to the role of women, the impact on gender in society (e.g., increases in gender based violence, teenage pregnancies) or to the generational impact of violence, perceived injustice, and punitive action by the state.

It was observed that while holistic, or all-inclusive responses seem to be preferred to counter specific groups or their control in certain areas, when in fact, ‘small-pocket’ and incremental approaches may prove more effective. Often timing is important – a situation may be intractable at first, but small windows of opportunity may present themselves which need to be seized. However, the question remains on how to ensure the necessary monitoring that would allow those strategic opportunities to be identified, and to ensure that the international or national policy framework is in place to allow timely action.

In regards to the actors best placed to respond, it was broadly observed how challenged the multilateral system was to engage in this environment. The level of state complicity in crime (as
observed by Shelley’s Holy Trinity model), and the often competitive or controversial relationship that states have with terrorist groups both nationally and regionally, can make it challenging to agree on mutual courses of multilateral action. It was suggested that the way forward may have to be modular approaches to multilateralism, or looser coalitions that are formed outside of the formal multilateral system. These suggestions have been used to good effect in the cases of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) or in the Contact Group to Counter Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), which was particularly notable for its inclusion of the private sector.

Perhaps more important than international and multilateral action, the critical importance of achieving community level ownership and buy-in was heavily emphasised. While there are many challenges to achieving this effectively and delivering over the long-term against short-term expectations, the discussions emphasised that without community engagement there can be little hope of success.

In conclusion, however, there was a mutual understanding that addressing the organised crime and terror nexus as a governance paradigm is a long-term endeavour, with many iterations required, and one in which we have few positive examples of success. There was a general sense that not enough is known on how to effectively rebuild governance, the rule of law and the social compact, and that our toolbox of responses seem poorly designed for the task.

The participants welcomed the efforts of UNICRI and TIJ through this forum to offer the opportunity for knowledge and experience sharing, and to build networks of practitioners and experts. In particular, they proposed a number of areas where UNICRI and TIJ could add value in developing research, policy or programmatic responses.

**A Framework for Response**

Several priority areas were identified in the course of the discussion where responses would need to be strengthened to address the organised crime and terrorism nexus. These can be loosely divided into three areas: (i) building the evidence basis; (ii) promoting local engagement; and (iii) building capacity of state and non-state actors.

- **Building the Evidence Basis**

To achieve a more systematic, comprehensive and multidimensional response, a stronger evidence basis is needed not only to understand the nexus between organized crime and terrorism, but also how it is enabled. Research priorities identified during the meeting include:

- Understanding and addressing the enabling environment for the OC-CT Nexus.
  - What are the facilitating factors?
  - How do conflict and insecurity open opportunities for crime and terror groups to strengthen their influence?
  - Negotiating strategies with criminals and terrorist groups in a transition.
• Identifying, documenting and disseminating best practices and lessons learned in the following areas:
  o Sources of community resilience;
  o Building legitimacy of state institutions for local service delivery.

• Community perception surveys to identify sources of local legitimacy and possible change agents.

• **LOCAL ENGAGEMENT**
The empowerment of local communities to build social resilience to terrorism and crime entails an all-of-society approach with relevant actors at all levels involved in identifying responses and solutions. All relevant actors, including women and young people, community organizations, religious and other civic leaders, financial institutions, the private sector and educators at all levels, need to be involved in designing comprehensive solutions to build the State’s capabilities and enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of local communities. Innovation and experimentation is needed in the following areas:

  • Building linkages between community and the state in areas vulnerable to crime and terror.
  • Mobilising alternative livelihoods for those engaged in illicit trafficking and terrorism.
  • Demobilisation strategies for those involved in trafficking and terrorist groups.
  • Strategic communications initiatives that focus on raising awareness on the negative impact of local terrorist and criminal activities.
  • Community-led service delivery initiatives.
  • Strategies for community engagement and communication through social media.

• **CAPACITY BUILDING**
New approaches require the development of tools and building capacity to address priority challenges. The expert participants identified the following themes where capacity building was a priority:

  • Strengthening the capacity of state institutions to engage with local communities in a way that is consistent with international human rights norms and the rule of law, and which reinforces state legitimacy in the eyes of the populations.
  • Building capacity of independent media, civil society and other non-state actors to counter crime and terrorism and promote alternative narratives.
  • Strengthening capacity to protect advocates and promote peaceful protest and citizen engagement.
• Strategies to shift informal activities into the formal sector, to promote social protection of those involved and regulate crime controlled enterprises.

In addition, the discussions worked towards the completion of a matrix that identified priority areas for concern and possible programmatic responses that could be used to address them. While not all issues were covered in full, the resultant discussion and conclusions serve as a useful guide to future programming.
1. Building the Evidence Basis

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<th>Priority</th>
<th>Response from Experts</th>
<th>Programmatic Response</th>
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| To break down the nexus between crime and terrorism, what kinds of information do we need to know? | • Understanding that each situation is highly context specific, and usually with a long history.  
• Developing an effective response requires a granular knowledge of the group, its evolution and its interactions with the state, including past state approaches and responses.  
• Examining how money is earned and spent helps to characterise and understand the motivations and interests of specific groups, in some cases.  
• Understanding who benefits from illicit flows, where the funds are spent can be critical to achieving effective strategies and sustainable responses.  
• Recognising and measuring the level of local legitimacy actors have with communities is also important – often terrorist or criminal groups are an important source of security, livelihood or service delivery to local communities. | • Developing and integrating political economy analysis (PEA) that includes illicit resource flows into policy and programme planning.  
• Ensuring that there is a capacity for ongoing monitoring of the political economy of both crime and terror groups, as well as their state and institutional counterparts.  
• Strengthening capacity to track illicit financial flows, including in the informal financial sector.  
• Investing in regular community perceptions surveys will provide insight to which actors and institutions have legitimacy and can serve as agents of change. |
| By what means can this be collected, who should be collecting it and which actors need to be involved? | • Effective PEA can be a challenge, as the analysis will always be coloured by the perspective of the person doing the analysis. Thus, PEA should be a multi-stakeholder exercise to review and reflect different viewpoints.  
• The capacity and tools by which to monitor illicit flows and trade are largely inadequate. Better instruments are needed to be effective in regions where the economy is largely cash based, or to deal with hawala transfers. | • Creating or building the capacity of independent organisations to canvass and project local community ‘voices’ can be an important way of understanding the needs of communities.  
• Supporting research and pilot approaches into tracking and managing illicit flows in informal contexts. |
| Frequent public perceptions surveys undertaken by independent bodies (e.g. polls; ‘Afrobarometer’ style assessments) can improve the efficacy of engagement strategies and programme delivery.  
Independent observatories or networks of independent investigative journalists can build this capacity at a national level.  
Data gathering and analysis is often driven by external actors, and thus priorities. A more active research sector within the affected countries would be necessary to shift that paradigm so that it is more reflective of local / national concerns.  
The challenges of doing research and gathering information in the types of environments were noted. Often only small samples of the population, or specific points in time data are extrapolated to draw generic or too broad conclusions. While this is necessary, it can compromise the findings of research, and in particular in academia, efforts to study transnational threats meet methodological challenges. |
| Promoting platforms that provide spaces for a plurality of voices.  
Building capacity of national / local academia, research institutions and think tanks that could drive the research and policy agenda from the affected countries. |

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<tr>
<th>How can links between international, national and civil society actors be reinforced to provide better information exchange?</th>
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| Rarely is the relevant kinds of information collected on a systematic basis, using comparable method, over time. Often research and analysis is sporadic, ad-hoc and uncoordinated initiatives.  
National capacity for data collection is typically very weak, and often focussed only on criminal justice indicators (seizures, prosecutions, homicides, violence), which only provide a |
| Increasing inclusion of civil society organisations in multi-lateral forums.  
Building capacity and resources of civil society both at national, regional and international levels to monitor and report.  
Creating neutral (safe spaces) forums for dialogue that are multi-sectoral. |
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<th>Question</th>
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<td>limited scope to understand the phenomena at hand.</td>
<td>• Much more nuanced and multi-dimensional metrics are needed to examine questions of harm, impact on governance and the rule of law, and on people’s perceptions of state institutions.</td>
<td>• Building capacity of national statistical units, including specific capacity building around multidimensional metrics for insecurity.</td>
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<td>• International community needs to be much more vigilant, proactive and consistent in responding to evidence of rising violence, human rights abuses, repression, fundamentalism or extremism.</td>
<td>• Civil society institutions often have a greater capacity to investigate, report and advocate on sensitive issues than multi-lateral institutions, and therefore encouraging their presence and engagement at national and international levels is critical.</td>
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<td>How can those providing information be better protected?</td>
<td>• It is unquestionably a challenge that those who speak out on issues of crime, corruption, terrorism, money laundering and financial flows are under great risk – both internationals and nationals.</td>
<td>• Supporting international journalism networks and build capacity of local journalists.</td>
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<td>• Journalists and environmental defenders have come under threat.</td>
<td>• Oversight bodies, commissions, clear commitments of political will, all support building a culture where media freedom is welcome and the results are followed up.</td>
<td>• Developing a greater degree of innovation and experimentation in this area.</td>
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<td>How should data, evidence and analysis be disseminated to effectively inform policymakers?</td>
<td>• Experts confirmed that the evidence basis is often fuller than policymakers would realise, and it is can be a challenge to convey research in a way that resonates with policymakers, or that the policy relevant conclusions are easily accessible to the</td>
<td>• Creating shorter reports, summaries, and policy briefs from research bodies for the appropriate audiences.</td>
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relevant stakeholders.
- Academia struggles with this challenge, whereas the body of policy think tanks appear to have a closer link to policy debates.
- The required information on OC / CT / CVE issues is often very wide – spanning security, development, political history, etc. – which makes it challenging to distil the salient information and still provide the degree of nuance that the earlier points noted as essential.
- Particularly in the CT field, there are an enormous number of actors generating research and undertaking policy-relevant analysis. Greater effort is needed to coordinate and cross-reference research agendas and research conclusions for better policymaking.
- It was noted that more grass-roots analysis would be beneficial. While this is beginning to take place, local organisations struggle to raise their research to the level of national or international policymaking forums.

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<th>2. Local Engagement</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Response from Experts</th>
<th>Programmatic Response</th>
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| Who are the target groups for local engagement (e.g. women, youth, private sector, marginalised communities)? How are they each best enabled and | • In each case this will be very context specific.  
• It is clear however that there are negative consequences to being too categorical in definitions, e.g. ‘terrorist’ or ‘criminal’ which might then prevent or restrict engagement.  
• Identifying sources of resilience or possible change leaders or influencers will be a critical component to navigating successful | • Building flexible models for consultation, consensus building and platforms for inclusion into programme design.  
• Ensuring gender sensitive analysis is conducted.  
• Including a means of identifying change |
| supported? | negotiations, transitions or state consolidation exercises.  
|---|---|
| • Often engagement will be needed a multiple reinforcing spheres or levels. No one should be excluded.  
| • In some cases, where full consensus cannot be achieved, modular diplomacy can be a useful first step or entry point.  | agents in the analytical phase of any programme.  
| If local engagement needs to be context specific, to what extent can we draw lessons across jurisdictions, or expect to replicate approaches? | • There is a limited capacity to replicate approaches, though often listening and providing space for different groups to voice their perspectives and/or grievances can create a foundation for building their engagement and buy-in. This is true both at a project level, or for a change process as a whole.  
| | • Who and how a message is conveyed is as important as what that message says.  
| | • Lessons learned show that there is no silver bullet: negotiating with armed groups, criminal groups, terrorists, is a long-term trust building exercise that may have many cycles. Consistency and integrity are required to build that trust.  
| | • It will be apparent where development is used as a means for achieving overtly security related priorities, and this will reduce credibility of the interventions and the actors.  
| Which actors are best placed to have credibility, project authenticity and build trust with local communities? Are there any good practices to | • Again this will be context specific, and should be determined based upon community surveys of the target population.  
| | • It should not be assumed that the state or state institutions are the best placed – often a system of hybrid governance will be the result.  
| | • At the same time, however, validating local ‘warlords’ or | • Using flexible approaches to determine which groups and actors are best placed to deliver messages, assistance, governance. It may be necessary for programmes to be designed with multiple channels of delivery simultaneously.  
| | |
alternative governance providers without securing means to tie them into a central state consolidation exercise or a peacebuilding process does not resolve the fundamental issues creating terrorism, disenfranchisement or criminal governance.

- It was observed that the choice of local interlocutor / recipient for development assistance or security investment will alter the local political economy and thus may have unintended consequences in shifting patterns of power and legitimacy. This should be factored into the PEA and the project design.

Aiding conditionality can be useful in incentivising preferred behaviour, or building adherence to agreed common norms and standards.

Which relevant assistance can be provided to Member States to develop effective strategic communications initiatives that focus on raising awareness on the negative impact of local terrorist and criminal activities?

- Often the state is very poorly placed for strategic communication and ‘messaging’ (narratives / counter narratives). Social media has created the capacity for hyper-responsiveness and this is used to great effect by both terrorist and crime groups. Rarely will states have the capacity to engage at that level of personalised communication that is required.
- Ensuring that state has its own message – one of inclusion - and does not only broadcast, but also responds.
- Violence itself is also a means of communication for both crime and terror groups. Therefore responses to violence need to be calibrated.

- Developing a more effective strategy to provide a means for multiple voices to be projected and heard, rather than trying to communicate in the same way as ideological or criminal groups do, thus creating a marketplace for ideas.

### 3. Capacity Building

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<th>Programmatic Response</th>
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<td>What are the emerging issues or priority groups to</td>
<td><strong>There has been an overwhelming emphasis on state institutions and to be effective in countering OC / CT and the nexus will</strong></td>
<td><strong>Analyzing the innovative programmes around collaborative border security in the</strong></td>
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which traditional capacity efforts have not adequately engaged? Are there any innovations or nascent lessons learned worth highlighting?

| How effective and sustainable have past capacity building initiatives proven? Are there any best practices? | While not discussed at length, it was clear that building capacity, building strong institutions and changing attitudes is the work of generations, and that a sustained commitment will be required.  
It was observed that capacity building and alternative livelihood programmes to engage with groups (youth) vulnerable to radicalisation, gang membership or criminality often fail to resonate with the target audience. Finding new interventions that respond to the higher levels of risk tolerance, the desire to have status enhancing employment or the prospects of enhancing the social compact are important. | Using some of the efforts to provide alternatives to gang membership in the Americas might be one area of lessons learned or best practice.  
Using lessons learned from Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) projects may be applicable in certain contexts. |
|---|---|---|
| For maximum efficacy, what other actions need to be taken to reinforce capacity building? | Capacity building is not a panacea. Addressing root causes is also important: building up viable socio-economic alternatives, reducing inequality, improving quality of governance and the rule of law are all essential pre-requisites. | Using capacity building as only one intervention in a spectrum of activities that comprise an integrated response.  
Using many of the suggestions above. |
**UNICRI - United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute**

UNICRI is a United Nations entity established in 1965 to support countries worldwide in preventing crime and facilitating criminal justice. As crime becomes increasingly internationalized, new forms of crime emerge, and organized crime spreads, national responses and international cooperation are required in the fields of crime prevention and criminal justice. UNICRI supports governments and the international community at large in tackling criminal threats to social peace, development and political stability. Specifically, UNICRI is mandated to assist intergovernmental, governmental and non-governmental organizations in formulating and implementing improved policies in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice.

UNICRI’s programmes aim to promote national self-reliance and the development of institutional capabilities. To this end, UNICRI provides a one-stop facility offering high-level expertise in crime prevention and criminal justice problems. Technical co-operation is enhanced using action-oriented research to assist in the formulation of improved policies and evidence-based intervention programmes. Institutional and on-the-job training of specialized personnel form an integral part of UNICRI activities. UNICRI’s programmes focus on various areas with the aim of creating and testing new and holistic approaches in preventing crime and promoting justice and development. UNICRI plays a leading role with respect to specific niches and supports the work of other international organizations through its specialized and advanced services.

**TIJ - Thailand Institute of Justice**

TIJ was established by the Royal Thai Government in 2011. It aims to promote excellence in research and capacity-building in crime and justice. Building on Thailand’s engagement in the UN Commission on crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the UN Crime Congresses, TIJ serve as a bridge that transports global ideas to local practice, including in enhancing domestic justice reform and the rules-based community within the ASEAN region.

At the core of TIJ approach is the promotion of criminal justice system reform through the implementation of international standards and norms related to the vulnerable groups in contact with the justice system. TIJ also gears its work towards important cross-cutting issues on the UN agenda such as the rule of law, development, human right, peace and security.

TIJ is a Public Organization. It receives funding from the Thai government but is directly accountable to the Board of Directors which consists of experts from different backgrounds and ex-officio member from justice institutions. To formulate or update the policy and strategic frameworks and to oversee the work of TIJ, the Board of Directors benefits from the counsel of the Special Advisory Board currently chaired by Her Royal Highness Princess Bajakitiyabha Mahidol of Thailand.