MIGRANT DEADLOCK
THE ABYSS
OF CIVILIZATION

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Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Robotics: MAXIMIZE THE BENEFITS, MINIMIZE THE RISKS.

Given the broad societal impact that advancements in AI and robotics are having, it is both prudent to better understand the potential global security implications of such technological advances and, if necessary, to be prepared to take appropriate steps to address these risks.

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Migrant Deadlock
The Abyss of Civilization

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If our goal is to slow migration, then the best way to do so is to work for a more equitable global system. But slowing migration is an odd goal, if the real problem is global inequality.

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The global displacement
by Cindy J. Smith

In the past year the word “emergency” has so frequently been used to describe the migration phenomenon that the two words are seldom used apart. This is because it is indeed, an emergency. Although migration has occurred throughout history, we seem unprepared to protect the victims. In only one of the many examples, from 1970 to 2010, 1,417 million legal migrants from Africa and 4,287 million from Europe moved to the United States. This does not include the illegal migration. Why is society today still unable to protect those who strive to build a better future or escape violence? It has been estimated that in 2016, so far 2,800 people have drowned in the Mediterranean Sea while 206,000 risked their lives to reach Europe by sea. These numbers are growing exponentially while the international community is trying to find solutions. We simply, yet embarrassingly, were not ready when the “new” emergency started.

We need to rethink our policies and practices to save lives. The migration emergency over the last decade, oftentimes associated with criminal phenomena such as smuggling and trafficking in persons, has made it clear that changes are needed in both origin and destination countries.

What has contributed to this emergency?

In the countries of origin, the number of conflicts and its ramifications, and the scale and pace of illegal migration are contributing to the mass exodus. In countries of destination, fear and reduced confidence in economic and security systems are generating sentiments of prejudice and racism. The addition of the growing threat of violent extremism to the two connected realities is alarming.

With regards to the spread of conflicts across the world, this is contributing to the emergency. Today, levels of instability are affecting countries such as Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, South Sudan, and Yemen. There is concern that countries in conflict will continue to increase in number.

The interdependence between migrants, natives and violent extremists begins with the scale and pace of the number of people crossing the borders illegally, causing alarm in destination countries. The emerging phenomenon of violent extremism has served to exacerbate tensions in destination countries and augments the feeling of exposure to threats among its population. Migrants, too, feel imperilled and
leave their homes, among other reasons, as a result of the actions taken by violent extremists operating in and around the regions in which they live. The population in the destination countries also may react with fear and xenophobia, contributing to the increased vulnerabilities of migrants, through the rise of populist movements claiming to defend their homeland against the unstoppable influx of newcomers.

Has there been a shift in our thinking? Did we backtrack from promoting the ideas of globalization and striving to create a more interconnected world where persons and goods, capacities and knowledge can circulate to trigger prosperity and dialogue among populations? Each day we witness nations taking a step backward; reluctance and fear in accepting diversity, the closing of frontiers, and the dissolution of long-standing partnerships. The ideological perception of migrants is generating debates that are not conducive to finding solutions. We have reached a point where we are fully aware of the challenges. It is not only a matter of who is hosting the migrants. Instead, it is about how can we translate our principles, respect for human rights and for people’s dignity, the rule of law and development into concrete actions.

Now is the time to find effective answers. During an interview by UNICRI of a group of undocumented migrants housed in a reception centre, many described the numerous abuses suffered during their travel. They were asked if in hindsight, with the knowledge of the hardships they went through they would attempt the journey again. They did not hesitate when they answered “yes,” because faced with the only opportunity to escape violence or poverty in their own country; this was what they saw as their sole option.

How can we address the needs of those in need of protection and opportunities? And what are the possible solutions?

First, origin and destination countries need to work together to find a common strategy. The response to the emergency that includes rescue operations - especially along the Mediterranean coast - needs parallel long term political and economic answers that transcend the life of political parties and politicians. Moreover, international cooperation could be more effective in origin countries: for example, an alternative to creating detention centres to stop migrants could be to support development in countries of origin. Aid could be conditioned to clear criteria, including transparency and inclusiveness where sustainability is key. Local populations, profiting from international cooperation would include benefiting from the natural resources in their home countries and taking advantage of advances in technologies in a more effective way. It is equally fundamental to improve preparedness and resiliency to natural disasters. Legal frameworks for economic migration in both the origin and destination countries should be enhanced to regulate the phenomena in a way that does not leave space for traffickers and smugglers. Much more should be done to stop organized crime and terrorist groups from taking advantage of people’s vulnerabilities to raise the funds for their operations.

Second, we need to reaffirm a principle of global belonging. The migration emergency is displacing our own principles of equality and fundamental human rights and in many countries is spreading fear more than solidarity. We have created a global market, but not a global community sharing the objective of a peaceful and wealthy world. In the UN Charter, We the peoples of the United Nations determined

- to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
- to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and
- to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
- to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom...

It is time to address our weak integration policies and the economic segregation that is forming and consolidating. Violent extremism further complicates this matter by potentially influencing the new generation of migrants and native young people who feel displaced because of migrants. Despite
long-standing efforts made by governments, real integration of immigrants in hosting societies has not yet reached the level desired. The process may be undermined by several factors (some of these include living in deteriorated and poor neighbourhoods of urban centres, facing discrimination, difficulties in finding or maintaining a cultural identity accepted by the hosting society, lack of a real dialogue with the natives), and further, the lack of integration may lead to unemployment, alienation and frustration, which can consequently create the conditions for social conflicts and delinquency among immigrants.

While the lack of integration may lead to social conflicts and deviance, criminal behaviour among immigrants harms their opportunities for integration. This problem mainly affects young immigrants, whose sense of not-belonging or frustration may lead them towards the criminal groups who promise and deliver a feeling of belonging and ultimately damage their process of integration.

We need to consider the fact that policies affecting immigrants are often drawn up by governments without the participation and support of target group. The lack of interaction and joint strategies between natives and immigrants represent the most evident deficiency in the current integration efforts.

Our society is perceiving the butterfly effect: small causes can have large effects and what occurs in one place reverberates to another. We are learning this but we still do not capitalize enough on our failures.

A few months ago, the world leaders endorsed the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development for a world free from violence and exploitation. The Agenda’s goal is a world in which all legal, social and economic barriers are removed; a just, tolerant and socially inclusive world in which the needs of the most vulnerable are met. Utopic and far-removed as it may seem to some, the goal, in time, is attainable. It is today more than ever before that this Agenda is needed to protect the global citizens we have worked so hard to become, as it is now more than ever that we have the capacity to strive towards these aims and achieve them.
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EU Customs at the border of the Union intercepted counterfeit food for a total value of Euro 2,219,300

How many kilos of counterfeit food would you eat in 2016?
Migrants as victims: victimological perspectives of human smuggling and human trafficking

by Michael Kilchling

1. Introduction
The ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe touches on fundamental issues of international law, criminal policy, criminology – and victimology. Public perception of and opinions on human trafficking, human smuggling and the situation of migrants in general is in a state of flux; perceptions and opinions are heavily influenced by media depictions and highly dependent on the general political climate of a society. Political, public and even academic debates are often polarizing events that are characterized by stereotyp-
Migrant deadlock: the abyss of civilization
Migrants as victims - victimological perspectives of human smuggling and human trafficking

Critical arguments. In the course of such debates, distinct phenomena such as trafficking (THB) and smuggling of humans are often mixed to the point that differences between the two become increasingly blurred. The treatment of migrants under international law is equally ambivalent. The two main phenomena of interest for criminal policy – trafficking versus the smuggling of humans – are addressed in the two amending Protocols to the 2000 UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention): the Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking, and the Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air. In the latter text, migrants are perceived as offenders rather than victims, in particular in the context of illegal smuggling. This is due to the fact that they represent the demand side of the illegal smuggling services, and it is this demand that is considered to be the main incentive for this branch of organized crime.

This approach is reflected in the design of the related national statutory offences in which the migrants appear as co-perpetrators. Moreover, many jurisdictions have adopted a concept in which the illegal entry is the principal crime whereas human smuggling is legally designated as assistance – aiding and abetting – to the crime of the migrant. This concept is traceable even in those penal codes in which the assisting part has, in the meantime, been upgraded to a principal crime.

However, the current legal situation – neither the international legal framework nor the statutory provisions implemented in major jurisdictions – does not reflect the victimological reality of migration. The distinction between trafficking and smuggling creates a significant divide in the treatment of victims. The same is true in regard to public, political and academic discussions which tend to neglect the reality of migration, which is characterized by the fact that not only victims of human trafficking but migrants in general are explicitly vulnerable and exposed to a multitude of victimization risks. These will be explained and analyzed in more detail in the following sections.

Two similar pictures:

The setting is more or less the same. However, on picture 1 the refugees appear as (dangerous) invaders, on picture 2 as victims in acute danger. It is just a matter of perspective based on which completely different public perception can be reached.

2. Defining victimhood
Victimology distinguishes between various definitions of victimhood. Genuine victimological definitions are independent of, and broader than, definitions of criminal victimization found in legal codes. Non-criminal victimization includes categories such as human rights violations, discrimination and other forms of systematic injustice. The UN Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power have adopted such a broad definition.

A very common definition is based on the different dimensions of victimization. Primary victimization refers to material and/or physical and/or psychological (emotional) harm caused by the immediate victimizing event (crime) which can be a
single (one-time) or a repeat event (re-victimization, serial or multiple re-victimization). Secondary victimization has its focus on re-traumatization and the consolidation of primary damages and their consequences which can be reinforced or fortified through relatives and/or social surroundings, through various instances of social control (police, criminal justice system) or through the media. Tertiary victimization addresses the longitudinal effects of primary and secondary victimization.

The distinction between trafficking and smuggling creates a significant divide in the treatment of victims

Victimization can be further be classified according to the degree of involvement. Besides the direct victims, further persons can be affected as so-called indirect victims. Family members of a direct victim often fall within this group; indeed, to demonstrate the significance of family members as indirect victims, the renowned German victimologist Hans-Joachim Schneider once introduced the term “co-victims”. Highly affected indirect victims are certainly persons who have lost a family member through a lethal victimization. It is likely that most of the drowned migrants who were shipwrecked in the Mediterranean Sea because of the profit-driven overfilling of boats have co-victimized families who neither receive adequate victim support nor any public attention. In the aftermath of the mass victimizations in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia and other regions, an additional differentiation between individual and collective victims has been acknowledged. Quite regularly, victimized members of ethnic minorities suffer more intensively as they have been hurt not only as individuals but simultaneously as members of a group. Christians emigrating from Syria or Yazidis from Iraq and Syria are just two recent examples that received some international attention. And finally, subjective perception is an important factor of victimhood: dependent on the concrete circumstances of an actual victimizing event, subjective feelings can be perceived totally differently from the objective incident.

Migrants can fall under any of the typologies addressed by these definitions. The typologies can be of relevance in all the typical victimization risks that refugees face, as will be explained in the following section.

3. Victimization risks of migrants

Migrants are exposed to manifold risks of victimization, and many of them have suffered from victimization – occasionally, repeatedly and sometimes even systematically. Such victimization risks can be categorized alongside their individual biography of emigration and immigration:

Prior to emigration, direct or indirect victimization in the home country or the place of origin can be an important driving force for the individual decision to leave the country, either alone or with the family or parts of it. Further risks can arise in the preparation of their journey.

During the migration phase, refugees are most likely to be threatened by various direct or indirect victimizing situations in countries of transit; particular risks come up in connection with border transfers.

Not enough, exposure to direct or indirect victimization often continues to occur subsequent to arrival in the place of destination.

Victimization in the country of origin

Life conditions marked by repeat or multiple experiences of victimhood are important determinants for the decision to migrate; in the literature they are referred to as a significant push factor. Whereas war is currently the main focus of attention (and which enjoys common consensus as a legitimate ground for flight) other threats such as killings of relatives or neighbors, displacement, political oppression, continuous ethnic or religious discrimination are not less traumatizing. Natural or environmental disasters, the loss of basic life resources (eco-
nomic, social, healthcare, etc.), pervasive corruption or chaotic economic or social life conditions can be similarly harmful. According to article 18 of the UN Basic Principles, desperate life conditions can be considered as victimologically relevant. Preparation of the escape often produces further risks of impairment through theft or torching of property left behind or through extortion or deceit when property has to be sold at any price to generate at least a bit of income for the financing of the journey abroad. While reflecting the pros and cons of emigration, when the decision to leave enters the phase of concrete planning and preparation, individuals are also vulnerable to human traffickers.

Victimization during the transit stage
During transit, migrants are prone to a variety of victimization risks and are extremely vulnerable, due to the loss of their regular social networks and the situational reduction of their individual resources for self-defence. Deprivation of liberty, assault, aggression and violence by police and border control forces are as prevalent as corruption and arbitrary treatment by civil service agents which include police, border control and immigration officers, but also members of military or para-military forces, or, as currently in some regions in the Middle East, ISIS and other terrorist groups. Additional victimization risks faced by refugees include fraud, harassment, extortion and racketeering by smugglers or traffickers, theft, robbery, extortion, harassment, assault and even killings by criminals or ordinary citizens of the transit region, as well as theft, robbery, extortion, harassment, assault and killings by other migrants.

According to article 18 of the UN Basic Principles, desperate life conditions can be considered as victimologically relevant

Particular risks exist in the context of border transfers. This becomes explicitly prevalent when refugees do not have some or all of the necessary papers or transfer titles. A first imminent source of endangerment under such circumstances are systemic-structural risks arising from the need to conquer natural barriers, such as drown-
These menaces have become most prevalent in the current refugee crisis, and have led to thousands of victims drowned in the Mediterranean Sea. Risks further arise from technical systems of border control; these can be alarm systems, fences, razor-wired barriers or even mines or similar lethal installations. Hazards can, finally, arise from inter-personal interaction or confrontation in the context of so-called control encounters. Besides the fact that these can be another situational cause for corrupt exploitation, such encounters are prone to produce hazards linked to the use of weapons, firearms or physical violence (including bites from police dogs). These latter examples point to a further category of indirect personal risks which may arise from traffic accidents caused by stress related to the escape, or the attempt to escape, such encounters; voluntary acts of desperation or even cases of suicide have been witnessed, too.

**Victimization risks at destination**

At the place of destination vulnerability continues. The risk of victimization is higher for immigrants than for the regular population. Risk factors include the loss of the cultural environment, the lack of or interruption of social bonds, insufficient integration in the new society, low trust in state institutions and - particularly for illegal immigrants - the fear of being detected and expelled. Refugees quite often face discrimination, xenophobia, hate crime and aggression by citizens of the host country. Inter-group and intra-group pressures are as prevalent as victimizations from property crime and violent crime including sexual harassment and exploitation in camps and mass dwellings. Exclusion from the regular labor market can increase exposure to and involvement in trafficking.
or other criminal activities. Unfriendly treatment in every-day life and status-related criminalization can further increase the perception of unfair treatment and contribute to the perpetuation of stress symptoms or stress disorder from prior victimization and traumatization.

4. Specific victimization risks in the context of THB
Victims of human trafficking are in a somewhat different situation. On the one hand, they may have a lower risk of – occasional, unrelated – victimization during the transit than migrants, because traffickers often have an interest to keep control and to protect ‘their’ victims in order to make sure that they reach the country of destination in relatively good physical condition. On the whole, the victims of trafficking may therefore have a safer journey than migrants who place their lives in the hands of reckless smugglers. On the other hand, these victims are systematically exposed to continuous, systematic victimization once they arrive at their destination. Besides their ‘core’ victimization though sexual or labor exploitation, they suffer from intimidation, coercion, abduction, threats, use of force, deceit, fraud, etc. An additional component is the increased threat of indirect victimization in cases where family members or friends in the victims’ home country become the subject of intimidation or extortion.

5. Need for more political support of migrant victims
This short article has shown that all groups of migrants are explicitly vulnerable and, at the same time, exposed to increased risks of victimization. It is not too speculative to assume that only a very small minority of migrants have never suffered from any victimization throughout their odyssey. On the contrary, many of their personal biographies would disclose horrible records of victimization and trauma experienced at home, during transit and even later in their place of destination. In addition to specific risks related to their status as migrants, they also face the same risk as any other citizens of becoming victims of conventional crimes which have not been specifically highlighted here.

In light of the plethora of threats to which all migrants are exposed (and which have been sketched here only very briefly) the question has to be put forward as to whether they receive sufficient protection through international law. To date there are significant differences in international victim-policies which are symbolized by the different standards of support for and protection of victims as provided for by the 2000 Palermo Protocol no. 1 on trafficking in human beings.
the one hand, and Protocol no. 2 on the smuggling of migrants on the other. Whereas the THB Protocol has a strong focus on victim protection and victim support, the smuggling Protocol appears, first and foremost, to be an instrument of criminalization – notwithstanding the fact that the latter includes at least a few provisions addressing some victimological aspects, in particular in its article 5 which provides that migrants shall not be liable to criminal prosecution for the fact of having been smuggled.

This obvious distinction between the two groups of victims certainly contributes to the public perception that migrants are criminals. More generally, they do not meet the common stereotype of the ideal victim. Unlike victims of THB who enjoy a privileged status of protection, ‘ordinary’ migrants can at best enjoy general standards of victim assistance and victim protection effective at their destination – at least in jurisdictions in which access to protection has not been barred for victims who have been involved in any kind of illegal activity before. Otherwise, it can happen that the legitimate victim status of migrants is denied just for the fact of having passed a state border illegally. This is in contradiction to one of the basic principles of justice for victims according to which the same victim rights shall be applicable to all, without distinction of any kind (1985 Declaration, para 4). Ultimately, the question is whether a politically motivated differentiation into two groups with two different standards of protection can be justified, especially in light of the enormous victimization risks to which all migrants are exposed.

The victims of trafficking may therefore have a safer journey than migrants who place their lives in the hands of reckless smugglers.

The author

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Mediterranean migration towards Europe: system failure?

by Karoline Popp

The Mediterranean has historically been a space of exchange, contact, and conquest. Migration – in all directions – has always been part of the cultural, political and economic negotiation around “Mare Nostrum.” Few things, however, have thrown European identities and the European political project into question more than the recent movement of migrants and refugees across the Mediterranean. In 2014, more than 170,000 migrants reached Italian shores on maritime routes. Italy was the prime landing site for boats, departing mostly from Libya. Approximately a quarter of those crossing were Syrian refugees, while the remainder came from West Africa, Eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa. In 2015,

the phenomenon transformed from a “Mediterranean problem” into a European-wide one, with a marked shift from the Central Mediterranean Route (from North Africa to Italy) to the Eastern Mediterranean Route (from Turkey towards Greece and along the Balkan route towards Central, Western and Northern Europe). Between January and mid-December 2015, more than 800,000 individuals arrived in Greece, compared to 150,000 in Italy during the same period. The distribution in 2016 to date has remained roughly the same with 147,000 arrivals in Greece and 13,000 in Italy (see infographic).²

With a view to the Europe-

an policymaker’s perspective, this article outlines the causes, trends and patterns of migration between North Africa, the Middle East and Europe in the period 2014 to early 2016 that should serve to inform political analysis and policy approaches.

A crisis announced

Why now? While the large-scale arrivals in Europe in 2015 came as a surprise to many, the writing has arguably been on the wall. Libya had not regained its stability since the 2011 conflict but instead descended into further chaos in mid-2014. Yet, it is often forgotten that Libya is traditionally a major magnet for migrant labour in the region and, despite the large-scale departure of migrant workers amidst the fighting in 2011, many returned and continue to enter Libya for work to this day, especially from Egypt, but also through Niger.³

In conjunction with the growing lawlessness, the large migrant populations for whom Libya is a transit or destination country spelled perfect conditions for people smuggling.

With no end in sight to the war in Syria, hope has been dwindling for the displaced and conflict-affected populations inside Syria, and those in protracted displacement outside. Living conditions in Syria itself and in the main host countries, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, have become increasingly precarious for Syrian refugees. Cuts in basic humanitarian assistance – including food⁴ – are likely to have accentuated the underlying despair. In addition to worries over basic subsistence, the onward migration of Syrians is also an expression of a desire for a more stable future,

² IOM Missing Migrants Project http://missingmigrants.iom.int/en. See also http://migration.iom.int/europe/. This article was finalised in late March 2016. Numbers and trends are constantly changing and more up-to-date data can be found here IOM Missing Migrants Project http://missingmigrants.iom.int/en and http://migration.iom.int/


⁴ World Food Programme Forced To Make Deeper Cuts In Food Assistance For Syrian Refugees Due To Lack Of Funding (1 July 2015) https://www.wfp.org/news
in particular for an overwhelmingly youthful population seeking educational and professional opportunities. However, IOM surveys indicate that up to 90 per cent of Syrians travelling on the Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan route, in fact, departed directly from Syria and only spent a few weeks or even days in transit countries such as Jordan, Lebanon or Turkey. Some of the most important triggers for the movements may therefore be found in Syria itself, including intensified conscription efforts by the Syrian armed forces. This could also go some way towards explaining the large proportion of young men from relatively well-educated, urban, middle class background among the refugees.

In short, changes inside Syria (especially conscription), desperation (from a life in limbo), opportunity (in the form of ever greater availability of information and facilitation of irregular migration), networks (of the growing number of compatriots already present in Europe), but also a certain “now-or-never” mentality deriving from an educated guess that Europe’s doors will not remain “open” for long, have culminated in the current dynamic that has become almost self-perpetuating.

Who moves (and who doesn’t)

While the attention is firmly on Syrian refugees, it is worth taking a closer look at the diversity of populations crossing the Mediterranean. On the Eastern Mediterranean route, Syrians were the largest group by far, with 455,000, more than half of those arriving in Greece in 2015, followed by Afghans and Iraqis. Arrivals in Italy were more diverse, with Syrians only taking fifth place in 2015 after Eritreans, Somalis, Nigerians and Sudanese. Late 2015 and early 2016, by contrast, saw West African nationalities – especially Nigeria, Gambia, Senegal, Mali and Guinea – dominating the route towards Italy.

The changes in the routes and populations between 2014 and 2016 are not incidental and at least three considerations should inform possible solutions: firstly, they illustrate – once again – that migration routes are flexible and adaptable, usually outpacing those trying to study or track them. Closing off one route will open up another; and populations not seen in a certain location today may well appear tomorrow. Turkey is the latest in a series of countries closing off visa-free entry for Syrian nationals, and in combination with the measures agreed upon between the European Union and Turkey in March 2016, there is room for speculation about yet another shift in routes, including a renewed rise of numbers in the Central Mediterranean or entirely new paths, such as the “Northern Route” or via Mauritania.9

While the large-scale arrivals in Europe in 2015 came as a surprise to many, the writing has arguably been on the wall

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See also: Profiling of Syrian arrivals on Greek islands in February 2016 http://reliefweb.int

6 A recent IOM study on Iraqi migration to Europe similarly indicated that “no hope for the future” was the primary reason for the decision to migrate. See http://www.iom.int/news


8 See IOM Mixed Migration Flows in the Mediterranean and Beyond – Compilation of Available Data and Information 17 Mar 2016 http://doic.iom.int/docs

9 Informal information via IOM offices. See also for example http://www.reuters.com/article

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Secondly, the characteristics of those on the move to and through North Africa and the Middle East and towards Europe are diverse and one solution will not fit all. There is certainly truth in the simplification that migration to Europe broadly combines individuals with mainly economic motivations and those fleeing persecution and war. But it remains a simplification of far more complex, layered and textured realities that shape migration decisions, where questions of safety and survival combine with economic needs and aspirations.  

Therefore, targeting just one migrant category or oversimplifying the reasons for migration may risk excluding some groups or potential solutions a priori. Blanket declarations of “safe countries of origin” could foster similarly undifferentiated responses.

Thirdly, not everybody moves, and of those who do, not all move to Europe. It is easy to lose a sense of proportion or an appreciation of the fact that migrants still constitute a small percentage of the overall population. Most migration takes place regionally, in particular to neighbouring countries, and the same is true for refugee flows.  

In a similar vein, there is good evidence that many of those departing Libya by boat had not intended to do so but felt compelled by the insecurity in Libya to leave.  

Of villains and travel agents  

Much attention has been paid to the role of people smugglers in organizing – and profiting from – migration across the Mediterranean. While an element of transnational organized crime is undeniably at play in organizing migration across the Mediterranean, responses deriving purely from law enforcement, security

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11 For example, the vast majority of Syrian refugees are hosted by countries neighbouring Syria. Concerning migration from the Horn of Africa, see analyses by RMMS, e.g. A Nairobi: Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat.

and criminal justice approaches may not reach far enough.

**Smuggling thrives in response to a demand for migration that is not met through other, legal channels**

Research suggests that smuggling networks operating in North Africa are more like loose chains than tight webs: generally with a person at the top of the hierarchy who never interacts with migrants but reaps the profits, and with layers of front men - often of the same nationality as the migrants - carrying out the daily “dirty work”. Hardly ever is anyone involved in a smuggling network found on the migrant boats. As such, networks can recombine and adapt rapidly. Furthermore, the image of the ruthless, mafia-like villain does not always hold: especially in settings where smuggling is decentralized and popularized, rule of law is weak or absent, and alternative economic opportunities are scarce, smuggling activities can be likened to a form of income generation rather than to criminal operations. Lastly, smuggling thrives in response to a demand for migration that is not met through other, legal channels. In other words, smuggling is in many ways a symptom, rather than cause of the problem.

**No band-aids for system failure**

The temptation is great to reduce the problem to “the Syrian crisis”, “smuggling networks” or “rule of law in Libya.” A partial analysis is likely to lead to piecemeal solutions addressing only certain groups or certain aspects of the phenomenon. According to most experts, the proposal to create so-called “processing centres” in North Africa – questions of legality and political feasibility aside – would at best be ignored and avoided by migrants as irrelevant to them, and at worst turn into a new generation of long-term refugee camps, creating fertile grounds for smugglers, and facilitating mass deportations by host governments. Underlying this is the desire to frame the current situation as a moment of exception that will soon pass,
rather than a “new normal.”

Two basic tenets should be at the core of any approach to the Mediterranean situation and migration in general: first, an honest acceptance that migration is here to stay, and second, that the current predicament is not borne out of a single humanitarian crisis, but a series of political, developmental and humanitarian failures. The obvious fact that these will not be rectified or resolved in the near future should not engender resignation. Instead, it should sharpen the focus on what could be possible: more legal migration options, whether for refugees, workers, or students; more circular mobility; more investment in integration and social cohesion; access to labour markets and livelihoods and development-based approaches, to mention a few. Any response should also include an honest examination of the impact of other European policies towards the Middle East and North Africa, especially in the realm of trade. Lastly, it does not diminish the suffering of migrant men, women and children to say that there is an inherent opportunity in the challenge and choices European societies and leaders have to face: whether to revert to defensive and anachronistic reflexes or to face up to a more diverse, more mobile future.

The author

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The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not represent an official position of IOM.
Introduction and problem analysis

It is self-evident that large-scale migration of people has consequences for the communities they arrive into. We live in a world that is experiencing growing populations (often with expanding numbers of middle class people who are more likely to move) and that is increasingly interconnected. Most analyses therefore indicate that the majority of countries in the world face increasing people movement, often people moving for short durations and for a range of reasons. Governments will thus increasingly be expected to grapple with the consequences of migration for communities on the ground.

There is a lot of academic evidence on the impacts on communities of migration. How can such research help inform the choices made by policy makers and governments to respond more effectively to the challenges?

Research offers answers but it is worth being clear upfront that the research offers many answers because the literature is vast: literature reviews that use search terms for “migration” and “social cohesion”
(even when additional terms are included that are related, such as “integration”) cover upwards of ten thousand papers. Even if it were possible to sift and organize such a literature, drawing out a clear answer is unlikely to succeed as every major academic review of migration, integration and social cohesion underlines the fact that the terms and definitions are contested. Just as importantly, research definitions of migration are not widely shared. An “immigrant” in the UN definition — widely accepted by governments — is a person borne outside of a country that moves to another country with the intention of staying 12 months or more. However, this definition does not equate to most people’s notions of migrants or foreigners. As a result, no one agrees on what an integrated or socially cohesive society that incorporates immigrants looks like.

The majority of countries in the world face increasing people movement, often people moving for short durations and for a range of reasons

In previous work for the UK’s Migration Advisory Committee, we took an inductive rather than a deductive approach to the question of how migration impacts social cohesion, looking at the different clusters of research work that have been undertaken on the subject (especially quantitative studies). Acknowledging an inevitable degree of authorial curation, we outlined three areas that researchers have concentrated on. These three areas map to three foundational questions:

1. **Who are we?** Social cohesion and integration is often seen as important to the (national or federal) identity of the country. In part, integration policies and measures may be deployed to respond to the perceived dilution of distinctive national identities. This crisis has been both fueled by and reflected in the rise of far-right, anti-immigrant political movements that are principally concerned with perceived cultural threats. The national or federal level matters a lot,
even if it is only in the sense of imagined social cohesion.

2. Are they like us and can they become us? Much research refers to the outcomes of immigrants themselves — whether particular ethnic groups have jobs, what level of education they attain, whether they commit crime at certain levels and so on. Typically the debates are related to empirical measures that reflect how well immigrants (or the children of immigrants) are doing compared to the societal average.

3. Can we live together? This is perhaps best understood as communities that are safe and where residents coexist harmoniously and demonstrate respect for one another. Most quantitative studies are based on data that ask variants of the question of how people “get along” with their neighbours. Qualitative work — often long-term ethnographic work — provides further, rich insights into how communities interact. At heart though, social cohesion is about place and specifically local communities and neighbourhoods.

It is important to note that these three clusters are not mutually exclusive. A socially cohesive community (as reported by local residents) may be affected by changing national identity or whether new or established migrant groups are doing well or badly in the labour market for example. Naturally this has policy implications too. A shared sense of national identity, emphasised

in government strategy towards integration and cohesion, can draw on, or repel, immigrant national or ethnic identity and their ability to be included in different spheres of life.

A shared sense of national identity, emphasised in government strategy towards integration and cohesion, can draw on, or repel, immigrant national or ethnic identity and their ability to be included in different spheres of life.

Defining success

The most important decision for governments, in our view, is to clearly articulate the goals of policy in respect of migration and social cohesion and what might constitute success.

This is far from straightforward because of at least three complexities.

The first complexity is that integration and social cohesion is both a means and an end. To decide the ideal endpoint, which governments need to do, may require trade offs — for instance the goal might be to see immigrants integrated on the basis of a basket of objective indicators or the goal might be local cohesive communities on the basis of enduring good relationships between neighbours. To set goals in priority order when in the middle of a dynamic, shifting process is hard but necessary if governments are to make and assess progress towards an endpoint.

Second, immigrant groups may have very different outcomes and trajectories depending on what sphere of human life one is discussing. Different immigrants and immigrant groups have significantly different voting patterns, settlement patterns, types of social and cultural interactions, employment and wage rates, civic participation rates, and so on. Incisive analysis of immigrant integration needs to disaggregate migrants according to factors which may influence their integration outcomes — in particular their origin country, length of residency and skill levels. Analysis should also not lump together different forms of migration — the pattern of integration outcomes is likely to be very different for refugees than labour migrants arriving in a country for work for example. Ultimately, the key to understanding whether or not governments are making progress is whether the trend is
towards a narrowing (success) or widening (failure) with the majority population.

Last, as many studies show, much of the integration gap or social cohesion problems are down to the majority society (through laws, customs, attitudes) that are responsible in part for the under achievement. The literature is clear that the attitudes and behaviours (typically through institutions) of the existing population have an important bearing on integration outcomes (in employment, housing, marriage etc.) for immigrants.

Management of social cohesion

Research offers different answers to the questions of living together that point in different directions. For instance, researchers - such as Robert Puttnam - have indicated that there is a trade off between diversity and cohesion (i.e. the increase in diversity that is a consequence of migration weakens community cohesion). Other research, including our work, suggests there is no evidence for this, at least in Europe, and social cohesion in communities is driven by poverty levels and public service delivery, and not by immigrants themselves. However, this does not mean that a sudden influx of immigration will not cause local issues and negatively affect social cohesion. Immigrants may, for example, affect community stability or be perceived to drain public resources. A rapid influx of newcomers usually entails lower per-person funding of public services, and for major influxes there is inevitably going to be significant and difficult adjustment. However, in the longer term there is no evidence that immigrants or the diversity they produce negatively affect neighborhood cohesion.

There are important insights here for the management of immigration. For instance, where opinion regarding immigrants in local communities is particularly sensitive, it is useful to know how far this is connected to the scale or proportion of immigrant settlement. It may be that the crucial destabilizer is not absolute numbers but rather the rate of settlement across relatively short time periods.

There is no evidence that immigrants or the diversity they produce negatively affect neighborhood cohesion

Overall though, the explanations for different research findings are likely to be found in differences in historical and institutional contexts. Country context matters for social cohesion, far more than it does for other areas of public policy. For example, projections of national identity typically draw on heritage and tradition;
immigrant group outcomes depend on levels of institutional discrimination and openness of labour markets or education systems; and how communities think of their new neighbours depends on the pre-existing state of their neighbourhood, and so on.

In the final analysis, social cohesion and immigrant outcomes are more affected by broad currents of public policy: active labour-market policy interventions, the state of the economy, regional economic drivers, public spending on deprived areas, and education policies for example. Providing targeted resources (especially to deal with short-term influxes) and ensuring leadership encourages opportunities for all (starting with inclusive rhetoric) within a system that manages diversity and has strong non-discrimination norms offers the best chance of increasing social cohesion in the face of migration.

Bibliography


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Given the broad societal impact that advancements in AI and robotics are having, it is both prudent to better understand the potential global security implications of such technological advances and, if necessary, to be prepared to take appropriate steps to address these risks.

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The term “environmental refugees” was used for the first time in 1985, when the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) researcher Essam El-Hinnawi defined these persons as those “who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life.”

Whereas it has been demonstrated that phenomena linked to climate change are among the main causes of populations movement, it is also true that these people do not belong to any well-defined category of subjects of international law that can guarantee their protection.

The impact of climate change on people’s lives

It has been reported that between 2008 and 2014, sudden-onset disasters, such as the Haiti earthquake of 2010 or Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines of 2013, caused the displacement of 184 million people, with an average of 26.4 million people leaving their homes per year. In 2013, people obliged to flee their habitat by disasters were almost three times as many as those forced to flee their homes by conflicts. It has to be noted that numbers of people are excluded from this statistic such as those who had to move due to of the effects of rising sea levels, desertification, and environmental degradation. All of which are not considered disasters because of their very slow nature.

In 2013, people obliged to flee their habitat by disasters were almost three times as many than those forced to flee their homes by conflicts. The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) recently presented a new analysis emphasising that 2015 was the hottest year on record. Last year 98.6 million people were affected by disasters and, according to UNISDR, “Climate was a factor in 92% of those events.” The natural disasters producing the greatest impact were droughts: in comparison to the ten-year annual average, drought rates have more than doubled in number, affecting 50.5 million people, particularly in Africa. Floods were the phenomenon that had the second greatest impact in 2015.

Another climate change phenomenon, more “silent” but of equal relevance for the people affected, is the slow-onset degradation that is dramatically impacting some low-lying devel-

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2 Nansen Initiative, Global Consultation Report, October 2015.
5 Ibid.
oping countries and small island states, which are expected to become uninhabitable. The last report issued by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) emphasises that “Due to sea level rise projected throughout the 21st century and beyond, coastal systems and low-lying areas will increasingly experience adverse impacts such as submergence, coastal flooding, and coastal erosion.”

Scientists agree that climate change, in combination with other factors, will cause an increase of people displacement in the future. Moreover, according to the IPCC report, “Displacement risk increases when populations that lack the resources for planned migration experience higher exposure to extreme weather events, in both rural and urban areas, particularly in developing countries with low income.” It has been reported that 97% of disaster-related displacement, between 2008 and 2013, occurred within developing countries. In addition, climate change is also expected to have an indirect impact on increased risk of violent conflicts, such as civil war and inter-group violence.

The issue of protection of people on the move in international law

While it is clear that climate change produces a serious impact on migration and displacement, it is also true that it is quite difficult to identify a direct link between the two phenomena. The reason is that different communities perceive the impacts of climate change differently, depending on their political, economic and social conditions. Their ability to cope with the same type of sudden or slow-onset disaster and their resilience are therefore different. This obviously affects people’s mobility decisions.

It is more common that displaced people affected by a sud-

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7 Ibid.


10 Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, 2015.
den or slow-onset disaster stay within the borders of their home country. In this case, the state has the obligation, under national and international law, to respect their rights and to protect them. On the other hand, when they move to a foreign country, there is no specific legal instrument that regulates how these migrants have to be treated for what concerns their permission to stay and their protection.

Two main international legal instruments exist with the aim of protecting the rights of people who move to a foreign country for different reasons: the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990).

Refugees are a very precise legally-defined category of people including anyone who, “Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.” When a sudden or slow-onset disaster happens, only if the state discriminates against some specific group of people in giving assistance, can those people who do not receive protection be considered as persecuted and therefore entitled to international protection. In the same way, if the disaster is caused by some action or inaction imputable to a discriminatory attitude by the state towards a particular group of people, these people could fall into the refugee category. However, migrants who cross borders for reasons connected to climate change and cannot demonstrate persecution by the criteria defined in the Convention cannot be considered refugees. This is why the term “environmental refugees” is not legally correct (although it stresses very well the need of protection of this category of persons).

On the other hand, a migrant worker is defined as anyone who is not compelled to move but does so to conduct “a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national.”

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11 Volker Türk (UHNCR), Remarks at Discussion Forum on Climate Change, June 2014. [www.unhcr.org/542e99719.pdf](http://www.unhcr.org/542e99719.pdf)

12 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, Article 1 (A) (2).

13 Volker Türk (UHNCR), Remarks at Discussion Forum on Climate Change, June 2014. [www.unhcr.org/342e99719.pdf](http://www.unhcr.org/342e99719.pdf)

14 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families
Even if some decide to live and work in a foreign country do so as a consequence of the impact of climate change on their country of origin, it does not mean that they are entitled to international protection. In addition, the Convention does not guarantee the right to be admitted to or stay in a foreign country.\(^{15}\)

**Scientists agree that climate change, in combination with other factors, will cause an increase of people displacement in the future**

In general, International Human Rights Law obliges all States to respect and protect human rights of all people within their territory or jurisdiction, even those who are not citizens of the state. If people do not fall within the refugee category, but face risks such as arbitrary deprivation of life, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, then they can enjoy the so-called “complementary protection” by a foreign state and avoid being forced to return to their home country. However, complementary protection does not seem to be the right solution for people moving due to the impact of climate change. In fact, courts have ruled that poverty and lack of resources do not correspond to inhuman or degrading treatment (unless the situation is imposed by the state), and that the harm feared has to be relatively immediate to be a condition for protection.\(^{16}\) As a consequence it is not likely that people fleeing from disasters, and even less those escaping slow environmental degradation, could enjoy this kind of protection.\(^{17}\) Indeed, in 2014 two cases involving some small island-states’ inhabitants asking for international assistance on the basis of complementary protection were rejected exactly because of the lack of immediate danger.\(^{18}\)

**The way forward**

In short, international human rights law does not address the issues of people’s admission to and stay in a foreign country following a sudden or slow-onset disaster connected to climate change. However, the international community is in the process of identifying a practical solution to this legal protection gap.

**Migrants who cross borders for reasons connected to climate change and cannot demonstrate persecution by the criteria defined by the Convention cannot be considered refugees**

It seems that for the time being an international convention is not feasible\(^{19}\) it would need complex negotiations and would take time. However, many other tools can be used to address the issue, such as developing and sharing good practices, and

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\(^{15}\) Walter Kälin and Nina Schrepfer (UNHCR Division of International Protection), Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change. Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches, February 2012.


\(^{17}\) Ibid.

\(^{18}\) The two cases involved people moving from Kiribati and from Tuvalu, two small island-states of Oceania (cited in Jane McAdam & Marc Limon - Universal Rights Group, Policy Report: Human Rights, Climate Change and Cross-border Displacement, August 2015).

\(^{19}\) The Nansen Initiative, more than 100 governments affirm broad support to better protect people displaced across borders by disasters and the effects of climate change (Press Release), October 2015. [https://www.nanseninitiative.org/](https://www.nanseninitiative.org/).
adopting soft law instruments, like bilateral and multilateral agreements and context-specific policies informed by human rights principles.

International Human Rights Law does not address the issues of people’s admission to and stay in a foreign country following a sudden or slow-onset disaster connected to climate change. The Nansen Initiative, for instance, is a state-led consultative process led by Norway and Switzerland aimed at building international consensus on a protection agenda to address the needs of people displaced abroad following the impact of climate change. The Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change (Protection Agenda) was endorsed by 109 governmental delegations during a global intergovernmental consultation in October 2015.\(^\text{20}\) The Agenda explores the potential measures that States may voluntarily adopt to address the protection and assistance needs of persons displaced abroad by disasters, such as admitting them on the bases of humanitarian considerations and international solidarity. In parallel, the Agenda also identifies effective practices to manage disaster displacement risk in the countries of origin.\(^\text{21}\)

In September 2015, at an historic UN summit, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was adopted, including 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that universally apply to all. These goals aim to end all forms of poverty, fight inequalities, tackle climate change and improve environmental protection.\(^\text{22}\) With the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, it was finally recognised that climate change is already affecting public health, food and water security, migration, peace and security, and there are some specific goals that address these impacts.\(^\text{23}\)

\(^{20}\) The Nansen Initiative, Global Consultation, October 2015. https://www.nanseninitiative.org

\(^{21}\) Ibid. The main practices suggested are reducing vulnerability, building resilience, facilitating migration out of hazardous areas before disasters strike, planning relocation and responding to the needs of internally displaced persons.


\(^{23}\) Ibid. Besides Goal 13, which is specifically on climate change – Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts – other Goals
Moreover, with the historic climate agreement reached last December in Paris, the international community in its entirety has further demonstrated its concern about the issue of climate change and its willingness to enact an effective response to the threats it poses to the world’s population. Hopefully, this is particularly a positive moment to address the issue of the international protection of people displaced by the impact of climate change, in a framework of multi-level cooperation and solidarity.

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In cooperation with
Implementing Agenda 2030: welcome to the UNSSC Knowledge Centre for Sustainable Development

by Daniela Cepeda Cuadrado
Haus Carstanjen, where the Knowledge Centre for Sustainable Development will be located
Implementing Agenda 2030: welcome to the UNSSC Knowledge Centre for Sustainable Development

by Daniela Cepeda Cuadrado

On 1 January 2016, the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and its 17 Goals (SDGs) come into effect. The same day, the UN System Staff College (UNSSC) inaugurated the UNSSC Knowledge Centre for Sustainable Development.

Since 2002, the UNSSC has been the learning and training outfit for UN staff, benefiting on average 7,000 participants from all over the world each year. Through the development of courses and learning initiatives, the UNSSC has played a significant role in strengthening collaboration and operational effectiveness within the UN system; enhancing cooperation between the UN system and Member States, NGOs and civil society; and developing and maintaining a cohesive system-wide management culture.
Implementing Agenda 2030: welcome to the UNSSC Knowledge Centre for Sustainable Development

2016 is indeed a year of high expectations, as the new agenda promises to be a much more comprehensive endeavour than the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Whereas the MDGs’ main pledge was to half global poverty, the Agenda 2030 has committed to the full achievement of economic, social and environmental development simultaneously and sustainably. It is expected to foster inter-sectoral coordination among all SDGs at the country level. The 2030 Agenda originated from joint discussions among Member States, UN institutions, regions, local institutions, business and industry organizations, the scientific and academic communities and civil society. The involvement of all relevant stakeholders has magnified the expectations held by the international community that a global commitment will lead to a successful implementation of the new Agenda. Indeed, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon echoed these feelings during the UN Sustainable Development Summit by inviting Member States to endorse the Agenda 2030 as “a to-do list for people and planet, and a blueprint for success.”

The Agenda has been set with, and will be evaluated against the highest standards. As a result, the UN system is deeply aware of the need to become Fit for Purpose and for this to happen, it is essential that its staff is well prepared to tackle today’s challenges and in particular: conflicts, climate change, poverty and gender inequality.

There is an overall understanding among the UN personnel that the UN system must ensure its operations on the ground are relevant, innovative, agile, inclusive, coordinated and results-oriented; are guided by international norms; are responsive to the different needs of national governments; and are driven by key partnerships that foster expertise, capacity and resources. In addition, the elements of universality, equality, integration, human rights and data management need to be present at all times and shape the UN’s quest to achieve sustainable development in all contexts.

The endorsement of the new Agenda has made a serious call on the UN to play a key role in the establishment and maintenance of a global partnership, where all relevant stakeholders stand ready to jointly and collaboratively localize all SDGs.

Given the aspirational nature of the Agenda 2030, there are still some important questions to be resolved: is the UN ready for a changed world and for the challenges ahead of the Agenda 2030? What can the UN do to ensure that global partnerships functions smoothly and consistently? How can the UN guarantee that all its operations on the ground are integrated and coordinated? Which practical approaches can the UN system take to avoid working in silos?

At the UNSSC, we believe the best way to address these concerns is by equipping the UN system with a clear roadmap to harness and transfer cutting-edge knowledge for sustainable development. With this in mind, and with the generous financial support of the Federal Republic of Germany, the UNSSC has inaugurated the Knowledge Centre for Sustainable Development in Bonn, Germany.

Is the UN ready for a changed world and for the challenges ahead of the Agenda 2030?

The Knowledge Centre, in collaboration with relevant UN and non-UN institutions, supports the policy and operational framework of the UN through the development of learning tools, platforms for interaction and executive programmes around the environmental, social and economic dimensions of the new sustainable development Agenda. The Knowledge Centre provides spaces to foster active learning and knowledge sharing on the implementation of the new Agenda, thereby ensuring that its participants are well-equipped to respond to the emerging needs of the international community.
To effectively assist the UN system in the field of learning on sustainable development, the Knowledge Centre is organized around two interrelated learning streams: the UN Policy Coherence and Innovation stream, and the Learning and Training in support of Country Programming stream. For both directions the Knowledge Centre runs various activities ranging from e-learning courses; face-to-face training and knowledge events; development of system-wide learning management portals, case studies and practitioner tools; instructional design, training and advisory services; to launching a UN learning magazine UNovation for Sustainable Development; fostering public outreach and partnership building for learning; facilitating services on Sustainable Development; and offering multilingual programmes.

In essence, the UNSSC Knowledge Centre’s courses and activities caters to the needs for One UN learning as well as fosters UN’s involvement with all relevant stakeholders. By providing spaces for joint and interdisciplinary learning, the Knowledge Centre plays a key role in encouraging its participants to engage in inter-sectoral approaches when localizing the Agenda. Additionally, the Centre will organize annual events – such as the UN Reflection Series and the UN Summer Academy – for public outreach and reflection on issues of contemporary relevance.

**We cannot permit ourselves to postpone ‘certain agendas’ for the future**

Examples of courses that the Knowledge Centre offers are: foundational courses for each of the SDGs; courses focused on environmental sustainability, climate change and disaster risk reduction; trainings on how to build partnerships for development effectiveness in a post-2015 world; courses on communicating as One; trainings for effective use of data for public policy; and courses on political economy analysis and risk management for UN programming.

At the inauguration of the UN Sustainable Development Sum-

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Available at: www.unicri.it
Just numbers and maps? The importance of monitoring trafficking in human beings for the development of evidence based policies

by Rita Penedo
nized definition of Trafficking in Human Beings (THB), later on consolidated by the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (2005) and, more recently, by the Directive 2011/36 of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, transposed into the Portuguese legislation in August 2013 and thus revising several internal laws, namely the Article 160.º of the Penal Code (Trafficking in Persons).

All the above references - as structural, mandatory, guidelines at an international, European and national level - mention the concept of the abuse of the position of vulnerability in the definition of trafficking as one of the three constitutive elements of the crime (the others, as known, are the action and the objective).¹

In the chapter “Trafficking in Human Beings in Time and Space - A Socio-ecological Perspective,”² Daniel-Wrabetz and Penedo questioned if the common understanding and typification of vulnerability is enough to address some of the root causes of trafficking in all its phases and across time and territories: "Why are there some places where the occurrence of the phenomenon – either as source or destination – is/will be more frequent? What are its main features? What makes a person, whether man, woman or child (more) vulnerable to human trafficking?”.

What makes a person, whether man, woman or child (more) vulnerable to human trafficking?

At an institutional level, these questions represent the basis of the creation of the Observatory on Trafficking in Human Beings (OTSH) by the Portuguese Ministry of Internal Administration in 2008, as a response to a set of national and international recommendations for the implementation of a National Monitoring System on THB.³ Since then, the OTSH has followed a socio-ecological approach (through the adoption of the geographical information systems) by applying the concept of vulnerability to the territory.

This approach means, or better, suggests, that THB, as a special hidden social and criminal phenomenon, "[...] may be better understood (and thus prevented) if and when the socio-ecological factors that underlie it and which are manifested on a more aggregate scale are identified. Strictly speaking, this understanding will come from the nexuses (...) established between the individuals (perpetrators, accomplices, victims, witnesses) and their ecological environment. The social ecology of crime demonstrates that certain types of crime occur more frequently (with greater probability) in certain social and physical contexts than in others, because the former possess characteristics which, under various conditions, can be regarded as congruent with or permissive – or even predictive – of this criminality." Moving forward five years, to 2013, it was in this formal and theoretical setting that the project “Towards a Pan-European Monitoring System on Trafficking in Human Beings” (hereafter MoSy) began.

³ Also worth mentioning that the OTSH finds its origins in the 1st national project on THB and, later on, in its political framework as a measure included in the 1st National Action Plan on Trafficking in Human Beings (2007/2010).
⁵ Developed with the financial support of the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme - European Commission - Directorate-General Home Affairs (HOME/2011/ISEC/AG/THB/4000002251).
The social ecology of crime demonstrates that certain types of crime occur more frequently (with greater probability) in certain social and physical contexts than in others.

Promoted by the General Secretariat of the Portuguese Ministry of Internal Administration/OTSH, the project had as direct partners the Bulgarian National Commission for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, the Ministry of Interior of Cyprus and the Federal Ministry of Interior of Austria/Criminal Intelligence Service – Central Service for Combating Human Smuggling/Human Trafficking.6

MoSy is based on the assumption that the transnational nature of the crime makes essential the establishment of networks between different countries and European/international organizations in order to share information and promote knowledge. This in consideration of the fact that one of the main obstacles to the implementation of anti-trafficking policies is the lack of common methodologies and an integrated system for the collection and analysis of data, and that both leads to a series of constraints for the necessary – more, imperative – contextual, comprehensive, systematic and comparative analysis within and between countries.

The MoSy main objective is to provide current and future partner countries7 with a monitoring system in the framework of best practices regarding the harmonization of procedures.

6 The project also benefited from the expertise of an Advisory Board with following bodies: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (oiip) via the ‘Regional Implementation Initiative on Preventing & Combating Human Trafficking’ as its lead organisation from 2010-2013 and the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe IDM since 2014; Europol; OSCE; IOM; ICMPD; and Frontex.

7 Presently the countries that have adopted MoSy are Portugal, Bulgaria and Cyprus.
The MoSy database (with a victim and a trafficker/criminal justice dataset) has three operational levels that acting as a gear, operationalise the concept of thinking globally and acting locally. The levels are: 1) the Local Repository, addressed to data providers organizations, with the objective to support the effective collection of microdata on victims and/or traffickers/criminal justice; 2) the National Repository, addressed to national bodies producing national harmonized geo-statistics; 3) the International Repository, aimed at an international body responsible for the overall aggregated cross-national comparable statistics and geo-statistics on THB between the adopting countries. Without going in depth into the way data is collected and analyzed, the MoSy’s Dissemination Module is as an innovative tool concerning the presentation of THB data – and where statistical reports and geo-statistics can be visualized.

Although each country can collect additional variables to produce its own national reports and assessments (customization to national needs that the policy of ‘harmonization’ must not forget), the MoSy’s has a set of common core indicators that allows comparability of statistical reports between the adopting countries. At the local and national level, stakeholders have access to consolidated national statistics; at the international level, stakeholders have access to consolidated statistics either from one specific country or from all countries.

In order to be properly planned the fight and prevention of THB, must be evidenced-based

Besides the numbers, the MoSy also includes a Territorial Analysis Platform as a step forward in the presentation of national, regional and global THB distribution, trends and patterns. This is achieved via a set of tools, namely Choropleth, Routing, Clusters and Heatmaps (see examples produced with fictitious data) that “[...] will help to develop models of vulnerable areas and groups, either at origin,
where recruitment occurs, or at destination, where exploitation is already taking place.\(^8\)

Evoking a broader conceptual understanding and making references, amongst many others, to the idea of geographic democracy (social asymmetry and resilience in the exposure and response to risks) and human security (redefinition of the concepts of security, liberty and justice)\(^9\) the knowledge produced by the MoSy’s “[…] is essential to assist all relevant actors in the planning of intervention measures based on knowledge at different but interconnected levels: operational, tactical, investiga-
tive and strategic policing, crime reduction and victim support.”\(^10\)

In order to properly plan the fight and prevention of THB, there must be evidenced-based data, information, knowledge and actions. Extending the concept of vulnerability to the territory is one way, an important way, to approach it, fight it and above all, prevent it.


8 Daniel-Wrabetz and Penedo, 2014:16
10 Daniel-Wrabetz and Penedo, 2014:16

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The author

**Rita Penedo** is a sociologist, who began her professional activity in Academic Research institutes and in 2006 in the Ministry of Internal Affairs as Project Officer. In 2010 she became a Consultant to the Directorate-General of Internal Affairs and the Observatory on Trafficking in Human Beings/Ministry of Interior, assuming also the role of Contact Point to the European Crime Prevention Network. Since 2013 she is the Director of the Observatory on Trafficking in Human Beings.
Smuggling networks to Europe: a spectrum from organised to disorganised crime

by Mark Shaw

As Europe struggles to find a coherent approach to its burgeoning refugee and migrant crisis, one set of actors has been universally vilified: the migrant smugglers. While they are not the cause of the current crisis, they have certainly amplified it, and are often responsible for the greatest violations against human rights and protection. Turning attention and public outcry toward the smugglers arguably allows the EU member states to detract – and distract – from their own derogations of their obligations to international law and refugee protection.

In the context of the current crisis, however, the blanket term of “migrant smugglers” masks a very wide spectrum of actors: from concerned citizens trying to assist those seeking refuge by offering a ride across a border, to the genuine transnational organized crime syndicates providing upscale servic-
es – including the procurement of tickets and false documentation – and a corridor of corrupt officials who will wink the illicit traveller through every port and border.

This ambiguity generates space for law enforcement officials to appear to make progress, though the impact on the smuggling market is negligible. For example, the emphasis on the number of ‘facilitators’ apprehended by Frontex refers not in fact to smugglers, but to anyone identified as having an operation role, which includes, for example, the boat migrant who made the call to the coastguard for rescue. Similarly, there have been cases where individuals have been prosecuted for ‘migrant smuggling’ as they loaned their passport to a family member to assist them fleeing active conflict. How then should the crime of migrant smuggling be understood? According to the United Nations Transnational Organized Crime Convention (UNTOC), with its dedicated protocol on the Smuggling of Migrants that has 112 signatories and 142 parties, the crime is defined as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.” But this dry definition does not describe the function that a smuggler performs for the migrant, nor does it help us to understand when it is necessary to respond to the act.

A smuggler is required when a barrier - either physical, geographic, political or cultural - prevents a migrant from making the journey without assistance. For example, for a migrant from the Horn of Africa to travel to North Africa, a smuggler is mandatory: not only are the roads and borders full of hazards, from militia groups to national armies with a shoot-to-kill policy, but the Sahara itself is an un navigable death-trap for those without specialised knowledge and significant pre-planning.

To understand the nature of the smuggling industry within the framework of the European crisis, given the range of people travelling, the wide catchment area from which they come and the diversity of routes that they have been taking, it would be wise to stream analysis by the nationality of the migrant. More so than other criminal industries, illicit migration is a transaction based on trust: the commodity is the life and future of the migrant or their loved ones. And, as mentioned above, the service being provided by the smuggler is often to serve as a guide and protector along a dangerous journey. Furthermore, migrants chosen final destination is most typically where a large Diaspora population of their own nationality is already present. For all of these reasons, therefore, migrants transact predominantly with intermediaries in the smuggling network that are of their own ethnicities, and take confidence and comfort from being able to speak the same language and know the same people. Smugglers get their primary business from referrals from migrants who have completed the journey successfully, and use this to build the trust of new clients. Collateral services, such as the third-party broker chosen to hold their money, will also be a person of the same ethnicity. It is often restaurant owners, or those with a business that easily marks them as being
part of the same identity group. Dependent on the funds available, migrants can request different levels of services from the smuggler, ranging from help to cross a single border, to bespoke journeys traversing tens of thousands of miles. Every manner of transportation has been used: planes, cars, boats, but also bicycles, jet skis, and luxury yachts. The more complex the journey, and the longer the route being negotiated, the higher the price the migrant will pay, and the more professional (criminal) the smuggling group will need to be.

There are typically three indicators by which the professionalization and consolidation of a criminal industry (in any commodity) can be understood: price, level of violence, and ease of market entry. Monitoring these three metrics over time also provides indicators into the changes in the market. \(^1\) The markets around the smuggling of migrants are particularly effective at demonstrating this.

### Smugglers get their primary business from referrals from migrants who have completed the journey successfully

**Market entry:** The more difficult the border to cross, or the more complex the journey offered, the more professional the smuggling group will need to be. In 2015, the Turkish town of Izmir has become a smuggling hub for the thousands of migrants seeking to cross the Aegean to Greece. The crossing takes a mere 1–4 hours, and boats push off from the beach, thus requires nothing more complicated than a cheap rubber dinghy. There is little surveillance or penalty from local law enforcement. With it this easy, the market includes all manner of local citizens choosing opportunistically to make some money. Residents have been quoted as saying, “Why shouldn’t I? If I don’t, someone else will.”

Market entry conditions can be changed, with significant impact on the market. For example, where smuggling from the Libyan coast to Italy by boat was initially a relatively specialised industry, it is now a free-for-all similar to that seen in Turkey. The change in this case was the introduction of sea patrols by first the Italians, and then the EU. It reduced the requirement on smugglers to have a sea-worthy enough craft and capable

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enough crew to navigate the full 160nm crossing to Italy, down to having to just ensure a boatload of migrants could make it 12nm to international waters. The costs of boats and fuel fell dramatically, as did the risk, as it is no longer necessary for the smugglers themselves to go to sea, and as a consequence the market has proliferated and fragmented.

Criminal groups themselves can also change the conditions regarding market entry when they have access to a commodity or consumers to which they want to retain privileged access, and they will often use violence to protect their market.

Violence: the ability to control and use violence is a defining feature of a criminal group. The higher the value of the commodity the more violence is required to ensure protection. Increasing levels of violence can indicate challenges in the market, the level of arms being exhibited and used is a similar indicator. Along the route between the Sahara’s main smuggling hub, Agadez in Niger, to Sebha in Southern Libya, two groups are coming in increasing competition: the Taureg and the Tebu. Both nomadic tribes who have long been traders along the trans-Saharan routes, their largely peaceful coexistence has been shattered by the newly lucrative migrant industry.

Market entry: the more difficult the border to cross, or the more complex the journey offered, the more professional smuggling group will need to be.

Where previously migrant convoys of migrants were guarded by two lackadaisical guys with an AK-47, they now are accompanied by numerous ‘security vehicles’ packed with armed men to stave off attacks by competing groups. The groups have been clashing heavily around the town of Ubari, a pivotal stop on the route north to Libya’s coast.²

Price: as with any market, price is reflective of a number of dynamics in the smuggling industry. Where smugglers are trying to build a market, they offer price incentives. On the North African coast, where the business model requires smuggling brokers to transact in groups of 20-50 migrants at a time, bulk discounts are offered: “if you bring 3 migrants, you travel for free.”³ Through extensive interviews with migrants, the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime has been tracking the prices paid along various legs of the journey towards Europe. The price changes have


proven to be highly responsive to changes in the market and European policy. When a border closure is announced, prices rise quickly – when German Chancellor Merkel announced in August 2015 that all Syrians could register in Europe, prices along the previously prohibitive and dangerous Balkan Route crashed, and Do-It-Yourself migration surged.

If you analyse market entry, price and violence together, then you see that there is no unified smuggling market working to facilitate transit to Europe. Instead, what you see is a spectrum from disorganised to organised crime, that is responding to a set of market conditions which are also changing.

As worldwide displacement hits record levels, yet border controls and barriers to labour movement steadily rise, dealing with criminal markets orientated around human smuggling are going to be an increasingly dominant feature of the global transnational organised crime landscape. Developing a nuanced and proactive capacity to measure price, violence and market entry over time, not only in Europe but globally, would greatly facilitate a proper analysis and a more effective capacity to define policy and responses. As this article has attempted to show, this is a market that is determined by the extent of the barriers that are imposed, and more often than not, this is something entirely under the control of the international community.

Mark Shaw is the Professor of Justice and Security, Faculty of Law at the University of Cape Town, and the Director of the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime (www.globalinitiative.net), a network of prominent law enforcement, policy, governance and development professionals committed to seeking better responses to transnational organized crime. With the Institute for Security Studies, the Global Initiative has recently published a report on migrant smuggling and Europe’s crisis: “Survive and Advance: the economics of smuggling refugees and migrants into Europe”, drawn from extensive fieldwork in ten countries, and nearly four hundred interviews with experts, national authorities, migrants and smugglers themselves.
IN A CHANGING WORLD...

SOME RULES ARE TIMELESS...

ACCURACY, RELIABILITY AND PLURALISM

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THE POST DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

...somewhere in Armenia

by Barka Onlus
The Travel

It was the beginning of October, we left Turin (Italy) at dawn and after a long stopover in Paris, we landed in Erevan, Armenia’s capital city, late at night. Father Mario, a Camillian, was waiting for us there. He has been living in Armenia for many years and is the administrative manager of a hospital, located in the Ashotsk region, where he oversees the distribution of basic necessities to a population becoming poorer and poorer, daily.

We left Erevan’s sparkly lights and expensive cars in the chaotic traffic, and reached Ashotsk through disrupted roads with big potholes and very few street lights. We saw huge old trucks going to Georgia and back, and some old cars produced in Russia. During the travel, foxes and other little animals crossed our road. We were surrounded by darkness, only interrupted by the few lights very far away. Abandoned houses, and factories in ruins and other old crumbling buildings were just part of the landscape.

During the travel to Ashotsk, we realized that this little city, situated on upland near the border with Georgia, is very different from the capital.

On Site

The territory of Armenia lies in mountains with approximately 3.5 million people living in the country. In Ashotsk the temperature can reach 30 degrees in summer and almost minus 40 degrees in winter. During the few days we spent there, we worked with sister Noelle and father Mario in the local hospital of the remote villages of the area. At the hospital, they provide patients with free medical care, which is not taken for granted in this country. They distribute small amounts of money, clothes and food such as pasta, rice, oil and some chocolate for children in the villages.

Every day, father Mario and sister Noelle assist people who live in extreme poverty. If it were not for them, in many villages people would not have clothes and food.

Father Mario ensures children’s primary education by using his own money, and supports cattle farming - run by local people - by guaranteeing that the hospital purchases milk and meat from them.
With this extraordinary man, we travelled for hundreds of miles, through dangerous roads, trails and rocky areas, where sheep and a few cows were grazing. We reached many little suburbs, the majority of which were hit by the 1988 earthquake, that caused about 80,000 deaths. There, people still live in slums; there are miserable shelters with roofs made of asbestos cement with nothing inside: no chairs or armchairs, no paintings, no dishes or tables loaded with food and drinks. What stood out was a persistent and sharp smell of manure, which is pressed and dried out during the hot summers and burned to heat up the houses in the winter.

During our travel, while delivering clothes and food, we learned about the tragic stories of many women and children. We discovered that they survive thanks to child sponsorships and father Mario’s personal commitment.

I was shocked by the situation of women and children. Many of them have been abandoned to their fate by their husbands or fathers who left home to seek their fortune (and often found a new family) in Russia. Some of their stories left me speechless:
The Boy Without Dreams

We met a fifteen-year old boy with a difficult family situation and a life of hardship: he openly told us that he has never dreamed and that he feels he has nothing to dream about.

The Girl Torn to Pieces by Dogs

A twelve-year old girl was attacked by a herd of hungry wild dogs, fell in the snow, and was ripped apart, sustaining horrible wounds that compromised part of her muscles. She was saved, underwent several surgeries at the Redemptoris Mater hospital and was sponsored. After 8 years, when she got pregnant, she was advised to interrupt her pregnancy because she would not have been able to carry it to term. She came back to the hospital and stayed for three months before giving birth to her son. She was left by her partner and continued to stay in the hospital for some months.
Besides the emergency caused by the earthquake, there are other difficulties that affect Armenia, which are tied to the lack of assistance and medical structures. First of all, Armenia has to deal with its disadvantaged geopolitical position; it has a few kilometres of open borders with Georgia and Iran, while the borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan are closed. The fall of the Soviet Union had a severe impact on the domestic economy, which used to work as part of a planned and centralized system. Armenia has no natural resources, in the past they were imported from other former Soviet countries, processed by local factories, and absorbed in the Soviet market. When this chain broke, factories closed, one after the other.

It was not easy to accept all the misery and sadness we saw. We met with families in most of the cases composed of women, who were always smiling and friendly. Children in Armenia are nice just like every other child in the world, but they do not have electronic devices and toys. Nobody begs, and everybody looks for a human connection, despite the linguistic barriers.

We also visited some monasteries that represent part of what is left of this little country’s history. Armenia was the cradle of Christianity, and for this reason many monasteries and churches made of stone distinguish its beautiful landscapes.
The South of the country, characterised by many fields and orchards, has not yet recovered from the terrible earthquake of 1988.

Electricity is provided by the largely criticized nuclear power plant, built during the Soviet era just outside Erevan, in a seismic zone.

Despite all challenges, despite that many people have been obliged to leave the country, the majority of Armenians want to live in Armenia - in the uncontaminated natural environment where their people have been living for many centuries, laying the foundations of a remarkable religious, cultural and artistic heritage.

WHO WE ARE

My name is Dante Caramellino, I am a member of Barka Onlus, an NGO that deals with international cooperation and humanitarian assistance. The organisation is composed of people from different fields of expertise, but all driven by humility and helpfulness. We are aware that we will not be able to solve the problems that affect some countries, but we are willing to cooperate with everyone according to his/her own expertise, capabilities and competencies, and offer assistance and protection to people that are less fortunate than us. Our aim is to improve the physical and social development of disadvantaged children and vulnerable people in general.

There is a wide range of reasons that push people to be engaged. Today it is easier, and possible, for everyone who wants to help, to devote money, time or energy to assist vulnerable people.

We work on a voluntary basis and for free. Our travels are completely self-funded, in order to ensure that the selected projects receive 100% of the funds that have been raised. We are engaged in humanitarian projects in Italy, Burkina Faso and Armenia. My first experience in Armenia started in October 2015.
WHAT WE DID IN ARMENIA

We came back to Turin full of hopes and projects. By involving a network of friends and people of good will, our organization has already started to fulfill some of them - like administrating a clinic - while others are going to be realized soon.

For a couple of years we committed to fund a medical unit run by a local nurse who provides vaccinations and medical care in a very isolated village for at least three months every year. We are organising a collection of second-hand clothes and shoes. This is just a drop in the ocean, but it is worthwhile! This is a commitment from which we cannot back out, after having seen so many sad and moving situations.
The Author

Jason deCaires Taylor is an internationally acclaimed sculptor born in 1974. Son of English father and Guyanese mother, he grew up in Europe and Asia, where he spent his childhood exploring the coral reefs of Malaysia. Taylor graduated from the London Institute of Arts in 1998 with a BA Honours in Sculpture and became a fully qualified diving instructor and underwater naturalist. He is known worldwide for his underwater living installations, and is also an award winning underwater photographer, famous for his images that capture the metamorphosing effects of the ocean.

In 2006, Taylor founded and created the world’s first underwater sculpture park off the west coast of Grenada in the West Indies. In 2009 he co-founded MUSA (Museo Subacuático de Arte), a monumental museum off the coast of Cancun (Mexico) with a collection of over 500 of his sculptural works.

Behind Taylor’s works there are themes such as the sense of loss and fragility that current generations are experiencing in front of the drastic and rapid changes of society (for instance from the technological, cultural and geographical point of view). The artist’s aim is to promote social change while encouraging environmental awareness.
Life and ecosystem

Working with Marine biologists, Taylor employs their research in designing habitat spaces that can make specific forms of marine life flourish. Scientists say that over the past few decades we have lost more than 40% of our natural coral reefs, and predict that 80% of them will disappear by 2050. In this context, Taylor’s art, focused on conserving reefs and making them thrive, represents an opposition to the “land as commodity” mentality and an example of generative human intervention in the ecosystem, emphasizing the positive power of individual imagination and collective effort.

Moreover, as Taylor says, “Taking art off of the white walls of a gallery offers the viewer a sense of discovery and participation.” The experience of visitors who go underwater to see his works of art offers a more intimate and personal viewing perspective.
Off the coast of Lanzarote, one of Spain’s Canary Islands, Taylor has recently created the first underwater contemporary art museum in Europe and in the Atlantic Ocean. The Museo Atlántico will be completed in 2017 and will be comprised of more than 300 sculptures, of various shapes and sizes, that draw attention to issues such as climate change, conservation and migration. As his former works, also the Museo Atlántico is designed “to promote the regeneration of marine life and to use sculpture as a means of conveying hope and awareness of the plight of our oceans before it is too late.”
“The Rubicon”

The largest installation is entitled The Rubicon and comprises a group of 35 people who appear to walk randomly towards a gate. Taylor says this work is about climate change and how mankind seems to be heading blindly towards a point of no return.
“The Raft of Lampedusa”

The Raft of Lampedusa represents a small raft that carries 13 passengers towards an unknown future. In particular, on the fragile boat sits an African man with his eyes closed and his hand on a lifejacket. As a model for this figure, Taylor chose Abdel Kader, a boy from Laayoune, the largest city in Western Sahara. That region is very close to the Canary Islands (115km from its coastline), and therefore is a very common point of departure for migrants and smugglers. Kader, who now is 29, made that dangerous journey himself by boat to Lanzarote 16 years ago. By the age of 12, with the entire family to support, he worked until he saved the money to pay the smugglers for the journey. He remembers that before leaving the vessel looked safe to him, but when in the middle of the sea, the engine stopped and water began to come in. He couldn’t swim and he was very scared, especially when days passed by and the boat was more and more flooded. He and the other 24 passengers were found on the fourth day by a fishing boat, which called a patrol to rescue them, and were taken to Lanzarote.

At the back of the sculpture, lying helplessly over the back edge of the raft, a man seems more desperate than the others. This figure is a direct reference to Théodore Géricault’s 1818 oil painting The Raft of the Medusa, which was based on a tragic event happened to the crew of a French ship.

1 Source: (http://www.theguardian.com/)
Perceptions of ethnic Albanians in New York City and the role of stereotypes in fostering social exclusion and criminality

by Adriana Michilli and Jana Arsovskà

If I awake to look out my window, walk out my front door and to my right, left and for as far as my eyes can see, my once tranquil city is plagued with carnage, bloodshed, strife and civil war would I not seek
The scope of this study was to understand the nascent criminalizing effects of migratory stigmatization, in achieving this end we set out to determine the sources which encourage prejudice against certain alien groups. We intended to examine if the prominence of these factors creates xenophobic attitudes and hinder the newcomers’ ability to access critical social spheres, therefore increasing the discouraged migrant to gravitate towards developing innovative coping strategies by engaging in illegal means to survive within United States society.

The community suffered from reduced economic opportunities because of their media inflated categorization as inherently violent beings.

The objective of the research funded by the Department of Justice was to examine whether New York’s media coverage has the potential to trigger a process of social isolation and deviancy amongst the Albanian migrant population by contributing to their labeling as criminals and if this curbs their smooth social integration to the same degree in which it does in many European states. The conclusions you will read below are based on the analysis on how Albanians were depicted in New York newspapers in the period 1990-2014; interviews with non-Albanian population in New York City (N=85) and interviews with ethnic Albanian immigrants, including offenders in New York City (N=88).

The research first examined general scholarly literature on media, stigmatizations and crime, looking at existing studies on the portrayal of Albanian people in European countries such as Greece, Italy, and the UK. The next literature review was targeted to an analysis of U.S. language newspapers containing both positive and negative depictions of ethnic Albanians. Our selection mainly included newspapers such as The New York Times, The New York Post and The New York Daily News. The second phase of our study was based on short survey interviews conducted on the streets of two New York City boroughs: The Belmont area of the Bronx and the Ridgewood area of Queens-zone known to host a high Albanian community. The areas were also identified as ‘hot spots’ for Albanian organized crime activity by the New York City Police (NYPD, 2006). Finally, we conducted face-to-face interviews with the Albanian Diaspora including document-
ed and undocumented migrants as well as offenders. The sample was composed of 62.5% males and 37.5% females. More than half of the participants fell between the age range of 18–35 years old, and 34% of interviewees held a high school diploma, 89% were foreign-born. The results of these statistics were interpreted using SPSS.³

The academic literature demonstrated that negative depiction of immigrants can lead to stereotypical public opinion towards foreigners. For example, research showed that newspaper readers consistently exposed to stories about ethnic criminality were more likely to perceive immigrants as a threat to national security than those reading less about ethnic crime cases. We also found a psychological explanation for the influence news media can exhibit on the formation of racially charged stereotypes.

³ SPSS is a software package used for statistical analysis.

The academic literature demonstrated that negative depiction of immigrants can lead to stereotypical public opinion towards foreigners.

Priming occurs when mass media observers are unable to evade messages that are omnipresent with mainstream news and entertainment channels that reinforce the image of the out-group member as criminal. Research explained that the hegemonic immigrant shaming cycle is especially corrosive because of how challenging it is for an individual to regress and reconstruct their attitudes to include favorable perceptions of ethnic groups after the priming process has already been mentally anchored. Individually speaking, our literature review also showed us that the decay of group stigma is difficult to overcome because stigmatized individuals embody the deviant self-concept and assume the role that media has assigned them as they start to comport themselves as a criminal. The subconscious acceptance of the adverse social image impairs the person’s successful social inclusion. Furthermore, these persons consciously refrain from placing themselves in situations where they would have direct interaction with other ethnic groups for fear that they will face peer rejection.

Shortly after the Albanians migrated their land and sea borders to Greece and Italy during their civic catastrophe in 1991 and 1992, popular opinion of the refugees shifted from deserving political migrants to greedy...
economic gangsters. In their research, King and Mai (2004) state that Albanians were quickly one of the most excluded groups in the European Union. Italian newspapers released a slew of news articles negatively portraying Albanians as virulent criminals. In Greece, journalists went so far as to publish data from state law enforcement officials to use describe them as a dangerousness reference point. We noticed from over three qualitative studies that Albanians are occluded entrance to key social sectors such as housing and labor markets because of the noxious perceptions created by the national media. In summary, the literature is suggestive of the theory that since Albanian immigrants in Europe were forced to occupy the lowest tiers of the social echelon system (because image garnered from media channels) they often shifted towards pursuing goals of materialistic success via illicit means as they became increasingly frustrated by repeated encounters of goal blockage, a process known to stimulate social deviancy.

Our New York based news media analysis illustrated that the percentage of stories regarding Albanian profit-oriented and involved in violent crime while significant, was not as prominent as in EU media sources. In addition, the most common crimes linked to Albanian immigrants that are frequently mentioned in New York media are related to organized theft, burglaries, and drug trafficking. There was very minimal information available on human trafficking, illegal immigration and prostitution. These illegal activities seem to be more popularly reported when publishing on Albanians in European media. This finding proves that media effect on cultivating attitudes on criminal labeling of ethnic Albanians is overall weaker in the U.S., particularly when compared to some European countries where Albanians are routinely linked to episodes of extremist criminality such as brutal murders and sexual exploitation of minors by press agencies.

Interviews with residents in the Bronx and Queens showed that people tend to exhibit more positive out-group perceptions of Albanians, even without experiencing any direct contact. In other cases, those who did have frequent contact whether in school or at work did not hold positive perceptions towards them. Over 50% of the time, respondents who indicated that they only know of Albanians via indirect contact expressed either positive or neutral perceptions of them. Furthermore, we saw fluctuating attitudes of Albanians for respondents who knew Albanians through mass media observations only (swaying from positive/neutral to negative) as an indicator that media-influenced opinions are wavering instead of being strong. Commonly cited personality attributes of Albanians being “ambitious” and
“hardworking” demonstrate that overall the Albanian community is respected by many American and non-Albanian social counterparts. However, it should be considered that despite the majority of positive opinions, many non-Albanians still perceived this population to be especially cloistered in comparison to other more assimilated cultures living in New York City. A majority of the respondents noted that the Albanian community remains a highly celled ethnicity and complete acculturation and assimilation into the U.S. host country has yet to take place.

Our third group of findings from the Diaspora sample remained relatively consistent. While some participants exhibited opinions that they had confronted inequalities within the US, they did not believe this was the byproduct of the country’s media. Ability to integrate in housing and labor markets was not seen as any more difficult than the typical immigrant experience of other common groups (Hispanics, Italians and Irish). Respondents who mentioned criminality associated to Albanians in the news media did not believe that this imagery created a tainted image of their people or their homeland.

Instead, Diaspora members, many of them being foreign and having lived in Western Europe prior to their move to the U.S. would mention that Albanian’s criminality is much more exacerbated in the dramatic headlines and moral panic norms stirred by Italian, Greek, and English papers abroad. Finally, it is critical to maintain that our study concluded that even if Albanians in the U.S. feel that they are stereotyped or that their co-nationals are shown in print and TV outlets as criminals, this does not appear to stagnate their socio-economic opportunities for betterment.

Over 50% of the time, respondents who indicated that they only know of Albanians via indirect contact expressed either positive or neutral perceptions of them.

Results from this study have demonstrated that New York media does not place a salient emphasis on Albanian criminality.

The main idea behind our study was to advocate for the social annihilation of malpractices which either intentionally or un-intentionally offset a cataclysmic process of social exclusion and crime. Our theory was that when the shared concept of biases towards foreigners - formed by mass-media outlets - undermines the foundation of a democratic society which should strive to endorse peace, security and protection of human rights for all of its inhabitants, the result can usher in a wave of ethnic based criminality. Although
the results did not demonstrate a strong linkage between the effects of media onto crime, it should be restated that further research into the criminalizing effects of media stigmatization and social labeling of immigrant populations is necessary to promote the advancement of international criminal justice policies and universal human rights norms within global society.

The authors

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Hate speech online: assessing Europe’s capacity to tackle an emerging threat

by Arthur Brocato

From politically charged headlines to hate-filled interactions on social media, the phenomenon of words being used as weapons has rapidly taken shape in the public sphere within the last decade. Advances in global communication have made it easier for people across the world to stay in touch, exchange ideas, and foster cooperation at all levels of society. Nevertheless, communication technologies can also be used to spread extremist ideologies, racism, xenophobia, and other social ills, while potentially inciting individuals or groups to commit psychological abuse or physical acts of violence in the real world.

Hate speech is not a new issue societies are facing, and the question of where the limits of freedom of speech end and hate speech begins is one that has yet to be decided. However, in the past, means of mass
communication were limited in scope and arguably more quantifiable. These days, the rapid expansion of the Internet and the birth of social media have an effect on billions of people worldwide and have brought the issue of hate speech to the forefront of social and political discourse. Perceived anonymity in cyberspace and the ability to cheaply reach large numbers of people in a multimedia environment makes the Internet an attractive arena for individuals that are intent on engaging in hate-filled rhetoric that targets immigrants, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community, persons with disabilities, and other vulnerable groups.

Upon analyzing the comments made by users on popular news sites, video sharing websites, social media and other fora, it may appear as if cyberspace is governed by no rule, except for the law of the jungle. However, this is not quite the case, at least within the European Union. As part of PRISM – Preventing, Redressing, and Inhibiting hate
Speech in new Media, a project funded by the European Commission’s DG Justice – UNICRI, as a member of a consortium led by the Associazione Ricreativa e Culturale Italiana (ARCI) that includes 11 partner organizations based in 5 European countries, has engaged in significant research on the legislative frameworks and procedures in place across Europe to combat hate crime, particularly hate speech in new media.

The data obtained to produce the *Comparative Analysis: Legislation and Existing Legal Procedures for addressing Hate Crime and Hate Speech across the European Union* was derived through the distribution of a comprehensive questionnaire to national equality bodies and relevant ministries in each of the 28 EU Member States.\(^1\) The questionnaire covered issues pertaining to the adherence to international protocols, European and national level legislation, legal procedures, mechanisms for reporting, interagency cooperation, and levels of awareness.

Responses were received from entities in 18 EU countries, allowing for the assessment of trends at the macro level with respect to the use of definitions, the diversity of legislative frameworks, information sharing, reporting procedures, and gaps in awareness and training.

Stakeholders responding to the questionnaire were generally very open, offering important insights for preventing and countering hate speech at the practical level.

To begin with, working definitions of hate speech are often employed to tackle this phenomenon and typically vary from country to country, posing a challenge to harmonization efforts. While utilizing working definitions, and in some cases strictly defining “hatred” in national legislation, can be beneficial at the country-level for tailoring laws to the cultural context, legal harmonization across borders is important in the cyber domain as crimes committed in this field are often transnational in nature. Failure to do so can lead to jurisdictional barriers and differing interpretations as to what constitutes hate speech in a particular state. On the positive side, however, the EU has formulated unified language on forms of hate speech through

\(^1\) For more information, and to download all of the available PRISM reports, please visit: http://unicri.it/special_topics/hate_crimes/
the enactment of EU Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA, meant to be complied with by all member states. Moreover, guidance on hate-based crime from international institutions, such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe provide a basis from which legislation on hate speech can be further enhanced. The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, and specifically its Additional Protocol concerning the criminalisation of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through computer systems, represents a benchmark in the fight against hate speech; yet, some states with- in the EU have still not ratified these fundamental pieces of international legislation.

Legal harmonization across borders is important in the cyber domain as crimes committed in this field are often transnational in nature

In the area of national legislation, many states do prosecute hate speech, but also continue to rely on outdated laws that fail to take into account the potential damage caused by committing such acts in a multimedia environment, which can impact countless individuals. Other states have taken a different route by enacting hate speech legislation that encompasses enhanced penalties for offenses carried out through computer systems, or the like. While serving to contribute to the diversity among legal frameworks for the time being, states such as Croatia, Greece, Latvia, and Spain, among others, do have legislation of this nature and can serve as examples for others to follow.

Disparities with respect to victim assistance and relevant services have also emerged as major issues that need to be addressed in this field. Reporting hate speech incidents in-person or via phone to local police stations remains the standard reporting method in all member states. Other forms of recourse available to victims, depending on their country, include reporting to prosecutorial offices; contacting the police through mobile phone applications, email, or online forms; reporting via a toll-free hate crime hotline; reporting to equality bodies and via third parties; and reporting incidents anonymously. However, according to the data obtained from stakeholders, these methods represent the exception rather than the norm, with most states often offering only two or three of these additional reporting methods. In the case of online hate speech, reporting cybercrime of any kind is typically bewildering to victims due to its virtual nature; therefore, providing multiple methods of reporting can offer them channels through which they can comfortably bring incidents to the attention of law enforcement authorities, and simultaneously tackle underreporting.

Many states do prosecute hate speech, but also continue to rely on outdated laws that fail to take into account the potential damage caused by committing such acts in a multimedia environment

While underreporting represents a serious risk when trying to accurately calculate the number of hate speech incidents at national level, this task is additionally hampered by a lack of data sharing between law enforcement agencies and equality bodies, among others. Where information sharing does happen, it is normally carried out through ad-hoc arrangements. In other circumstances, channels may be official, but information is likely separated in different agency databases, being difficult to
This separation of information leads to the creation of knowledge gaps, contributing to the inability of national authorities to accurately gain a comprehensive understanding of hate speech in their respective countries. While states have begun to form specialized law enforcement departments and prosecutorial offices to address hate-based crime, these entities will still need to routinely share information with national equality bodies and civil society to bridge any knowledge gaps, promote awareness, and build trust within the community.

Finally, training and awareness were evaluated through the questionnaire, with respondents being allowed to rate awareness levels of hate speech among policymakers, civil society, the general public, prosecutors, law enforcement and the private sector. Perceptions regarding hate speech awareness among the general public and the private sector were typically the lowest, with respondents citing poorly funded (or nonexistent) public awareness campaigns and a lack of cooperation with social media and private enterprise as being significant factors. In many countries, training on how to deal with hate speech is often not mandatory, and when it is available, programmes routinely target general human rights issues and are only open to certain actors, such as law enforcement, while failing to take into account the needs of judges or other key stakeholders.

Training remains an important tool for actors to exchange good practices, engage in dialogue, forge networks of cooperation, and kick-start public awareness and victim assistance initiatives.

In conclusion, examples of good practices and legislative measures to combat hate speech are prevalent throughout the EU and efforts are being made to pro-

Underreporting represents a serious risk when trying to accurately calculate the number of hate speech incidents at national level.

It is within this scenario that Europe can distinguish itself and exhibit its strength to effectively address hate speech in new media, simultaneously speaking with a unified voice to foster positive change at the global level.
**The project and the author**

**PRISM** is a project funded by the European Commission - DG Justice, under the Fundamental Rights and Citizenship Programme. PRISM has worked to develop effective strategies for awareness raising, information and dissemination, both for increasing denouncements and reporting, as well as for promoting a more conscious use of language, in order to reduce the use and impact of hate speech. For further information, please consult the PRISM website at prismproject.eu, or the project’s Facebook and Twitter pages.

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Besides the socio-economic motivation, the charm of the Caliphate among children of immigrants

by Viviana Premazzi

The importance and characteristics of the phenomenon

The United Nations Resolution 2178 (2014), adopted unanimously by the Security Council, includes, for the first time, a definition of what a “foreign terrorist fighter” is under international law. Foreign terrorist fighters are defined as “[…] individuals who travel to a state other than their states of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist
acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict.”

In April 2015, the United Nations estimated that as the Syrian conflict escalated, the total foreign fighters inflow increased from 700-1,400 in mid 2012, to 22,000 in early 2015, including approximately 4,000 terrorists from Western Europe. Coming from 100 different countries, foreign terrorist fighters have joined Sunni militant organizations in Syria and Iraq. With up to 11,000 terrorists, the Middle East represents the main region of origin of foreigners involved in the conflict. Among them, 3,000 are Tunisians, 2,500 come from Saudi Arabia and 1,500 from Jordan. As said, Western European states have also experienced notable outward flows of terrorists. France, the UK, and Germany have produced the largest numbers of fighters, while in comparison to their total population size, the most heavily affected countries are Belgium, Sweden, Norway and Denmark.

Regarding the characteristics of the foreign fighters, experts found that almost all Europeans who have joined militant organizations in the Middle East pretend to be Muslim and few of them have direct connections to Syria such as relatives or acquaintances. In addition, their knowledge of the conflicts in the Middle East appears to be very limited. As Remi Piet writes: “Their understanding of the conflict in Syria in fact is, in most cases, the result of a very recent indoctrination, devoid of any solid mastering of the holy texts and historical facts.” Also recent is their discovery (or rediscovery) of the religion and based on some interpretations, they develop or reinforce the

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1 The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence (ICSR) updated figures in the run-up to UN Security Council Resolution 2178 in September 2014, for which ICSR served as external advisor. Last updated data were published by ICSR in collaboration with the Munich Security Conference in beginning 2015. The figures include estimates for 50 countries for which sufficient data and/or reliable government estimates were available. With the exception of some Middle Eastern countries, all figures are based on data from the second half of 2014 and refer to the total number of travellers over the course of the entire conflict. http://icsr.info/

2 Different from Lybia where the fighters have a family connection to the country, as McQuinn, a researcher from the University of Oxford, who conducted field research in Misrata, Libya, pointed out.


perception of a fundamentally sectarian conflict.

As previously mentioned, the majority of the foreign fighters do not have close connections to Syria but, on the other side, according to the findings of the anthropologist Scott Atran, 95% of the foreign fighters who join ISIS are recruited by friends and family members. Family relationships seem to play a crucial role in the recruitment process. In most cases, in fact, radicalisation takes place in small groups and the decisions are influenced by an individual’s interaction with pre-existing social networks or with like-minded individuals. Individuals are often introduced to the jihadist ideology by relatives, friends or even casual or new acquaintances made in a peculiar environment (such as neighbourhood or jail) with whom they recreate their “ideal” family and find a sense of brotherhood. They become a chosen group of fighters for a better world: as the international expert, Lorenzo Vidino, explains, “Jihadist radicalisation in Europe is largely, in substance, a bottom-up process that is better defined as linkage.” For this reason, being based on personal ties, these networks are also more impervious to infiltration. It is also important to note that it is now easier to maintain contacts through social media such as Facebook or Twitter. Those who left for Syria can stay in touch with friends back home and, chat after chat, convince them to leave too. As stated by the researcher and specialist in Islamic radicalisation, Montasser AlDe’emeh “If you play football every day in the park and two of your friends go to Syria, you stay in touch with them on Facebook. They say, ‘It’s boring there in Belgium. Here we have nice rivers and Kalashnikovs. Here in Syria we are somebody’. In Belgium, they’re nobody.”

Besides the socio-economic motivation: what drives the second generation to leave everything and go fight for the Islamic State? What do they look for and what do they not find in European societies?

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5 “It seems apparent that there is no one path to radicalism and no common profile, but each case must be analysed individually. And in many cases, it seems clear, psychology is more useful than sociology in identifying the dynamics of radicalisation”. Lorenzo Vidino, Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy: Birth, Development and Radicalization Dynamics, European Foundation for Democracy and ISPI, 2014, http://www.ispionline.it/it/EBook/vidino-eng.pdf

95% of the foreign fighters who join ISIS are recruited by friends and family members

Experts agree that radicalisation is a highly complex and individualised process and they identify structural (root causes) and individual motivations (personal factors) that sometimes interact with each other: political tensions and cultural cleavages, the shock of a life-changing event and the influence of a mentor. Finally, several theories have been formulated to specifically explain the radicalisation of European second generation youth; as shown by Vidino, “These range from a search for identity to anger over discrimination and relative economic deprivation.”

Today more than ever, the socio-economic motivation, the gap between natives and immigrants (from outside the E.U.), in terms of employment and education opportunities, is not enough: other, perhaps more important, reasons are emerging more related to moral values and purpose for life, and should be discussed and considered for effective programmes of counter-radicalization.

The famous French anthropologist Dounia Bouzar confirms: “Radicalization used to be limited to the poor and the uneducated. Immigrants from Muslim backgrounds were usually the ones who joined jihadist groups. But the situation has changed today.”

Some European foreign fighters, in fact, hold college degrees and do not come from deprived neighbourhoods or face a precarious socio-economic and professional situation. Among the second generation immigrants there are those who feel as if they have no future and are disappointed for not being recognised and accepted as equal citizens. However, the foreign


Jihadist radicalisation in Europe is largely, in substance, a bottom-up process that is better defined as linkage.

It appears that religious motivation represents a strong push factor, de facto their knowledge of Islam is generally extremely superficial (some studied on “Islam for the Dummies”). As professor Rik Coolsaet writes, “They claim for themselves the right to interpret the Koran as they see fit – instead of studying it over decades. Their understanding of Islam is, in most cases, the result of a very recent indoctrination, devoid of any solid mastering of the holy texts and historical facts.” But it is also important to note, as Olivier Roy pointed out after the Paris attacks, that “When they join jihad, they adopt the Salafi version of Islam, because Salafism is both simple to understand (don’ts and do’s), and rigid, providing a personal psychological structuring effect. Moreover, Salafism is the negation of cultural Islam, that is the Islam of their parents and of their roots. Instead of providing them with roots, Salafism glorifies their own deculturation and makes them feel like better ‘Muslims’ than their parents.”

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“Here we have nice rivers and Kalashnikovs. Here in Syria we are somebody.” In Belgium, they’re nobody.

Most of them either broke from the Islam of their parents, or did not share religious beliefs with their parents, a religion culturally integrated in the European societies. It seems that the first generation was not able to share their Islamic culture with their children and also the countries of origin, especially those in the North Africa region, were not involved. The case of Turkey is different, which guaranteed the cultural transmission by sending tutors and imams to destination countries.

Their rediscovery of religion, and in particular of the Salafist version of Islam, also shows this generation has a need for strong narratives. As in the 1970s, many joined Fidel Castro or Che Guevara in South America against “American imperialism,” today, Islam is the new revolutionary ideology, but this time, it is not only against the economic and political “Western imperialism” but more against the cultural imperialism or the “Western approach to life in society.” In fact, the main criticism of the societies where extremists live is not only about discrimination or economic deprivation (if they are victims), but also about the loss of values from the Western societies. This involves questioning the role of women, the use of drugs, gay marriage etc. In this sense ISIS, as well as other extremist groups, provide for an alternative society with clear and straightforward rules. Moral absolutes are part and parcel of IS’ force of attraction, and all the more so since these can be applied immediately in Iraq and Syria. The goal of the recruiters and of ISIS propaganda is to make these young people believe that the world is evil and that they have been chosen, to go to Syrian and Iraq to fight for jihad, to make it a better place.

According to Dounia Bouzar, ISIS is able to conquer the minds and hearts of young people with a key message: they, who can no longer recognize and find themselves in the world in which they grew up, in those values and in that kind of culture, they are not the wrong ones, on the contrary, they are “the chosen by God, those to who he revealed the 9 Olivier Roy, What is the driving force behind jihadist terrorism? – A scientific perspective on the causes/circumstances of joining the scene, speech at European University Institute, BKA Autumn Conference, 18 - 19 November 2015, https://life.eui.eu/

truth than others are not allowed to see.”

Among the second generation immigrants there are those who feel as if they have no future and are disappointed for not being recognised and accepted.

As Roy highlights, those who joined ISIS shared the youth culture of their generation, they probably drank alcohol, smoked pot, towed girls and then, one day, they decided to (re)convert to the religion of their fathers but in the Salafi version, because they rejected the culture of their parents and even the “Western” culture, which become the symbol of their self-hatred. They believe the Islam proclaimed and lived by the jihadists is the right path to follow to be a good Muslim and the Islamic state is the only place in the world where one can be a good Muslim. In addition, the charm and strength of the message of ISIS compared to that of other fundamentalist groups, including Al Qaeda, is that today, ISIS offers the young who fail to find their place in the West both for socio-economic reasons, values and lifestyles, not just a cause to fight for, which makes them feel part of the community (ummah) of the believers, but also a physical place where they can be full citizens and true believers.

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It is widely recognized that the main purpose of the criminal justice system does not lie exclusively in punishing offenders, but above all and primarily, in respecting and restoring the human rights, dignity and needs of victims of crime.\(^1\)

**Bearing in mind that criminal procedural law and human rights protection are closely interdependent**

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\(^1\) Jeannette Kloetzer, Deputy Head of the OSCE Centre in Astana, Two-day OSCE-organized training seminar for judges on good legislative and judicial practices to combat trafficking in human-beings, 29 November 2011. See [http://www.osce.org/astana/85448](http://www.osce.org/astana/85448).
and reinforce each other\textsuperscript{2}, when responding to trafficking in persons within the criminal justice system, it is crucial to have the best interests of the trafficked victims\textsuperscript{3} at the forefront of all efforts to prevent and combat trafficking.

A victim-centred criminal justice approach to trafficking is most effective in terms of achieving a successful prosecution of the traffickers and supporting the human rights of the trafficked victims. Indeed, without access to protection and concrete assistance provisions, trafficked victims may not develop sufficient trust to cooperate with law enforcement personnel in their investigations activities and to effectively participate in the criminal justice process. Additionally, since without evidence and testimony from trafficked victims it is often difficult to prosecute the traffickers with full effect, ensuring the right to be heard and to participate in criminal proceedings (as a victim and/or a witness) is crucial for both reducing victim’s vulnerability and effectively prosecuting traffickers.

\textbf{Without access to protection and concrete assistance provisions, trafficked victims may not develop sufficient trust to cooperate with law enforcement personnel}

\textbf{Rights, support and protection of trafficked persons. The overall legal framework.}

At the international level, the rights of the victims of trafficking in criminal proceedings are defined in the 2000 UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime\textsuperscript{4} supplemented by the 2000 UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children. Those recognized rights are additional and correlative to those affirmed in the non-binding General Assembly’s Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power.\textsuperscript{5}

At the European level, the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings takes a “human rights-based approach” to the issue, explicitly highlighting the importance of protecting the rights of the victims while designing a comprehensive framework for their protection and assistance as victims and witnesses. Accordingly, the Directive 2011/36/EU on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and Protecting its Victims, which has replaced the Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings,\textsuperscript{6} prioritizes the protection of victims over the punishing perspective, explicitly supporting the adoption of an “integrated, holistic and human rights approach to the fight against trafficking in human beings.” With particular regard to the rights of victims and witnesses in criminal proceedings, those provisions need to be combined with the more recent minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime in general, as set


\textsuperscript{3} “Victims” means persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omission that are in violation of criminal laws operative within Members States, including those laws proscribing criminal abuse of power”. Item A.6 of the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations A/RES/40/34, 29 November 1985. See, inter alia, M. C. Bassiouni, Declaration of basic principles for victims and abuse of power, in The protection of collective victims, Paris, 1988.

\textsuperscript{4} UN General Assembly, UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime - https://www.unodc.org/


\textsuperscript{6} § 12 of the preamble to Directive 2011/36/EU.

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid, 7.
out in the Directive 2012/29/EU. This comprehensive approach shows a new widespread awareness of the needs of victims of crime. More specifically, it takes in due consideration the complexity of victimization in the phenomenon of trafficking.

**Italian legislation and the actual legal framework. Major challenges and persistent issues.**

In this scenario, Italian substantive/procedural model appears extremely progressive and innovative with respect to both assistance and protection of victims.

In accordance with Article 600 of the Italian penal code - recently rewritten in order to reflect the wide definition of human trafficking provided by both the UN Trafficking Protocol and the European Directive 2011/56/EU - the Italian substantive criminal law provisions defines the victim of human trafficking as a person reduced or maintained in a state of continued subjection, forced into labour, sexual services, begging or exploitation of criminal activities. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that despite the comprehensive legal framework on trafficking in human beings, the Italian anti-trafficking efforts and policies focus on the sexual exploitation of women with minor attention paid to the growing trend of trafficking for labour exploitation.

**Assistance provisions. Temporary residence and long-term assistance programme**

Of great importance is Article 18 of the Legislative Decree n. 286/1998 (Italian Immigration Act) which provides victims of severe exploitation with a six-month temporary residence permit for humanitarian reasons. More specifically, the temporary permit applies to foreigners in situations of abuse or severe exploitation where their safety is seen to be endangered as a result of trying to escape from the situation or as a consequence of pursuing criminal action against the traffickers.

According to the Italian law, registered NGOs, associations and law enforcement authorities are in charge of identifying victims of trafficking. However, considering that a correct identification of victims is a prerequisite toward safeguarding their rights, it is crucial to harmonize the existing local guidelines by homogenously defining a formal identification procedure. Additionally, in order to effectively

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8 The residence permits is renewable for one year and can be converted into study or work permits if the official requirements occur.
address victims’ needs, it is truly important to build institutional capacities as well as provide social workers and relevant law enforcement officials – especially from Identification and Expulsion Centres (CIEs) – with adequate training on trafficking in persons.

In order to obtain the above-mentioned residence permit, victims identified are required to participate in a programme for assistance and social reintegration managed and financed by the Italian Department for Equal Opportunities. The social integration projects within this programme (including accommodation, educational activities, health-care services, language courses, training) are conducted by registered civil society organizations (CSOs) which are selected through the governmental calls process.

**The temporary permit applies to foreigners in situation of abuse or severe exploitation where their safety is seen to be endangered**

Art. 18 envisages two alternative channels for obtaining a temporary permit: a judicial procedure (“judicial path”) activated by a public prosecutor which entails cooperation with competent authorities in criminal investigations and a risk assessment of victims’ vulnerabilities made by local authorities, accredited CSOs or NGOs (“social path”).

Although the temporary permit does not depend on victims’ capacity or willingness to collaborate with law enforcement authorities, it was reported that projects under art. 18 help increase victims’ cooperation during investigations. Indeed, social assistance projects and long-term residence permits contribute to build trust in law enforcement and local authorities, and strongly encourage judicial cooperation.

This approach prioritizes victims’ rights per se over the interests of prosecutors. However, it was observed that more restrictive immigration policies as well as the recent introduction

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of the Security Package (Law n. 94/2009) – which define and punish the crime of illegal entry and stay in the State’s territory – have forced several victims to choose between remaining exploited or facing the prospect of being criminalized, put in detention or deported.

In-court protection. Victims support and rights in Italian criminal proceedings

Bearing in mind that trafficked victims often face a secondary victimization during investigations and criminal trials, a comprehensive rights-based approach is required to effectively address their needs as victims and witnesses.

**Trafficked victims often face a secondary victimization during investigations and criminal trials**

In order to prevent secondary victimization or trauma during the criminal proceedings, Italian criminal procedure system en-visages the institution of a special evidence pre-trial hearing


nesses may be convinced not to testify, or if there is a risk of them leaving the country before the trial starts.

In trafficking cases, this pre-trial hearing can be requested without producing causes of non-adjournment or non-renewability as a standard practice aimed at reducing the secondary victimization as well as preventing the risk of a time-lag between the application of assistance programmes and the trial.

Conclusions

Although the Italian legal framework on trafficking represents a very comprehensive and progressive model, many institutional inadequacies still persist. The late adoption of a National Plan Against Trafficking (2016–2018) aimed at providing clear national identification guidelines, administrative tools and protocols as well as the inadequate implementation of Directive 2011/36/EU represents a persistent concern in correctly addressing the trafficking issue following an approach based on the principles of human rights protection and victims of crime support.

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The author

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Institutional child sexual abuse: impacts and responses

by Basia Spalek, Catherine McCall and Heather Bacon
Many countries are now dealing with cases of large-scale institutional child sexual abuse. The institutional aspects of child sexual abuse include: inadequate procedures to protect children; values that place the reputations of organisations above bringing child sex offenders to justice; marginalization of victims and whistleblowers; failure to involve police authorities to investigate criminality; and people in authority misusing their power to target vulnerable children through paedophile networks and organized crime syndicates. The hidden and insidious nature of institutional child sexual abuse makes it impossible to estimate its true extent.

Children subjected to severe and ongoing abuse cope by developing various psychological strategies, known as accommodation to abuse. The child may feel that something is very wrong but the abuser suppress their natural response by telling them it is normal. Most perpetrators have a close relationship with the victim, as a family member on whom the child depends, or a trusted adult in a position of authority and power. One function of accommodation is to protect the secret of the abuse. It is commonly induced by such threats as rejecting or sending the child away, abusing another child in their stead, killing a pet, or even killing the victim. Most crippling is the assertion that no one will believe them, an assertion that only too often turns out to be correct. Abusers may also deliberately induce guilt in the child about instigating the sexual acts. In organised abuse the child is trained to bring in other victims. Once the victim believes that they must accept the abuse and can never tell, the abuser is protected.

The profound impact of child sexual abuse on victims and survivors is often underestimated and misunderstood by professionals, and by society in general. The media may reject or vilify survivors who seem inconsistent or unreliable. Only a small proportion of survivors report their childhood abuse, many have significant mental or physical health problems, and some may take their own lives. It is essential to educate professionals and the wider society about these complex issues in order to promote better understanding and acceptance.

The child may feel that something is very wrong but the abuser suppress their natural response by telling them it is normal.

These dynamics create immense obstacles in accessing the justice system. The way investigations are carried out is determined by evidential standards for proving abuse. Survivors with mental health problems are particularly likely to be accused of non-cooperation, unreliability, fabrication or malicious allegations. Since
sexual abuse is by nature a secret and private crime, there are unlikely to be witnesses, and with historical abuse it is hard to obtain independent corroboration, or forensic evidence.

Police interviews are deemed to be most valuable where the survivor gives a spontaneous account of the experience without questioning or prompting. However, victims of long-term abuse simply cannot give a straightforward account of experiences that have become meshed together into one long nightmare. The process of remembering may induce dissociative flashbacks, producing secondary trauma.

The U.K. Government has set up an independent public inquiry into child sexual abuse led by Hon. Lowell Goddard. However, some survivors and their supporters do not have confidence in the public inquiry and have therefore established a separate United Kingdom Child Sex Abuse People’s Tribunal (UKCSAPT). This is an independent body of experts that is examining cases of institutional child sex abuse by providing a forum where survivors, supporters, and witnesses can speak freely. The objectives are: to raise potential avenues of inquiry related to the context, nature, and depth of institutional child sex abuse; to provide a safe space free from interference and scrutiny; to independently establish how institutional policies and judicial systems have failed survivors and failed to protect the best interests of the child; and to independently determine and discuss constructive remedies which could best address the allegations and issues brought forth.¹

The UKCSAPT panel received 24 written submissions; 18 from survivors, 4 from professionals, one from a journalist/whistleblower and one from the administrator of a charity. Four witnesses also gave verbal testimony. In this very small sample, the tribunal panel has nevertheless recognised patterns found in larger research studies, including how children become

vulnerable, how abusers gain access to them, and impediments in accessing the criminal justice system.

With repeated trauma the abusive experiences become separated from other parts of the child’s life and eventually, they become inaccessible to the child’s recall.

The UKCSAPT tribunal panel proposes that institutional child sexual abuse should be approached through the lens of social rather than criminal harm. Although the panel would welcome changes in the criminal justice system to assist survivors, in reality the UK adversarial system rarely achieves justice for them.

A social harm approach to child sexual abuse begins with a focus on the social origin of these heinous harms. Whilst human agency (that is, the actions of individuals) is acknowledged as important, more important still is a focus upon the wider social structures that create and sustain child sexual abuse. This perspective on the social aspects, or the socially determining contexts of child sexual abuse, would prioritise societal education, and interdisciplinary training for professionals working with vulnerable children and adult survivors across all service sectors.

The UKCSAPT tribunal panel proposes that institutional child sexual abuse should be approached through the lens of social rather than criminal harm.

UKCSAPT recommends the establishment of a non-govern-
mental commission for survivors, who would be able to develop a bond of trust with an advocate who would be assisted in the steps necessary to access justice. Specialist mental health services, linked with the police would be created to facilitate the process of disclosure. In cases of organized and ritual abuse an external agency, possibly a national crime agency, should provide independent scrutiny of local police services. It is only when such progressive measures are implemented that we can say that children will be safer and that survivors will be heard.

The authors

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**Catherine McCall** is a Licensed Marriage and Family Therapist in the United States with 30 years of clinical experience. A survivor of sexual abuse herself, she is author of the international bestselling memoir Never Tell, and on the Speakers Bureau of the largest anti-sexual assault organization in the U.S.A, the Rape and Incest National Network (RAINN). catherinemccall.net - http://catherinemccall.net

**Heather Bacon** is a retired Consultant Clinical Psychologist who began working with child victims of sexual abuse in Cleveland, U.K., where there was a crisis that led to a judicial inquiry in 1987. She specialised in the field of child protection for over 30 years, and acted as an expert witness in the U.K. courts. Over that time she has written, taught and taken part in collaborative attempts to raise the profile of child sexual abuse and the problems of societal recognition.
12 January 2016

International Organization for Migration

IOM Advises Central American States on Management of Cuban Migration

International Organization for Migration

- a pilot group of 180 Cuban economic migrants stranded in Costa Rica since 14 November 2015, will leave shelters provided by the Government of Costa Rica and depart the country as regular migrants;
- “The departure of the pilot group of Cubans should not distract from the urgent need to provide humanitarian assistance to another 7,802 Cubans who remain stranded in Costa Rica”.

20 January 2016

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

Home at last for Colombians as settlement declared legal

Thousands of displaced people will finally have access to education, roads, and housing after 10 years as their informal neighbourhood is incorporated into city of Cúcuta.

22 January 2016

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

CR deplores loss of life in the Aegean Sea, amidst worsening weather conditions

UNHCR deeply deplores the loss of life for the umpteenth time in two tragedies in the early hours of today when at least 42 people from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, including 18 women, 17 children and 7 men have been reported dead off Farmakonissi and Kalolimnos islets near Leros and Kalymnos islands, in South-East Aegean.

28 January 2016

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

UNHCR alarmed at the plight of refugees and migrants at Bulgaria borders

Sofia – The UN Refugee Agency is extremely alarmed at reports of two dead bodies being found on the Bulgarian border with Serbia, last week.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh C. Johnson on the State of Homeland Security

• We are expanding our Refugee Admissions Program to help vulnerable men, women and children in Central America who qualify as refugees.
• We are doing our part to address the Syrian refugee crisis. USCIS, in conjunction with the Department of State, is working hard to meet our commitment to admit at least 10,000 Syrian refugees by the end of this fiscal year.

Government of Serbia

Migrants returned from EU cannot stay in Serbia

Belgrade – Minister of the Interior Nebojsa Stefanovic said that Serbia will not become a “collective centre” for migrants, as it was clear that those not allowed into the European Union could also not stay in Serbia.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

Two children drown every day on average trying to reach safety in Europe

Two children have drowned every day on average since September 2015 trying to cross the eastern Mediterranean to find safety with their families in Europe, UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, said today.

International Organization for Migration, UN Children’s Fund, UN High Commissioner for Refugees

With growing numbers of child deaths at sea, UN agencies call for enhancing safety for refugees and migrants

GENEVA, 16 February 2016 – An average of two children have drowned every day since September 2015 as their families try to cross the eastern Mediterranean, and the number of child deaths is growing said IOM, UNHCR, and UNICEF. The agencies are calling for enhancing the safety of those escaping conflict and despair.
Government of the Republic of Slovenia

Slovenian initiative to stop irregular migration is yielding the first results

“Since the beginning of the migration crisis, Slovenia has been active, and this activity has yielded results – our initiative to stop irregular migration has been heard, accepted and supported by a large majority of leaders of European countries. It is also the only initiative to resolve the migration crisis that has begun to be implemented.”

Government of Serbia

Serbia not to become shelter for tens of thousands of migrants

Belgrade/Vienna, 24 Feb 2016 – First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivica Dacic said today in Vienna that Serbia will not be in a position to allow the migrants, whose influx has been permanent, remain and stay longer in our territory, if the countries upstream along the route block their passage and the final destination countries deny them reception.

Government of Hungary

Number of illegal migrants on Serbian-Hungarian border on the rise

The number of migrants who seek to cross the Serbian-Hungarian border illegally is on the rise: some 500 attempted to cross the border illegally in January, 650 up to 15 February, and in the last ten days 110 migrants have sought to enter Hungary illegally per day on average.

International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies

Humanitarian crisis in Greece – Red Cross scales up response

Despite EU talks with Turkey to stop the flow of migrants into Greece, more than 1,300 vulnerable migrants on average continue to arrive to the Greek islands every day. Over 35,000 migrants have been stranded across Greece for the past weeks. The situation is particularly dire in northern Greece with around 20,000 people, mostly families, waiting close to the border.
EU Migration Summit

EU Migration Summit: “Some European States showing a complete disregard for human rights” – UN expert

GENEVA (16 March 2016) – Europe cannot shrug off its responsibility for migrants and pass the buck to Turkey, said the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau.

“I have repeatedly stated that the only way to reduce migrant smuggling is to take over the market by offering regular, safe and cheap mobility solutions, with all the identity and security checks that efficient visa procedures can provide,” he insisted.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

More than one million refugees travel to Greece since 2015

GENEVA, March 16 (UNHCR) – The UN Refugee Agency said today that more than one million people, mostly refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, have now crossed into Greece since the start of 2015.

European Commission

EU and Turkey agree European response to refugee crisis

EU leaders and Turkey have agreed a comprehensive plan that opens a safe and legal route to the EU for Syrian refugees while reducing irregular migration. The plan fully respects EU and international law, and comes into effect on 20 March.

UN Children’s Fund

New EU-Turkey agreement on refugee and migrants could leave children at risk: UNICEF

Geneva – UNICEF today expressed concern that the new agreement between the EU and Turkey, which comes into effect this week, does not address the pressing humanitarian needs of 19,000 refugee and migrant children stranded in Greece.
UN High Commissioner for Refugees

UNHCR Chief in Canada hails PM’s leadership in global affairs

- United Nations refugee chief congratulated Prime Minister Justin Trudeau for his humanitarian leadership
- Canada is expected to resettle around 45,000 refugees in 2016

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

UN rights chief expresses serious concerns over EU-Turkey agreement

GENEVA (24 March 2016) – The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein on Thursday expressed serious concerns about the recent agreement between the European Union and Turkey, pointing to what he termed “a contradiction at the heart of the agreement,” as well as raising concerns regarding arbitrary detention of refugees and migrants.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

UNHCR calls for urgent action as Central American asylum claims soar

- The UN Refugee Agency today called for urgent action to help hundreds of people fleeing violence in Central America that has surged to levels not seen since the region was wracked by armed conflicts in the 1980s.
- 3,423 people, most of them from El Salvador and Honduras, sought asylum in Mexico. This was 164 per cent increase over 2013 and a 65 per cent increase since 2014.

UN Children’s Fund

UNICEF urges full hearings for refugee and migrant children stranded in Greece

Geneva – Currently more than 22,000 refugee and migrant children are stranded in Greece, facing an uncertain future and even forms of detention since the agreement went into effect last month.
8 April 2016

European Union

Frontex assists Greece in transporting migrants to Turkey

Today Frontex assisted Greece in transporting 124 migrants on two ferries from the island of Lesbos to Turkey. One of the migrants was refused by the Turkish authorities and was returned to Lesbos.

11 April 2016

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

UNHCR statement on violence on the Greece-FYROM border on 10 April

“Time and again in recent months we have seen tension unfolding at various European borders, between security forces on the one hand and people fleeing war and in need of help on the other. People get hurt and property is damaged. Harm is done to perceptions of refugees and to Europe’s image alike. Everyone loses.” (UNHCR Spokesperson Adrian Edwards)

12 April 2016

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

UNHCR: Include refugees and displaced in Colombia peace talks

• March 30 2016, the Government of Colombia and the ELN announced that they would start formal peace talks in an effort to end Colombia’s five-decade armed conflict that has produced the world’s second biggest displacement situation as of today, after Syria.
• Some 6.7 million people are displaced inside the Andean nation - around 13 per cent of the entire population. And 560,000 officially recognized refugees have fled abroad, most to Ecuador - which hosts the largest number of refugees in Latin America - and to Venezuela, home to around 170,000 Colombians in need of international protection.

20 April 2016

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

Massive loss of life reported in latest Mediterranean tragedy

Geneva – If confirmed, as many as 500 people may have lost their lives when the large boat went down in the Mediterranean Sea at an unknown location between Libya and Italy. The 41 survivors - 37 men, three women and a three-year-old child - were rescued by a merchant ship and taken to Kalamata, in the Peloponnese peninsula of Greece on April 16.
International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies

Dozens missing and hundreds rescued in tragic weekend of boat disasters

More than 700 people attempting the lethal sea crossing from North Africa to Italy were rescued and taken to Sicily this weekend. Italian Red Cross teams at the port of Pozzallo and Messina provided emergency medical care, food, water and psychological support to survivors who were rescued by the Italian coast-guard on Sunday. Two bodies were also retrieved in the rescue.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

UNHCR Calls for Immediate Movement of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers to Humane Conditions

There are approximately 2000 very vulnerable refugees and asylum-seekers on Manus Island and Nauru. These people have already been through a great deal, many have fled war and persecution, some have already suffered trauma. Despite efforts by the Governments of Papua New Guinea and Nauru, arrangements in both countries have proved completely untenable.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees

Coastguard rescues some 1,000 refugees and migrants off Italy

Approximately 1,000 people of various nationalities, including refugee families and unaccompanied children, have been rescued from the Mediterranean Sea in operations coordinated by Frontex, UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, said today.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

8 Migrants Rescued at Checkpoint by Rio Grande Valley Agents

FALFURRIAS, Texas — Agents rescued 8 illegal immigrants hidden inside a tractor trailer early Sunday morning at the Falfurrias Checkpoint on U.S. Highway 281 North. The rescue occurred when the driver and passenger, both U.S. citizens, approached the checkpoint. During the inspection, a Border Patrol canine alerted to the trailer. Upon further inspection, agents discovered the illegal immigrants concealed between pallets of cabbage with no means of escape.
11 May 2016

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

37 Immigrants Found in a Shrine Adorned Stash House by Rio Grande Valley Agents

EDINBURG, Texas – Border Patrol agents discovered a stash house in Edinburg with 37 illegal immigrants on Monday afternoon. A United States citizen and a Mexican national suspected of being the caretakers were arrested.

13 May 2016

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

Migrant children face grim human rights conditions in Greece

Approximately, one third of all migrants arriving in Greece are children. Migrant children, both accompanied and unaccompanied, are facing “serious violations to their human rights.” Whether they are in informal, formal, open or closed facilities, children lack access to education, play, adequate water and food.

13 May 2016

Frontex

Number of migrants arriving in Greece dropped 90% in April

The number of migrants arriving on the Greek islands in April plunged by 90% compared to the previous month, reaching fewer than 2,700. The drop is a result of several factors, including The EU-Turkey agreement and stricter border policies applied by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at its border with Greece.

16 May 2016

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (uscis.gov)

Temporary Protected Status Extended

Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson has extended Temporary Protected Status for eligible nationals of Honduras and Nicaragua for 18 months beginning on July 5, 2016
24 May 2016

International Federation of Red Cross And Red Crescent Societies

Migration crisis: border closures, changing routes and thousands stranded demand change in Red Cross response

The closure of the Western Balkan route in February and the implementation of the EU-Turkey deal in March, which will see new arrivals in Greece and potentially returned to Turkey, has seen the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) shift its response to meet the changing needs of migrants.

Arrivals into Greece continue but have plummeted with a daily average of 47 people per day.

26 May 2016

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Smugglers abandon women and children in the brush

EDINBURG, Texas — U.S. Border Patrol agents assigned to the Rio Grande Valley Sector saved the lives of a man, a women and a 3 year old who were abandoned by their smugglers in two separate incidents in the last 24 hours.

26 May 2016

U.S. Customs and Border Protection

Rio Grande Valley Agents rescue people locked in U-Haul

KINGSVILLE, Texas — U.S. Border Patrol agents at the Kingsville checkpoint rescued two people Thursday whose lives were in danger due to the reckless tactics of human smugglers.

31 May 2016

International Organization for Migration

Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals in 2016: 204,311; Deaths 2,443

Italy – IOM reports an estimated 204,311 migrants and refugees entered Europe by sea in 2016 through 30 May, arriving in Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Spain.

After a surge in reported shipwrecks and other incidents at sea during the past eight days, estimated deaths through 30 May this year have risen to 2,445 on all Mediterranean routes - a 54 percent increase over the first five months of 2015.

The past eight days – with at least 1,000 deaths – mark one of the deadliest periods yet in the migration crisis, which is now in its fourth year.
European Commission

Commission announces New Migration Partnership Framework: reinforced cooperation with third countries to better manage migration

Strasbourg - The European Commission has today set out plans for a new results-oriented Partnership Framework to mobilise and focus EU action and resources in our external work on managing migration. The EU will seek tailor made partnerships with key third countries of origin and transit using all policies and instruments at the EU’s disposal to achieve concrete results. Building on the European Agenda on Migration, the priorities are saving lives at sea, increasing returns, enabling migrants and refugees to stay closer to home and, in the long term, helping third countries’ development in order to address root causes of irregular migration.

International Federation of Red Cross

Italian Red Cross teams up with search and rescue service to save lives in the Mediterranean

Medics from the Italian Red Cross joined forces with the Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) on board its flagship rescue vessel Phoenix as it set sail from Malta on Monday.

The joint mission signals the stepping-up of the Italian Red Cross response to the on-going migration crisis in the Mediterranean. Although its emergency teams are currently stationed at ports and asylum centres across Italy, this is the first time the society has taken to the water to support life-saving operations.

International organization for Migration

Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals in 2016: 207,260; Deaths 2,856

Italy - IOM reports an estimated 207,260 migrants and refugees entered Europe by sea in 2016 through 8 June, arriving in Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Spain. Deaths so far this year are 2,856, compared with 1,838 through the first six months of 2015. In other words, fatalities in the Mediterranean in 2016 are over 1,000 more than last year’s mid-year total, although we now are some three weeks shy of 2016’s mid-year point.
We live in a world which is becoming increasingly urban. Over 54 per cent of people across the globe were living in urban areas in 2014. The current urban population of 3.9 billion is expected to grow to some 6.4 billion by 2050. Migration is driving much of the increase in urbanization, making cities much more diverse places in which to live.

Nearly one in five of all migrants live in the world’s top 20 largest cities. In many of these cities migrants represent over a third or more of the population. Other cities have seen a remarkable growth in migration in recent years. In Asia and Africa, rapidly growing small cities are expected to absorb almost all the future urban population growth of the world and this mobility pattern to cities and urban areas is characterized by the temporality and circularity of the internal migration process.

The fast rate of urbanization, and rising migration to cities, brings with it both risks and opportunities for the migrants, communities and governments concerned. The World Migration Report 2015 explores how migration and migrants are shaping cities, and how the life of migrants, in turn, is shaped by cities, their people, organizations and rules.

The report contributes to the global debate on migration and urbanization in three ways. First, it documents how migration is shaping cities and the situation of migrants in cities. Much of the current discussion about migration trends and migration policy tends to focus on the national level. Taking the migration enquiry to the city level increases our understanding of the local political economies of migration and the close connection between migration and urban development. Second, the report draws attention to the livelihood of migrants in the cities of the Global South. The existing discussions on migrants and cities are inclined to concentrate primarily on the Global North and the integration of international migrants. Third, the report examines both internal and international migration with cities across the development spectrum having to manage growing mobile and diverse populations. The first two chapters of the report present the main trends in cities and migration, and examine the various urban settings which have experienced recent growth of migration flows. Chapter 3 addresses urban vulnerabilities in general – livelihood and mobility strategies, barriers to accessing resources and specific forms of vulnerabilities, as they affect the populations most at risk including migrant women. Chapter 4 explores how urbanization and new mobility patterns can contribute to
In this Handbook the Inter-Parliamentary Union, the International Labour Office and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights offer responses to fundamental questions on migration, such as those concerned with its root causes and possible responses in terms of good policies and practices, as well as the challenges, both for migrants and for countries, in relation to national well-being, development and social cohesion. The handbook proposes a balanced approach to make effective laws and policies that address the human rights of migrants and the governance of migration.

Parliamentarians have a critical role to play to ensure a meaningful, balanced and informed response to migration. They are responsible for adopting adequate laws on migration to give effect to international obligations under the international treaty framework, in particular with respect to human rights norms and labour standards. Parliamentarians and governments can and should promote fair and effective policies in order to maximize the benefits of migration while addressing the real challenges that host, transit and origin countries and migrants face.

The main chapters concern international migration today; international law, migration and human rights; the elimination of discrimination and equality of opportunity and treatment; key human rights principles regarding the protection of migrants and fundamental human rights-based governance of migration.
Kevin Robins, Asu Aksoy, Routledge 2016

**Transnationalism, Migration and the Challenge to Europe - The Enlargement of Meaning**

This publication puts forward an alternative outline for thinking about migration in a European context. Moving beyond the agenda of identity politics, the book addresses possibilities more related to the experiential and existential dimensions of migratory - and importantly, post-migratory - lives. Examining the fundamental and radical argument that migrants should be regarded not as a problematical category, but rather as opening up new cultural and imaginative channels for those living in Europe, the book draws on extensive empirical work undertaken by the authors over the past ten years.

Grounded in the actual lives and experiences of migrant Turks, the book evaluates how their articulations regarding identity and belonging have been changing over the last decade. The agenda regarding migration and belonging has shifted over this crucial period of time. This shift is counterpoised against the unchanging national positions, and against the supra-national stance of ‘official’ European approaches and policies regarding migration and identity.

Transnationalism, Migration and the Challenge to Europe would be of interest to those involved in sociology, anthropology, transnational studies, migration studies, cultural studies, media studies and European studies.

Martin Geiger, Antoine Pécoud, Routledge 2015

**International Organisations and the politics of Migration**

Over the last two decades, international migration has become a global issue. It is perceived as an ongoing challenge for governments, as well as an issue that is deeply related to other international challenges, such as development, climate change, security and public health. In this context, international organisations have become influential in the way in which migration is thought about and governed. They play an important role, steering states’ behaviour and intervening on the ground, through the design and implementation of immigration policy.

International organisations tend to promote a positive view of migration, extolling its benefits for all parties. There often exists a contrast between this positive approach and the public and political scepticism regularly expressed in Western receiving countries. According to their advocates, international organizations have
the potential to improve the governance of migration, by supporting cooperation between states and promoting balanced and comprehensive political strategies. However their detractors criticise them for aligning themselves with the interests of receiving states and for their political agenda. This publication brings together analytical and empirical contributions that explore the role of international organisations in migration politics worldwide. This book was originally published as a special issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies.

Dario Melossi, University of Bologna, 2015

**Crime, Punishment and Migration**

In the globalized world an extensive process of international migration has developed. The resulting conundrum of issues when examining crime and migration makes for a bitterly complex and intriguing set of debates. In this compelling account, Dario Melossi provides an authoritative take on the theory and research examining the connection of crime, migration and punishment. Through a socio-historical and criminological approach, he shows that the core questions of migrants’ criminal behaviour are tightly related to the rules and practices of migrants’ reception within the various countries’ social and normative structures.

Written for students, academics, researchers and activists with an interest in the topic, the book will appeal to individuals in a range of disciplines, from criminology and sociology to politics, international relations, ethnic studies, geography, social policy and development.
The securitisation of migration in the EU. Debates since 9/11

“Since 9/11 Western states have sought to integrate ‘securitisation’ measures within migration regimes as asylum seekers and other migrant categories come to be seen as agents of social instability or as potential terrorists seeking to exploit immigration systems. But the upshot of treating migration as a security threat is the increased insecurity amongst migrant and ethnic minority populations in the West and particularly among those from Muslim majority countries or long-settled Muslim communities. This study of migration and security therefore considers whether national-societal or human-centric perspectives should be adopted, and whether the divergent and competing approaches to security (national, societal, human) can or should ever be reconciled. The questions arising from this dilemma are important for academics, policy-makers and the general public.”

Migration across boundaries. Linking research to practice and experience.

Bringing together scholars and practitioners from a range of disciplinary backgrounds working in Europe, North and South America, South Asia and the Middle East, this volume explores the question of how to ensure that migration research feeds back into improving the lives of migrants. It emphasises the necessarily interdisciplinary and cross-boundary nature of migration research, offering methodological recommendations to anyone studying or working in the field, and showing how migration studies can usefully affect real contexts by better exploring the potential that exists for both bridging academic disciplines and building links with work that occurs beyond strictly academic forums. Organised around the themes of methodological considerations and interdisciplinary approaches, the experiences of migrants as researchers and interaction between practitioners, policy-makers and academics, the book discusses the realities of the discourses that surround international migration, examining the proper role of academia in bringing together a range of stakeholders to formulate dialogic approaches to understanding migration. An international and interdisciplinary contribution to our understanding of how research in migration can be brought to bear on the experiences of migrants and linked to the work of activists, artists and policy-makers, this book will appeal not
only to scholars and students of migration across the social sciences, but also to those working in the fields of migrant advocacy and activism.

Robert E.B. Lucas - professor of Economics, Boston University, MA, USA. 2014

**International Handbook on migration and economic development**

Migration and economic development are mutually linked. Development is a catalyst for migration and vice versa. However, the signs of causal links in both directions remain widely disputed, prompting questions about the reciprocity between the two.

This Handbook summarizes the state of thinking and presents new evidence on various links between international migration and economic development, with particular reference to lower-income countries. The connections between trade, aid and migration are critically examined through global case studies. Some of the topics covered include: a review of European states’ co-development strategies to limit immigration and redirect remittances; an exploration of the role of the diaspora in transferring technology and stimulating trade; and an examination of the economic roots of international terrorism.

The various chapters extend our frontiers of understanding with fresh evidence, providing a useful reference point for researchers, students and policymakers interested in development and migration.

Sharon Pickering and Julie Ham. 2015

**The Routledge handbook on crime and international migration**

The publication addresses the various relationships between migration, crime and victimization that have informed a wide criminological scholarship often driven by some of the original lines of inquiry of the Chicago School. Historically, migration and crime came to be the device by which criminology and cognate fields sought to tackle issues of race and ethnicity, often in highly problematic ways. However, in the contemporary period this body of scholarship is inspiring scholars to produce significant evidence that speaks to some of the biggest public policy questions and debunks many dominant mythologies around the criminality of migrants.

The book also addresses the theoretical, empirical and policy knots found in the relationship between regular and irregular migration, offending and victimization, the
UNICRI’s Library Selection

processes and impact of criminalization, and the changing role of criminal justice systems in the regulation and enforcement of international mobility and borders. The handbook is focused on the migratory ‘fault lines’ between the Global North and Global South, which have produced new or accelerated sites of state control, constructed irregular migration as a crime and security problem, and mobilized ideological and coercive powers usually reserved for criminal or military threats. The book offers a strong international focus and comprehensive coverage of a wide range of border, criminal justice and migration-related issues.

Feargal Cochrane - Routledge Studies in Peace and Conflict Resolution. 2015

Migration and Security in the Global Age. Diaspora communities and conflict

This book is an interdisciplinary examination of several interconnecting aspects of migrant communities in the context of contemporary conflict and security. The book illustrates that within this globalised world, migrants have become key actors, living in the spaces between states, as well as within them. Arguing that migrants and their descendants are vital and complex constituencies for the achievement of security in this global age, the volume uses a number of case studies, including Palestinian, Sri Lankan, Irish and Somali diaspora communities, to explore the different ways that such groups intersect with issues of security, and how these attitudes and behaviours have evolved in the context of political transnationalism and the global economy.

Comparative and econometric studies of migration can provide a wide lens but at times fail to capture the depth and complexity of these communities and attitudes within them. At the same time, empirically focused studies are often case-specific and, while rich in local detail, lack comparative breadth or the ability to make connections and see irregularities across a number of contexts that might be of interest to scholars beyond that specific area. This book connects these literatures together more thoroughly. In particular, it demonstrates that political, cultural, economic and social factors all play important roles in helping us understand the actual (and potential) roles of migrant communities in conflict and the establishment of sustainable security within contemporary society. Lastly, given this context, the book seeks to examine the challenges and opportunities that exist, for such a sustainable security strategy to be developed.

This book will be of much interest to students of migration and diaspora communities, peace and conflict studies, security studies and ethnic conflict.
Organizational Perspectives on Environmental Migration

Over the past decade, international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have increasingly focused their efforts on the plight of environmental migrants in both industrialized and developing countries. However, to date very few studies have analysed the influence and rhetoric of advocacy groups in the debates on environmental migration.

This book fills this lacuna by drawing together and examining the related themes of

Child Migration and Human Rights in a Global Age

Why, despite massive public concern, is child trafficking on the rise? Why are unaccompanied migrant children living on the streets and routinely threatened with deportation to their countries of origin? Why do so many young refugees of war-ravaged and failed states end up warehoused in camps, victimized by the sex trade, or enlisted as child soldiers? This book provides the first comprehensive account of the widespread but neglected global phenomenon of child migration, exploring the complex challenges facing children and adolescents who move to join their families, those who are moved to be exploited, and those who move simply to survive.

Spanning several continents and drawing on the stories of young migrants, the book provides a comprehensive account of the widespread and growing but neglected global phenomenon of child migration and child trafficking. It looks at the often-insurmountable obstacles we place in the paths of adolescents fleeing war, exploitation, or destitution; the contradictory elements in our approach to international adoption; and the limited support we give to young people brutalized as child soldiers. Part history, part in-depth legal and political analysis, this powerful book challenges the prevailing wisdom that widespread protection failures are caused by our lack of awareness of the problems these children face, arguing instead that our societies have a deep-seated ambivalence to migrant children—one we need to address head-on.

Child Migration and Human Rights in a Global Age offers a road map for doing just that, and makes a compelling and courageous case for an international ethics of children’s human rights.
climate change and environmental degradation, migration and organizational studies to provide a fresh perspective on their increasing relevance. In order to assess the role of IOs and NGOs in the environmental migration discourse and to understand their interaction and their ways of addressing the topic, the book contains a wide-range of contributions covering the perspectives of organizational sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists, geographers, lawyers and practitioners. The chapters are organized thematically around the perspectives of key actors in the area of environmental migration, including IOs, courts and advocacy groups. The geographically diverse and interdisciplinary range of contributions makes this volume an essential foundational text for organizational responses to environmental migration.

Martin Kahanec, Klaus F. Zimmermann
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 07 Feb 2016 - 350 pages

Labor Migration, EU Enlargement, and the Great Recession

This volume extends and deepens knowledge about cross-border mobility and its role in an enlarged EU. More specifically, its main purpose is to enlighten the growing and yet rather uninformed debate about the role of post-enlargement migration for economic adjustment in the crisis-stricken labor markets of the Eurozone and the EU as a whole. The book addresses the political economy aspects of post-enlargement migration, including its broader political contexts, redistributive impacts, but also nationalization of the enlargement agenda. It also covers the experience of receiving and sending countries with post-enlargement migration and its role during the current crisis. Renowned experts in the field study, analyse whether and how post-enlargement mobility has enabled the EU to absorb asymmetric economic shocks, how it has affected the European welfare systems, and whether it has contributed to the sustainability of the Eurozone. The authors also evaluate brain circulation as a sought-after vehicle of improved allocative efficiency of EU labor markets and propose a policy agenda for mobility in an enlarged EU.
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