THE EUROPEAN HOUSE OF MAJOR EVENTS SECURITY:
A USER GUIDE FOR POLICE SECURITY PLANNERS AND POLICY MAKERS

Turin 2014
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UNICRI would like to extend its appreciation and gratitude to the national authorities of the twenty four EU Member States, Europol and CEPOL who have been represented as participating partners of The House Project Consortium throughout the course of the project from 2012 to 2014. They are listed within the table of consortium members included in this manual.
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE CONSORTIUM (2012-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Organizational Name</th>
<th>Short Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 United Nations</td>
<td>United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute</td>
<td>UNICRI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Austria</td>
<td>BundesministeriumfürInnere- Ministry of the Interior</td>
<td>BM.I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Germany</td>
<td>Deutsche Hochschule der Polizei</td>
<td>DHPol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Spain</td>
<td>Ministerio del Interior</td>
<td>MIR-CNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 France</td>
<td>Ministere de l’Interieur</td>
<td>D.G.P.N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 United Kingdom</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police Service</td>
<td>MetPol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Ireland</td>
<td>An Garda Síochána</td>
<td>AGS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Italy</td>
<td>Ministero dell’ Interno</td>
<td>MinInterno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 The Netherlands</td>
<td>Ministry of Security and Justice</td>
<td>MinJus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Portugal</td>
<td>Instituto Superior de CiênciasPoliciais e SegurançaInternacional</td>
<td>ISCP/MAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Greece</td>
<td>Center for Security Studies</td>
<td>KEMEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Latvia</td>
<td>State Police of Latvia</td>
<td>SP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Romania</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs-Inspectorate General of Romanian Police</td>
<td>MolA-GIRP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Slovakia</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic</td>
<td>MINV-APZ SK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Bulgaria</td>
<td>Academy of the Ministry of the Interior</td>
<td>Academy of MOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Slovenia</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Slovenia</td>
<td>MOI SI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Estonia</td>
<td>Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Estonia</td>
<td>MOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Cyprus</td>
<td>Cyprus Police</td>
<td>Cyprus Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Hungary</td>
<td>Hungarian National Police</td>
<td>HNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Malta</td>
<td>Malta Police Force</td>
<td>MPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Sweden</td>
<td>Swedish National Police Board</td>
<td>Polisen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Denmark</td>
<td>The Danish National Police</td>
<td>DNP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Lithuania</td>
<td>Police Department under the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania</td>
<td>PD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Finland</td>
<td>Police College of Finland</td>
<td>Polamk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Poland</td>
<td>WyzszaSzkolaPolicji W Szczytnie</td>
<td>WSPol</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: List of participating House Consortium members (2012-2014) by country and organization.

## HOUSE PROJECT TASK REPORTS & DELIVERABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Task Leader</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D 1.1</td>
<td>Network Steering Committee Reports: #1 (Turin, April); #2 (Paris, October); #3 (Porto, April); #4 (Cyprus, September)</td>
<td>UNICRI</td>
<td>Apr 2012 – Sep 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D 2.1</td>
<td>Common Taxonomy for Major Events Security Planning: Making Operating Versions of STEP (CTM5) and EMER (CTM6)</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Jan 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D 2.2</td>
<td>Report on the Application of Common Planning Standards (CTMs 1-4) to European Major Events</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Nov 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D 2.3</td>
<td>Report on the Application of Common Evaluation Standards (CTMs 1-4) to Major Events Security Planning</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Jan 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D 2.4</td>
<td>Report on Training Activities on Common Security Standards for Major Events in Europe</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Jan 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D 3.1</td>
<td>Report on the Contribution to the Implementation of the Stockholm Programme via The House</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Sep 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D 3.2</td>
<td>Feasibility Study on the Best Structure for The House: The Web-Based Electronic Planning Model (Presentation)</td>
<td>UNICRI</td>
<td>Sep 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T 3.1</td>
<td>Common Taxonomy (Research &amp; Technology): The potential contribution of STEP and EMER to the Implementation of the Stockholm Programme and other relevant EU policies (Report)</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Mar 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3.2</td>
<td>Common Planning Standards: The potential contribution of CTMs 1-4 to the implementation of the Stockholm Programme and other relevant EU policies (Report)</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Mar 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T3.3</td>
<td>Common Evaluation Standards: The potential contribution of CTMs 1-4 to the implementation of the Stockholm Programme and other relevant EU policies (Report)</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Mar 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 2: List of House Project Task Reports and Deliverables upon which this User Guide is based.*

*Note: all of the above project reports and deliverables are classified as dissemination level PP within the House Project: Restricted to other programme participants (including Commission Services).*
FOREWORD

Since the launch of its worldwide Programme on Security at Major Events in 2002, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) has been at the forefront of the coordination of major events security research and policy development, particularly in Europe and Latin America. Because of their scale and high visibility, major events are vulnerable targets for unlawful activities, including terrorism, and can be exploited by organized criminal groups to further their illegal activities. In 2004, the EU-SEC Project was launched marking the start of a fruitful collaboration between UNICRI and the European Commission in the area of major event security. The project brought together a consortium of ten European Union Member States in an innovative initiative to enhance security at major events.

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in its resolution 2006/28 expressed support for the work of the UNICRI Programme on Major Events. ECOSOC invited UNICRI to continue and expand its work on the International permanent Observatory on Security Measures during Major Events.

In 2008, a new project (EU-SEC II) was launched to continue the programme of activities with new momentum reflected in the increase in participating countries from ten to twenty two EU Member States. The third phase of the work initiated in 2004 was covered in a further project entitled “Enhancing European coordination of national research programmes in the area of security at major events: The House.” The consortium of countries increased to twenty four European Member States, including Europol and CEPOL.

UNICRI has identified applicable security standards and best practices, and tailored technical tools have been developed to assist policymakers and practitioners in planning security for major events.

This publication has been prepared for the use of European policymakers and security planners as a complement to the EU-SEC II Manual issued in 2011. It serves as a guide on how to make full use of The House and services available.

The House project reflects the strong and continued commitment of European Union Member States to the coordination of policy and practice in the area of major events security. Moreover, the implementation of The House Project during the past years demonstrates the contribution which the project has made towards the coordination of major events security at the European level.

Dr. Jonathan Lucas
Director
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute
INTRODUCTION: BALANCING FREEDOM & SECURITY

The balance between freedom and security lays at the heart of the common standards referred to in this guidance. It has underpinned the building of the European House of Major Events Security that provides them as research, planning, and evaluation services to EU Member States. Tactically speaking, the guide can be best followed from that perspective and the services it refers to can be best used in the same light. That is, to look at major events as ‘windows of opportunity’ for the strategic development of a common approach to policing in Europe where the purpose of security is the preservation of freedom in the interests of European citizens.

Organised major events, inside and outside Europe, be they sporting, political, cultural or otherwise, are always at risk of violent protests, terrorist attacks, organized crime, accidents and emergencies, or even incidents that publicly embarrass the national authorities hosting them in terms of exposing weaknesses in a host authority’s capacity to plan for and provide adequate security during them. The policing and security surrounding them and their associated politics, as well as innovations in the security technologies used during them, are inevitably the subject of much media attention and consequent public debate about the nature and direction of broader transformations in policing and security in contemporary society.

Recent global public protest and world-wide political concern over the relatively un-checked and rapid growth of internet-based mass surveillance has invokes ongoing public debate more broadly regarding issues of data protection, the invasion of privacy and the adequacy of public accountability mechanisms for any State’s policing agencies and the ethical development of new security technologies and practices on a mass, international scale. Such human rights concerns are very pertinent to the area of major event security, where, due to an increase in available resources for the staging of these events, security technologies are often used in an experimental manner before incorporation into routine policing practices.

Major events are fast becoming growth markets for the burgeoning private security industry in contemporary Western society. Both the privatization and the militarization of policing and security in Europe and elsewhere represent significant transformations that are rendered observable through major events for social-scientists, policy makers and police practitioners alike. As demonstrated through the abundant use of open source material in this preface, such transformations – largely made possible through the security innovations facilitated by major events – are brought into the public sphere by media coverage of those events. Such events then act as epicentres of new challenges for the governance of security by engaging deeper international public debate over their implications for democratic accountability and the ethical policing standards expected of any European Member State.

For reasons such as these, major events and their security will continue to draw international public attention for the foreseeable future. Their continued observation therefore remains as important as ever for the international development of democratic policing and security governance. As common research, planning and evaluation standards for major events security in Europe, the services of The House outlined in this user guide are intended to support hosting national authorities in this basic EU policy context of balancing freedom and security.
USING THIS USER GUIDE

This user guide is written as a public document aimed primarily at European policy makers and security planners in the field of major events. Yet given the transformative potential for security that major events can engage trans-nationally in terms of international cooperation, it can also be used as a training tool for national police officers aimed at ensuring the widest possible impact of the common policing standards provided by The House as services at the strategic European level.

What it is NOT, though, is a fully detailed compendium of those services themselves. Nor is it a ‘how to do it’ manual on major event security, or catalogue of best practices/lessons learned from the collective experiences of planning major event security around Europe. It is simply a service user’s guide. It provides the basic understandings required for making the best use of House services in relation to a national authority’s own research programme on security planning for future major events they foresee as hosting and needing to organise (or supervise) security for.

Chapter 1 explains UNICRI’s role in the development of The House. Chapter 2 provides an understanding of how The House defines and applies the term ‘major event’ and other key concepts in relation to security planning. Chapter 3 then considers the strategic significance of major events as ‘windows of opportunity’ for the development of policing and security governance in Europe. Chapter 4 covers House research and technology tools aimed at supporting field research, networking and training for security planners. Guidance on the use of House services developed as common planning and evaluation tools is then provided in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides a summary of EU policy suggestions developed by The House before a conclusion acknowledging this guide as a point of connection between EU policy makers and Member State practitioners.

As always though, ultimate responsibility for the provision and effectiveness of security during major events rests with the public authority hosting them. That includes the background research programmes, and the planning and evaluation of security in respect of it. What The House offers are services to help coordinate that national endeavour toward a sharable set of common standards in the interests of improved international cooperation over major events security in Europe, while underpinning the importance of balancing security with freedom.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The European House of Major Events Security (‘The House’) is the product of collaborative work between a consortium of 24 EU Member States funded by the European Commission between March 2012 and February 2014 (THE HOUSE Project). Following up on two previous EC funded projects (EU-SEC 2004-2008 and EU-SEC II 2009-2011), researchers, practitioners and policymakers representing national police authorities of all consortium members have worked together to pool recent knowledge and share the experiences of security planners for major events in Europe.

This User Guide is the consolidation of the research method, underpinning ideas and main outputs of that development. In pursuit of the basic House aim of improving the international coordination of security planning for major events in Europe and contributing towards the adoption of a common policing approach at EU level, it is intended for practical use by practitioners and policy makers in application of those ideas and outputs as ‘common standards’ and services of The House.

At the strategic level, it defines a ‘major event’ as an event that requires international cooperation in respect of its security planning. This is to direct the potential user of House services to those events, such as Olympics, political summits and international cultural festivals that carry the extra-ordinary security planning burden of cross-border police cooperation for national authorities precisely because of their international dimension. Security for such events necessarily calls for the development of common research, planning and evaluation standards in conjunction with the strategic aims of the EU’s overall policy agenda.

The development of House services has thus taken place in the EU policy context of the Stockholm Programme (2010-2014) and Internal Security Strategy (ISS). The provision of a common security planning model, best practices in public private partnerships, media management guidelines and ethical considerations for new security products and practices, and policy suggestions relating to them have been developed in alignment with the Stockholm Programme’s policy objectives.

Likewise, its research tools for sharing knowledge of and access to specialist technical equipment, and evaluative information on European major events registered with The House by their host national authorities, are in the process of development as prototypes in the same light. Above all, the continued development of networking and training opportunities, particularly through agreed collaborative work between UNICRI and the European Police College (CEPOL), is seen as crucial to the basic House methodology for supporting progress to a common policing approach in Europe.

The potential of major events as strategic sites of transformation for policing and security in Europe is not in doubt among consortium members. As ‘windows of opportunity’ they act as test sites for new security innovations as well as the identification of best practices and lessons learned. By way of this User Guide, The House can continue act as a supporting mechanism for observing security at major events in Europe and coordinating the exchange of such practices and lessons.
CHAPTER 1: THE EUROPEAN HOUSE OF MAJOR EVENTS SECURITY

The European House of Major Events Security (‘The House’) is a regional platform for the coordination of major events security research in Europe. It is the outcome of a European Commission funded project (THE HOUSE) which involved a consortium of 24 European Union Member States between March 2012 and February 2014 (Figure 1). It was the follow-up to two previously European Commission funded projects, EU-SEC (2004-08) and EU-SEC II (2009-11). Between them, they have drawn on the collective knowledge and experiences of European major event security planners and other experts in fields of policing and security since the millennium.

Coordinated by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and acting as a regional service provider to EU Member States, The House aims to improve coordination in the security planning of major events in Europe and contribute towards the adoption of a common policing approach at European Union level. These user guidelines provide practical guidance for policy makers and senior police practitioners on how to understand and make best use of The European House of Major Events and its services in pursuit of those broader strategic aims.

1.1 Understanding UNICRI and the development of House Services

UNICRI was established in 1967 to support United Nations Member States in the areas of crime prevention and criminal justice. In furtherance of its mandate, UNICRI uses action-based research to assist in the formulation of improved policies and concrete intervention programmes. Against this backdrop, UNICRI identifies areas of common concern to Member States which are of critical importance to the international community in general, upon which to concentrate. Security planning for major events is one such area.

Having identified major events as an area in need of international coordination, UNICRI launched its global International Permanent Observatory on major events security (IPO) in 2002. This programme has subsequently received express backing from the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Resolution 2006/28, in which the Council invited UNICRI to continue and expand its work in this area and invited Member States to request UNICRI’s assistance for the security planning of major events. For ready reference, a copy of ECOSOC Resolution 2006/28 is included in this user guide as Annex A.

Throughout UNICRI’s work, a common thread is the focus on activities at regional level. This stems from recognition that programmes and projects implemented among countries of similar social, political, and economic backgrounds and institutional frameworks can be carried out more effectively and the legacy of their successes can therefore be seen regionally. Based on this approach, the EU-SEC project was initiated by UNICRI in 2004, as the first regional platform for the coordination of security during major events in Europe. Subsequently in 2007, UNICRI launched a similar regional platform for the coordination of major events security in the Americas.
EU-SEC & EU-SEC II
EU-SEC involved 10 EU Member States¹ and was funded by the European Commission’s 6th framework programme (DG Enterprise and Industry). It was aimed at supporting and coordinating national research activities related to security during major events. Among other things, it developed work on police ethics and public private partnerships during the planning of major events, and other identified thematic priorities for future research. By establishing a coordination platform of end-users, EU-SEC laid the foundations for “The European House of Major Events Security.”

As a follow up project, EU-SEC II was launched in 2008, now involving 22 Member States.² It identified key areas of security planning for major events for further coordination. On this basis, a number of standards and priorities for future research were defined and/or elaborated on. These fell into two main groups: “Established Standards” and “Tools for Development” (Figures 3 & 4, below).

AS COMMON PLANNING & EVALUATION STANDARDS (ESTABLISHED)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>BRIEF DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>LEAD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>IPO Security Planning Model</td>
<td>A general security planning blue-print that can be used as planning/evaluation checklist and tailored to each country’s specific needs</td>
<td>DENMARK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Public Private Partnerships (PPPs)</td>
<td>Guidelines for assessing, establishing and utilizing best practices in PPPs</td>
<td>UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Media Management Guidance</td>
<td>General guidelines for police and security planners on the management of police and media relations for major events</td>
<td>ITALY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ethical Considerations &amp; New Security Products</td>
<td>A legacy tool for active reflection on the ‘European Code of Police Ethics’ and quality assurance processes for bringing any new security products into daily/routine use.</td>
<td>AUSTRIA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 3: House Services as Common Planning and Evaluation Standards*

AS RESEARCH & TECHNOLOGY TOOLS (FOR DEVELOPMENT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>BRIEF DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>LEAD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Specialist Technical Equipment Pool (STEP)</td>
<td>A database of specialist technical equipment that partners are able to share and/or comment upon to support planning and procurement decisions</td>
<td>ESTONIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>European Major Events Register (EMER)</td>
<td>A researchable database for host authorities to voluntarily register their events as ‘major’ and upload sharable evaluative information</td>
<td>PORTUGAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Networking &amp; Training</td>
<td>A tool to promote and raise awareness of House Services among EU police forces in collaboration with the European Police College (CEPOL).</td>
<td>FRANCE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 4: House Services as Common Research and Technology Tools*

¹The original 10 Member States of EU-SEC were Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
²The additional 12 Member States of EU-SEC II were Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Sweden.
The final output of EU-SEC II was the service owner’s manual “Foundations of the European House of Major Events Security” (on which these service user’s guidelines are now based). The manual detailed the above standards as services for development and live field testing, bringing THE HOUSE Project into being in order to do so.

1.2 THE HOUSE Project

THE HOUSE Project ran from March 2012 to February 2014. Funded by the European Commission’s now 7th Framework Programme (DG Enterprise and Industry) it was launched to field test the standards which had been outlined in EU-SEC II as common EU standards. As with the predecessor projects, THE HOUSE project saw an expansion in the consortium to its now 24 EU Member States.3

The process of “testing” these standards as common EU standards involved the project partners attending the “associated events” and discussing the standards of The House in relation to accepted national practice. After a consultation process with the project partners, during which over 30 major events were considered, eight major events were chosen. Particular importance was attached to achieving a balance between sports competitions, mass gatherings and political summits as the planning challenge presented to security planners by each of these events differed greatly. The eight events at which The House tested its standards are listed in Figure 5 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Major Event, City &amp; Date &amp; Type of Event</th>
<th>Host Country</th>
<th>Services Provided &amp; Date of Provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Euro Athletic Championships, Helsinki. June-July 2012 (Sporting)</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Services 2 &amp; 4 21 May 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>UEFA Euro Cup, Poland &amp; Ukraine (3 cities each) June-July 2012 (Sporting)</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Services 1 &amp; 4 23-24 July 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>FIFA World Cup Qualifier (Bulgaria v Italy), Sofia. September 2012 (Sporting)</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Services 3 &amp; 7 20-21 September 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>EU Presidency, Dublin. January - June 2013 (Political)</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Services 1 &amp; 3 29-30 November 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Rainbow March, Bratislava 21 September 2013 (Cultural/Mass gathering)</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Services 2 &amp; 3 16-17 May 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>EU Presidency, Vilnius June-December 2013</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Services 1 &amp; 5 February 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>CEV Euro Volley, Poland (and Denmark) September 2013</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Services 1 &amp; 6 February 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Nuclear Safety Summit, The Hague April 2014</td>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Service 1 15 March 2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: List of House Project Test Events for House Service provisions during 2012 & 2013

3The further 2 Member States were Lithuania and Poland, making the 24 Member Consortium in Figure 1.
In terms of research methodology, the “association” of an event to the project involved project partners meeting with the security planners of the chosen major events in order to present the proposed standards of The House. The subsequent discussion/consultation process helped to determine gaps and/or overlaps between The House standards and those applied nationally. The dual goals of this process were on the one hand to assess the impact of the standards as common European planning and evaluation standards; and on the other hand, to assess their potential impact on the main EU security priorities (The Stockholm Programme and the EU Internal Security Strategy).

The results of the consultation with national security planners were recorded and formed the basis of internal project reports (Figure 2). Drawing on those reports, this set of User Guidelines has been written as a public document to complement the mentioned Manual published at the end of EU-SEC II. These guidelines contain practical information for major events security planners and other security practitioners, on how to make full use of The House and its services.

A unique aspect of THE HOUSE Project as a research project is that national users from 24 EU Member States were its main actors/researchers. They were appointed to various roles ranging from: “Event Hosts”, who organize and facilitate the consultation process with national security planners of associated events; to “Standard Owners,” who act as “custodians” of a standard, presenting the standards to national security planners at the associated event meetings; and “Task Team Members”, who attended the associated events to gain and record feedback from the national security planners on the impact of the standards as common European planning and evaluation standards and on their potential impact on the main EU security priorities.

This method of policy development which involved the security planners at all stages ensured that they and their countries had real ownership over the output. That output shaped the services of what is now ‘The European House of Major Events’ coordinated by UNICRI and is reflected in this set of User Guidelines for those intending to make best use of the standards as services of The House.

FUTURE HOUSE DEVELOPMENT – ELECTRONIC SECURITY PLANNING MODEL

The 24 Member States of The House decided that the way forward should involve the development of an all-encompassing interactive web based security planning tool incorporating all of the methodologies and technical tools of The House. In this future phase, the consortium will attempt to ensure that its pattern of expansion continues beyond the current 24 Member States.

As in the previous phases of the project, the involvement of the national security planners will be essential to ensure that the outputs will have the approval of, and will be adopted by, the partner Member States. In addition, the consortium will continue to work to consolidate the position of The House as a comprehensive European planning framework for major events security in order to ensure that established best practices are continually codified and that lessons learned from major events in the EU are easily accessible to and serve to benefit the security of the entire community.

Resulting from a feasibility study made during THE HOUSE project, an electronic version of the IPO security planning model is being designed by UNICRI. Based on the original IPO model’s 3 part system and 12 elements (see Chapter 5), it can be continually updated with room for new elements and sub-elements. Composed of a basic narrative description, each sub-element contains checklists and databases for selection and reference as required by the user.

The House service user will be able to select those areas they feel they need to consider as either a priority or for later in their security planning or not at all. Divided as either internal or external factors, content will include traditional IPO Model topics such as Human resources training, logistics, technology and
intelligence and leadership, as well as new edition IPO Model topics, such as post-event evaluation, mass-media and public private partnerships and core IPO values such as research and best practices, civil protection/public health and security legacy considerations. As an integrated database for security planning, it is anticipated that the electronic model will be at the centre of future House services.
CHAPTER 2: KEY CONCEPTS - MAJOR EVENTS & SECURITY

It is important to understand how The House defines and uses the term ‘major events’ and other key concepts, such as ‘security’, ‘threats’, ‘research’, ‘planning’ and ‘evaluation’. For the sake of simplicity and common usability, it is best to avoid concerns over how adequately or not these terms and definitions sit with domestic legislation or differences of linguistic nuance. These definitions were first formulated and developed during the earlier EU-SEC and EU-SEC II Projects and, appearing in the EU-SEC II Manual, further refined during THE HOUSE Project for this User Guide.

2.1 Understanding & Using the House Definition of ‘Major Event’

HOUSE DEFINITION OF ‘MAJOR EVENT’:
For the purpose of accessing and applying the services of The House, a ‘Major Event’ is defined as:

An event that requires international cooperation in respect of its security planning

This definition is without prejudice to a service user’s own national legislation. It simply directs the user to the ‘international cooperation’ element of any given event’s security planning needs. It is used to filter out events which are appropriate for House services in furtherance of House aims.

House aims, of course, are the coordination of a common policing approach to major event security planning in Europe: hence the focus on ‘international cooperation’ within the definition.

‘International cooperation’ should be understood as voluntary cooperation between the police forces and agencies of the national authority hosting the event and those in different states.

‘Security planning’ simply means the process of drafting the operational security plan in preparation for the event. This is a process that often starts months in advance of a specific event, or even years in cases of events such as the Olympics. Of interest to The House are the strategic opportunities for security innovation, governance and development such long lead-in times can provide.

‘Event’ means, for House purposes, something organised and foreseeable. It will be known to the hosting national authority/police well in advance and can therefore be specifically planned for.

Scope of House Definition & Large Scale Public Order Incidents
Some new to The House may ask why the scope of the House definition of Major Event is limited to planned events and not those of a more spontaneous nature requiring a more immediate public order policing response to public protests and related outbreaks of disorder. The House focus on major events lies in the long-term planning opportunities presented for host authorities by organised commercial, governmental and/or communal events with a high international profile that are known months, even years, in advance. It is these, not the short-notice (days/weeks) of otherwise legitimate civic actions, that present the strategic planning opportunities discussed in the next Chapter.

That is not to say an organised and foreseeable event of international proportions (e.g. an annual march) with public order implications cannot be thought of as a major event for House purposes, provided it affords sufficient security planning opportunities as mentioned.
TYPICAL CHARACTERISTICS & QUALITIES OF A MAJOR EVENT:
Notwithstanding national definitions, analysis during EU-SEC & EU-SEC II of actual events considered ‘major’ by many host authorities (whether requiring international cooperation or not), found they are typically characterised by one or more of the following:

1. **Publicity**: Large/international (world) media attraction/coverage
2. **Popularity**: Their historical, political, cultural significance or popularity
3. **Participation**: By large or international crowds, potential target groups, or VIP/dignitaries.

However else defined locally, it is the *international dynamic* that makes any ‘major event’ significant overall, both in The House understanding and in relevant EU policies/recommended handbooks.

Past studies also find that such events tend to have the following generally recognisable qualities:

1. **Extra security requirements** of either a domestic or international nature for host country
2. **Tend to be urban in character/location** as a more cosmopolitan expression of society
3. **May be regular or non-regular** on spatial or temporal occurrence
4. **Tend to dominate** other security planning concerns for the host country
5. **Their security demand will be extra-ordinary** and in excess of routine domestic capacity
6. **They may produce new security measures** that redefine routine policing for the host

It is this last quality which risks leading to what some refer to as a ‘permanent state of exception’ (Houlihan and Giulianotti 2012) and underpins House services in relation to new security products.

**So what makes an event ‘major’?**
It is not simply a quantitative question of size or extent of the event itself but a qualitative one to do with its nature or dynamics. By ‘Major Event’, the House definition means something that is not routine or within the ordinary security capacity of the national authority hosting it. It means an event that is subjectively ‘extra-ordinary’ in terms of the new, unusual, or extra security burden it places upon the hosting national authorities – one that goes beyond routine national capacity and therefore requires (out of practical need rather than law) international cooperation in respect of its security planning implications.

**Examples**: Olympics, international football/sports championships/tournaments/marathons; political summits, EU Presidencies, state visits/funerals/occasions; mass gatherings, religious/cultural festivals, large/world-famous carnivals/parades/marches, international camps, world fairs/Expos.

**In sum**, the international dynamic of cross-border cooperation for its security planning is what makes an event ‘major’ for the purposes of the House and use of its services. The House definition of ‘Major Event’ and above additional elements is summarised in diagrammatic form as Annex B.

**Note**: Generally, the terms ‘major event’, ‘mega-event’ and ‘mass event’, are used interchangeably to mean roughly the same thing: a large-scale event organised by someone somewhere. Technically, they can also mean quite different things to different people for different reasons. These might be to do with their physical size (‘mass’), organisational complexity (‘mega’), calendar dominance or extraordinary nature (‘major’). There is no universal definition as to the meaning of ‘major event’.
BASIC TYPES OF A MAJOR EVENT

For the purpose of simple classification and use with its services, The House divides major events into four basic types:

1. **Political** (e.g. Summits, State visits/occasions, EU Presidencies, organised protests)
2. **Sporting** (e.g. Olympics, world championships, athletic tournaments)
3. **Cultural** (e.g. mass gatherings/camps, religious/music festivals, carnivals, marches, Expos)
4. **Other** (i.e. those which cannot be classified in any of the above)

Despite elements of protest and politics contained within them, events such as Rainbow marches can be considered ‘cultural’ in that they celebrate expressions of shared values in Europe. Likewise religious festivals can be classified under the same broad heading. Subject to being foreseeable for long-term security planning purposes, organised protests would fall under ‘political’ events.

The use of these ‘types’ help consider the nature of threats and security responses that are found to be typically (but not exclusively) associated with them.

THREAT CATEGORIES FOR MAJOR EVENTS

Security plans for major events are made in response to the potential of threats categorised as:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THREATS OF</th>
<th>TO</th>
<th>FROM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accident/Emergency/Disaster</td>
<td>Public Safety/Health</td>
<td>Natural/Man-made causes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Disorder</td>
<td>Public Order</td>
<td>Violent Behaviour/Protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>Domestic/International sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminality</td>
<td>Persons &amp; Property</td>
<td>Organised/Petty sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Embarrassment</td>
<td>Authorities</td>
<td>Unauthorised activity/security flaws</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: Threat Categories

To this one could add:

| Public Health | Contagious disease/contamination |

However, this can also fit the first category. There may be further considerations but the above five represent the main broad categories for The House. New threats (e.g. cyber attack) can be thought of more as *Modus Operandi* (MO) rather than a category. Likewise, threats to public transport systems and road safety can be considered in more specific terms within the general categories.

**Safety & Security**

In some European languages the words ‘safety’ and ‘security’ are reported to hold the same meaning and are not distinguishable in terms of national legislation. Some may even include ‘threats to public order’ in the same category as ‘public safety/security’. For the purpose of The House, the term ‘security’ (as defined later) should be seen as inclusive of all potential threats and encompassing ideas of ‘public safety’, ‘public health’ and ‘public order’, however defined locally.

A glossary of other terms that have been and continue to be used in the context of The House and application of its services as common standards appears in the 2011 EU-SEC II Manual. The more pertinent ones appear in the next section for immediate reference in the context of this User Guide.
2.2 Security, Security Threat, Security Product and STILT

**THREATS TEST SECURITY, PREVENTION PROVES SECURITY.**
SECURITY IS ONLY THEORETICAL UNTIL TESTED AND PROVEN.

For The House, ‘security’ is measured in terms of outcomes: it is the absence of various foreseeable adverse or unwanted facts that can cause harm to the event. It always refers to threat evaluation and how to prevent potential risks (the combination of ‘threats’ & ‘vulnerabilities’) from happening.

The specific forms in which those ‘threats’ and ‘vulnerabilities’ present themselves and combine as ‘risks’ will be varied and many. The general threat categories associated with ‘major events’ provides a framework of perspectives from which to identify, assess and evaluate specific threats & risks.

So, security is only ever theoretical until proven by the actual test of a real threat. The fact that nothing happened (because there were no threats), does not mean that the event was ‘secure’.

**Security** – The prevented harm of a potential ‘threat’ (as categorised for a Major Event)

**Threat** – The existing potential to cause harm (to or at the Major Event)

**Vulnerability** – A weakness in a security system (combined with a ‘ Threat’ = ‘Risk’)

**Risk** – The actual presence of a ‘threat’. (Or: the probability of harm from a ‘threat’).

**Contingency** – The materialisation of a ‘threat’ as harm (for which the overall security plan will cater)

**Security Tool** – Any instrument intended to prevent threats from materialising as harm.

**Security Product** – Anything specifically produced for use as a ‘tool’ in relation to a ‘threat’. It includes pre-planning threat assessments, post-event evaluation reports and the security plan itself.

**Security Plan** – Product of the security planning process aimed at providing security for the event.

**The STILT Classification System for Security Products:**
For House purposes, different types of ‘security products’ can be provisionally categorised using the STILT classification system, developed within EU-SEC II’s work on common research standards.

- **Strategic** – (e.g. the overall security plan and contingency plans within it)
- **Tactical** – (specific police operations within the plan, e.g. public order tactics)
- **Informational** – (e.g. intelligence, threat assessments, evaluation of the plan)
- **Legal** – (e.g. restriction orders and temporary powers given for use within the plan)
- **Technical** – (special equipment for use within the plan, e.g. Taser gun)

STILT can be used in conjunction with the House research tool ‘STEP’ as well its service regarding the quality assurance and ethical standards of ‘security products’ classified this way (see Chapters 4 & 5).

**Note:** while the STEP database is primarily one concerned with specialist ‘technical’ equipment, the sense in which STEP uses ‘technical’ can, for future development potential, be broadened out to include the wider ranges of ‘security products’ encompassed in the STILT taxonomy.
CHAPTER 3: THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF MAJOR EVENTS

3.1 Major Events as ‘Windows of Opportunity’

Major events are regarded as windows of opportunity because they are often accompanied by substantial increases in the financial, human, technological, and other resources which are available to national security planners. As a result, major events offer the finance and the availability of resources to expand a modern and efficient security infrastructure, which allows for increased security while requiring decreased levels of policing. Additionally, major events allow for the introduction of systems and practices, procurement of equipment and expertise, development of training and expansion of capacity in a manner that is innovative and meaningful. In this way, they provide a legacy of development in national security planning practices and structures, as well as new forms of thinking in response to emerging threats to national security, and the furtherance of international cooperation among security planners.

On a national level, security practitioners, policy makers and/or senior police officers reading this guide may find it useful to consider how they might see their respective country’s national authority benefit from making use of the services in the long-term. This might be as greater harmonization of security policy regarding major events in particular, or by moving toward an overall common policing approach and forum of interaction in Europe through them. More broadly, the method of policy elaboration applied by The House (see Chapter 4) could easily be adapted to other contexts and other regions of the world with the assistance of UNICRI, given their role in regional policy coordination for major events security at United Nations level (see Chapter 1).

THE HOUSE Project and its predecessors, EU-SEC and EU-SEC II, have been making, and continue to make, significant contribution to the coordination of European major event security planning. The objective for its partners is to create a lasting legacy of improved security capacity, common standards and procedural efficiency, and increased regional and international cooperation among security practitioners. In this way, the windows of opportunity offered by major events will be taken advantage of to the fullest strategic extent in terms of the security of the event itself, the maximization of the enjoyment of the event for all and the potential for development of security policies, practices and cooperation.

In the long term, the maintenance and expansion of the networks of security practitioners, methodologies and technical tools will ensure that the impact of The House goes far beyond major events security as it contributes to the realization of the main security priorities of the EU contained in the Stockholm Programme (2010-2014) and the EU’s Internal Security Strategy (ISS). This calls for, among other things, “more effective European law enforcement cooperation” and recognises the significance of major events as operational sites for doing so, as well as “the full and effective implementation, enforcement and evaluation of existing instruments” more generally but can be applied to relevant EU policies concerning major events with an international dimension.6

6 Paragraphs 4.3.1 and 1.2.2 respectively of the Stockholm Programme (see section 3.3 for further application of).
3.2 Premise of The House for EU Policy Contribution

The potential contribution of The House to EU policy development is premised upon the practical, structural and conceptual opportunities that major events present for the national authorities hosting them. As windows of opportunity, The House sees major events uniquely offering national authorities:

- Practical opportunities to increase routine resources as well as acquire and adopt for standard use new security products as technical innovations in security planning.
- Structural opportunities to build sustainable security strategies and provide legacies for national security planning and development.
- Conceptual opportunities to bring new forms of thinking in response to newly emerging threats to national security, applicable way beyond the scope of the event itself.

Likewise, The House sees major events as sites of high strategic potential for the domestic implementation of the EU’s own security based policy objectives. These broad objectives, outlined below, are expressed in the EU’s Stockholm Programme and associated Internal Security Strategy. The House feels the strategic significance of major events in Europe should continue to receive emphasis as a focal point for common EU policy in the field of security.

STRATEGIC POTENTIAL

The basic House view that major events represent significant operational sites of high strategic importance for EU policy implementation is not in doubt among those involved in their security planning or the delivery of The House services to them on behalf of the Consortium. Yet while security planners recognize that major events are of such high strategic significance for EU policy implementation and international cooperation, they feel quite strongly that EU policy proposals must be relevant to their own operational needs and have practical application. They see The House (and its continuation) as a productive resource for both themselves, as security planners, and the EU in this respect.

What needs to be shown more clearly in the communication of EU policy is how the strategic goals of the EU support the goals and shared interests of respective EU Member States while at the same time respecting national differences and being sensitive to state sovereignty. Accordingly, it is the pursuit and maintenance of the *democratic rule of law and respect for fundamental human rights* that provides the basic strategic EU policy context of common values for major events hosted by Member States and their policing/security operations. For such operations, House members have noted, provide highly visible ‘test cases’ as to how security governance is exercised in practice and made visible in a wider arena of publicity against a backdrop of not just national but international judgements, experience and expectation of accountability.

Underpinned by these common values as basic principles, the view of Consortium members (as stakeholders in relevant areas of EU policy development) is that The House possesses strong potential to facilitate the exchange of best practices nationally both at the strategic and operational levels – thereby contributing to the EU’s own Stockholm Programme based goals in these respects.

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7Which includes their own legal regulations as well.
The Stockholm Programme

‘Intensified law enforcement cooperation’ among EU Member States is central to the Council of Europe’s Stockholm Programme. The programme itself sets the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice for the period 2010 to 2014. Outlined in Figure 7 below, it defines the EU’s future policy agenda for Justice and Home Affairs and drives the Internal Security Strategy.

Figure 7: Overview of the Stockholm Programme in relation to potential House contribution.

The programme is organized around six political priorities: ‘A Europe that protects’, is the principal area in which The House feels it has the most potential impact. The priorities, ‘A Europe of rights’ and ‘a Europe of law and justice’, can be considered indirectly in broad terms of the potential impact of The House and sets the human rights based, democratic rule of law context in which European security provision is to take place. The other three priorities deal with globalization, immigration, and Europe’s foreign influences but are of less direct relevance. Despite maintaining an interest in all of the priorities, The House’s main interest rests in the priority area: ‘a Europe that protects’ and the Internal Security Strategy which it gives rise to.

The Internal Security Strategy (ISS)

The Internal Security Strategy has five strategic objectives. They deal with themes that are broadly and collectively engaged in any international major event security planning operation: serious and organized crime; counter-terrorism; cyber crime security; border security; crisis & disaster management. Though not explicitly mentioning major events as sites of application, major events represent operational opportunities in which international cooperation toward any of these strategic objectives can be progressed in general.
Summarised in Figure 8 below, each step has three or four areas of tactical action that, if worked towards by EU Member States collectively, would contribute to the respective strategic step. Taken together, all five strategic steps would improve Europe’s internal security as a whole.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRATEGIC STEPS</th>
<th>TACTICAL ACTIONS</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| 1 ORGANISED CRIME       | 1. Identify & disseminate criminal networks  
                          | 2. Protect economy against criminal infiltration  
                          | 3. Confiscate criminal assets  |
| 2 COUNTER-TERRORISM     | 1. Empower communities to prevent radicalisation & recruitment  
                          | 2. Cut off terrorist’s access to funding & materials, and follow their transactions  
                          | 3. Protect transport  |
| 3 CYBER-SECURITY        | 1. Build capacity in law enforcement & judiciary  
                          | 2. Work with industry to empower and protect citizens  
                          | 3. Improve capability for dealing with cyber-attacks  |
| 4 BORDER CONTROLS      | 1. Exploit full potential of ‘Eurosur’ (on surveillance)  
                          | 2. Enhance the contribution of FRONTEX at the external borders  
                          | 3. Common risk management for movement of goods across external borders  
                          | 4. Improve inter-agency cooperation at the national level  |
| 5 EMERGENCY PLANNING   | 1. Full use of Lisbon solidarity clause (on assistance)  
                          | 2. All hazards approach to threat and risk assessments  
                          | 3. Link-up different situation awareness centres  
                          | 4. Develop a European emergency response capacity for tackling disasters  |

Figure 8: Overview of EU’s Internal Security Strategy - 5 strategic steps and associated actions.  
('BOTEC': Border Control, Organised Crime, Terrorism, Emergency Planning, Cyber-Security.)  

In terms of taking the opportunity to contribute to the EU’s Internal Security Strategy, National Authorities faced with hosting a major event in Europe could consider how their security planning processes could constructively contribute and impact upon any, if not all, of these strategic areas and associated tactical actions. It should not be difficult to see how the threat considerations for any major event map onto the ISS’s five steps. Major events can thus be seen as significant sites that can both draw upon and drive forward the strategic objectives and tactical activity within the ISS.

It is therefore useful for the potential user of House Services to be aware of the EU’s Internal Security Strategy (if not already so) and be able to bare its five areas of strategic interest in mind when entering in the early stages of developing security plans for a major event. (The above acronym ‘BOTEC’ may help).

For Member States the ISS also represents a shared agenda to build common security policies in response to common challenges based upon common European values. Those values include the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights as laid down in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. One can add to this ‘democratic accountability’ as a defining principle of European policing and security within the EU.
3.3 Potential House Contribution to the Stockholm Programme

There is clear support for developing and implementing EU level regulation and policy in the field of major events. CEPOL, in particular, is seen as central to doing this in terms of helping realize the Stockholm Programme’s objectives and the development of international cooperation accordingly. In particular, the potential to produce what one representative described as “a mature level of national European law enforcement culture” via networking and sharing of best practices.

As another representative put it with reference to the international dynamic that defines major events as object of strategic interest for the development of common EU policy: “It’s necessary to understand that major events are no longer the problem of one single country but a continental issue.” This echoed overall recognition that a European police approach to major events is important because of what may be called the ‘cosmopolitan nature’ of the events and their participants.

Two paragraphs of the Stockholm Programme support development of The House as a longer-lasting tool for its continued implementation:

1. The recommendation in Paragraph 4.3.1 (more effective law enforcement cooperation) that the Commission considers the establishment of “ad hoc law enforcement cooperation at sporting events or large public gatherings (e.g. the 2012 Olympics, Euro 2012”).

2. On the topic of ‘implementation’ more broadly, the Paragraph 1.2.2 acknowledgement that “Increased attention needs to be paid in the coming years to the full and effective implementation, enforcement and evaluation of existing instruments (through use of existing institutional tools wherever necessary).” This goes on to add that “The development of action at Union level should involve Member States’ expertise and consider a range of measures, including non-legislative solutions such as agreed handbooks, sharing of best practice... and regional projects (that address the needs of citizens and practitioners).”

Between them, they direct House attention to the consideration of existing EU policies concerning major events as relevant policies upon which the potential impact of The House and its services could be assessed in furtherance of the Stockholm Programme (see Chapter 6 for summary).

RELEVANT EU POLICIES
A number of EU Council policies concerning international police cooperation over security for what The House define as ‘major events’ have been developed since the millennium. In particular:

**The 2007 Major Events Handbook:**

**The 2008 Prüm Decision**
EU Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime. (Chapter 3, on Major Events: articles 13, 14 & 15 enables information exchange between Member States for the purpose of security at major international events).
The 2009 Decision on Europol

The 2010 Football & Sporting Events Handbook & 2011 Update Regarding Multiple Host Countries

The Prüm and Europol Decisions set up the basis of an intelligence sharing mechanism for security at major events with an international dimension that the House can consider working with. The Major Events Handbook and the Football Handbooks represent primary common policy areas upon which to build in terms of sharing information on best practices and lessons learned.

A full list of other EU policies and recommendations issued since 1985 compiled by Poland in response to the consultation process appears as Annex C.

There is strong consortium support for the EU’s backing of The House as a longer-lasting European tool for coordinating the implementation of common EU standards at the national level. Below is a summary of key areas in the Stockholm Programme that The House potentially contributes to.

TOOLS FOR THE JOB (Paragraph 1.2)
As an essential tool for implementing the Stockholm Programme, mutual trust between Member State authorities, services and decision makers within the area is the basis of efficient cooperation. Ensuring it, though, is regarded as one of the main challenges for the future. From the outset in 2004, the EU-SEC programme has gone some way in helping establish mutual trust between its Consortium partners within its field. The potential of The House is to further such trust.

Of other tools, training is also as central to the generalities of Stockholm as it is to the particularities of The House. Detailed in the next Chapter with regard to the European Police College (CEPOL), the latter promotes the former in concrete terms.

The next three sections outline areas in which the House and use of its services can potentially contribute to three priority areas of ‘A Europe of Rights’, ‘A Europe of Law and Justice’, and ‘A Europe that Protects’ – the latter being the most pertinent to the field of major events security.

A EUROPE OF RIGHTS (Priority 1, Paragraph 2.1)
The Stockholm Programme sees a Europe built on fundamental rights. The rapid accession of the European Convention of Human Rights is now of key importance since entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1st December 2009. This obliges all institutions of the Union to ensure that such rights are actively promoted. The House standard on ethical security standards goes some way to encourage the active consideration of rights in the security planning process. It is not enough to assume such matters are self-evident. Their promotion needs to be actively asserted and critically engaged to constructive effect via strong police leadership. The House has potential to contribute further to this.

Other fundamental rights characterizing the Stockholm agenda for Europe include those of free movement around the EU area; respect for diversity and the vigorous pursuit of measures to tackle discrimination, racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and homophobia; the rights of the child and
vulnerable groups against exploitation and discrimination; support for the victims of crime and terrorism, as well as protection of the rights of suspects during criminal proceedings; enhanced regulation of personal data protection principles in terms of public authority interference for law enforcement purposes; transparency of decision-making and access to documents in support of citizens’ participation in democratic life and; default mutual protection of EU Member State citizens by other Member State diplomatic and consular authorities in Non-Member States (para’s 2.2 - 2.7).

While not appearing to apply directly to Major Event Security Planning and the services of The House, all have an indirect bearing on matters affecting major events: free movement impacts upon planning for mass international attendance across borders; respect for diversity impacts upon the policing of far-right and neo-nationalist demonstrations; rights of the child and vulnerable groups impact upon human trafficking for manual and/or sexual exploitation at mass events; the protection of suspects’ rights impact upon criminal investigations following public order incidents; data protection principles impact upon intelligence gathering and threat assessment provision; transparency of decision-making impacts upon public accountability over security planning processes; default mutual protection of EU citizens abroad impacts upon cooperation with security planning for major events outside the EU attended en mass by citizens form EU Member States.

A EUROPE OF LAW AND JUSTICE (Priority 2, Paragraph 3)

There are aspects of the Stockholm programme that the services of The House have potential to impact upon more directly. Section three of the programme speaks of strengthening the well-established principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions and judgements between Member State authorities. One might think here of European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) rulings on controversial policing tactics, such as the use ‘kettling’ (crowd containment) for example. First declared in the 1999 Tampere Agenda, the principle of mutual recognition is now expressed in the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. It has increasing implications for international cooperation in Major Event Security Planning and an overall move towards a commonality of policing in Europe in general. Whilst recognising a diversity of legal systems domestically, the services of The House have the potential to assist in developing a unity of European law through mutual recognition and trust.

Specifically, Stockholm’s development of a core of minimum rules (paragraph 3.3) is supported directly by House service on Ethical Considerations for Security Products. Where the service is based on promoting the Council of Europe’s European Code of Police Ethics among EU Members in the field of Major Event Security Planning, the Stockholm Programme seeks EU adoption of common minimum rules on the basis of mutual recognition of domestic court judgements, judicial decisions and police/judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The common ethical and operational quality standards promoted by this House service have the potential to help develop best practices and appropriate new technologies in contribution to this wider end goal (See Chapter 5.4 on Ethical Considerations).

Additionally, House guidance on best practices in Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) can contribute directly to the Stockholm Programme’s objective of supporting economic activity (paragraph 3.4.2). The EU recognises its need to create a clear regulatory environment so that small and medium sized private enterprises can grow and operate in cross-border markets. Being international in nature, major events (for the purpose of The House) represent such international markets for the engagement of businesses within the private security sector at European level. The House service on best practices in PPPs has the potential to help develop appropriate new technologies in this respect and thereby the resources available to Member States. However, it is the regulatory environment that is the key issue at stake here from both an EU and House perspective regarding the increasingly privatised nature of security provision (see Chapter 5.2 on PPPs).
A EUROPE THAT PROTECTS (Priority 3, Paragraph 4)
The House is intended to serve as a long-lasting tool at the disposal of EU Member States to help facilitate the effective design of security plans for major events. Beyond this, it foresees contribution to the improvement of security in the EU more generally for European citizens in terms of their safety and protection. This is by virtue of its services as helping to strengthen cooperation in police matters and law enforcement. Following Stockholm, what is required for this kind of security in the EU is for field operatives (represented by the consortium) to share a common professional culture, pool information effectively and have the right technological infrastructure to support them. The House is intended to assist with this.

Forging a common culture is an explicit objective of the Stockholm Programme (paragraph 4.2.1). It stresses the need to enhance mutual trust between all professionals at national and EU level. It seeks a genuine law enforcement culture that is to be developed through the exchange of experiences and good practices as well as the organization of study visits, joint training and joint exercises. As a service, using The House’s IPO Security Planning Model offers just that (see Chapter 5). In addition, House services on networking and training, especially via its CEPOL links, further drives development toward a common culture among security providers of EU Member States (See Chapter 4). It also further promotes the basic principle of mutual recognition between consortium partners via such joint activity.

With regard to the Programme’s objective of mobilising the necessary technological tools (paragraph 4.2.3), the use of ethical standards for security products as a House service and development of the Specialist Technical Equipment Pool (STEP), have continued impact potential. The former, in providing minimum ethical and operational standards, enables a degree of confidence between Member States in choosing products for procurement or planning. The detailed information provision foreseen in the potential of the latter enhances mutual trust and strengthens cooperation on the basis of it.

In this respect, enhanced cooperation is at the very heart of The House, the potential for which has been in full evidence during its programme of several service provisions for partners hosting major events during 2012 and 2013 as part of the project’s implementation.

The European Major Events Register (EMER) has potential to support the Stockholm objective of being able to make available adequate, reliable and comparable statistics (paragraph 4.3.3). For such statistics that are both over time and between Member States and European regions are necessary for evidence based decision making. This is so for informing common policy on major event security planning in general as well as informing security planning decisions for specific major events in host countries. The potential for detailed information sharing expected with the development of EMER (e.g. through threat incidence figures and event related evaluation reports) would provide basic but comparable statistics, assist with policy and planning decision on best practices and strengthen mutual trust at EU level.

Finally, there is conceivable potential for some level of contribution to be made by use of House services on PPP best practices to the Programme’s objective on disaster management in the EU (paragraph 4.6). Put simply, the use of public-private partnerships for operational delivery of crisis and emergency management within various major event security plans should, in natural consequence, contribute to the overall objective of developing effective policies based upon an integrated approach for the capacity to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from disasters in Europe more widely.
3.4 The Challenge to International Police Cooperation - Summary

Centrally, the Stockholm Programme points out one of the major challenges facing the development of international police cooperation in Europe. It is the need to ensure respect for fundamental freedoms and integrity while guaranteeing security in Europe. Striking the right balance between law enforcement measures and measures to safeguard individual rights, the rule of law and international protection rules, is of paramount importance. The House sees itself as being well placed to facilitate and promote a common approach to policing in terms of such a balance.

The specific services of The House CTMs (as common standards) are not provided by any other existing organization. If used and developed, they have the potential to fulfil key objectives for Consortium Partners and EU Member States in relation to Major Event Security Planning. Including:

- The promotion of the standardization of major event security across the EU, ensuring that citizens face similar experiences (e.g. Security Standards, Media Management)
- The promotion and facilitation of effective design of best-practice security plans for major events (e.g. the IPO Security Model)
- The promotion and facilitation of enhanced cooperation between Consortium Partners over the sharing of knowledge, resources and experiences (e.g. STEP & EMER)
- The provision of a forum to develop unique solutions to emerging major event security issues (e.g. Networking & Training/CEPOL)
- The building and facilitation of stronger relationships and enhanced innovation between the public and private sectors (e.g. PPPs)

The preceding sections help provide the EU Policy context in which continued use of House services sit. They help draw attention to the strategic significance of major events both to the EU and EU Member States as ‘windows of opportunity’. They provide a theoretical frame in which House services have the potential to contribute to wider strategic goals in support basic European values.

The next Chapter deals with the basic research method deployed by UNICRI through The House in pursuit of supporting those values within this theoretical frame of the EU policy context.
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY – COORDINATING COMMONALITY

ACTION-BASED RESEARCH & CTM PROVISIONS

As mentioned in Chapter 1, in furtherance of its general mandate to support Member States in crime prevention and criminal justice mandate, UNICRI uses ‘action-based research’ to assist in the formulation of improved policies and concrete intervention programmes. This has been applied in the development of House services as coordination tools/methodologies (CTMs) for the promotion of common standards in the specific field of ‘Major Events Security’ and general move toward a common approach to the policing of such events in Europe.

In the social sciences this methodology is recognised as ‘action research’. It is described as a ‘transformative methodology’ that combines knowledge gathering with an operational intent to affect change (Gobo 2008: 26). Ethnographic in nature, it is often carried out through ‘shadowing techniques’ of field observation in the natural environment of those being researched (Gobo 2008: 320). As a matter of intervention, the method tends to involve a degree of self-reflexive dialogue between the researcher and the researched, inviting those researched to reflect on their experiences (Saukko 2003: 87 & 91). From a critical theory perspective that values research in terms of its political effect rather than formulation of universal truths, it is said to attempt “an interactive cycle between practical struggles, the formulation of research questions and the reporting of research findings in a way that informs further practical struggle” (Schwandt, 1996 in Seale 1999: 9-10). UNICRI’s approach reflects this.

Broadly speaking, the method is a recognised approach in which the researcher (or in UNICRI’s case, the research institution) and the client (in UNICRI’s case, the Member States of the Consortium), collaborate in the diagnosis (identification) of a problem and in the development of a solution based on that diagnosis. In this sense, ‘action research’ is close to but should not be confused with ‘evaluation research’, which studies the impact of an intervention (e.g. a new policy) rather than the development of one. (Bryman 2004: 277). The timetable for action research, it has been noted (Gobo 2008: 307), tends to be governed by the budget limitations of the research funding for the project supporting it. This has been the case for the EU-SEC, EU-SEC II and HOUSE Projects in their use of the method.

In terms of the EU SEC programme and ensuing HOUSE Project, the overall research attempt based on this method has been to engage police security planners through a representative consortium of EU Member States in a bid to identify suitable topics for further research and ideas for future joint activities in relation to them. Then for operational engagement with those ideas, developed as common standards, and reported feedback on them with a view to future policy suggestions. For THE HOUSE Project stage, this has been described in Chapter 1 as a process of ‘testing’ those standards as common EU standards against ‘associated events’ for discussion in relation to accepted national practices. The use of Member State representatives as either hosting the event to which the standard was provided; being the provider of the standard to the event host; or member of the research team (‘task team’) studying the provision, constitutes the practical application of the method’s attempt to coordinate national security planning for major events toward a set of common standards in Europe.

Practical guidance developed by UNICRI for arranging such CTM provisions during the project emphasised the importance of identifying the focus group of national security planners and their familiarization with relevant project documents beforehand. For the provisions themselves, and associated discussions, it recommended organising into group sessions for 5 to 12 participants of about...
2.5 hours duration, including basic presentations of the CTM. The emphasis is quality time for small
group discussion, with the CTM and the host’s major event as the background context.

4.1 EMER and Use of The House to Share Lessons Learned

BASIC DESCRIPTION OF EMER
As a House research and technology tool, the main idea of EMER (European Major Events Register) is
to act as a researchable database for host authorities to voluntarily register their events as ‘major’ (in
accordance with the House definition of ‘Major Event’) and upload sharable and evaluative information
onto (see Annex D for original guiding specifications).

Of particular use to others for future security planning purposes would be summaries of ‘lessons learned’
and ‘best practices’ gained from EU recommended evaluation reports based on the experiences of the
particular international event registered on the EMER database. Taken collectively when monitored over
time, such lessons and other information could be researched and developed into suggestions for
common policy for EU Member States in due course.

Registering an event as ‘major’ with EMER is intended to be the basic means by which prospective users
of House services could facilitate access to those services.

CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF EMER
Conceived in 2006 during EU-SEC and conceptually tested during EU-SECII, an operating version of
EMER was developed as a prototype during 2012/2013 as part of THE HOUSE Project along with the
STEP (Specialist Technical Equipment Pool) database (subject of the next section). In principle, the ideas
of both STEP & EMER are viewed positively by House Partners as end-users and support for the
continued development of both as House research tools remains strong and clear among them.

It is important to reiterate the voluntary nature of the database. House Partners are concerned to ensure
that the type and amount of information that they wish to share always remains a decision made by the
end-users themselves. Each data contributor retains control over their own content.

The merits of reflecting EMER within EU regulatory frameworks were consulted on with House
Partners. They expressed caution over extending the voluntary registration of an event as ‘major’ to that
of a formal ‘declaration’ process at a transnational EU level, with any common standards compliance
implications going beyond those of the Partner’s own national/state framework. To be acceptable, any
potential EU level policy suggestions concerning EMER and the idea of registering or declaring and event
as ‘major’ should be put in terms of enabling Member States to do something voluntarily rather than requiring
them to do so.

The House use of EMER therefore remains limited to facilitating the exchange of experiences,
best practices and lessons learned between participating Member States as originally envisaged.

SHARING LESSONS LEARNED
Pending the operational development of EMER, The House – as a UNICRI coordinated EU-wide
network of practitioners engaged in action research – can still be used as a vehicle through which
evaluation reports containing summaries of best practices and lessons learned in consequence of
good/bad decision making can be shared, collated, discussed and disseminated in ways envisaged through
EMER and relevant EU Policy (e.g. Evaluation Reports as referred to and recommended in section IV.1
of the 2007 Major Events Handbook and discussed further in HOUSE Project report T3.3).
4.2 STEP and Use of The House to Exchange Good Practices

BASIC DESCRIPTION OF STEP

As a further research and technology tool, STEP (Specialist Technical Equipment Pool) is designed as a database of specialist technical equipment that cooperating House partners are able to physically share (subject to operational availability, transfer logistics and any licensing constraints) or at least professionally comment upon from a position of end-user experience and knowledge of its operational performance. This is in support of a national authority’s planning and procurement decision making processes for a major event (see Annex E for guiding specifications on STEP).

In being independent from any commercial interests, the database is intended to provide secure, selective and searchable data with relevant information about security technologies, services and equipment that have been produced or procured and used operationally during major events hosted by Member States. As a ‘peer-review’ system, the intention is to support decision makers by offering sharable overviews of the benefits, requirements, points of attention and possible improvements of the various security products contained within the STEP database.

CURRENT STATUS & FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF STEP

Like EMER, STEP was conceived in 2006 and conceptually tested during EU-SEC II. An operating prototype was built along-side EMER as part of THE HOUSE Project. Following the original idea, it is designed as a pool of potentially sharable specialist equipment between House members on the one hand, and a source of independent field operative’s review of equipment that is either commercially available or has been produced by an authority’s own research and planning.

The prototype has been built using the STILT classification system for a wider range of equipment, services and technologies as ‘security products’ detailed in the previous chapter. There is strong support for the STILT taxonomy among practitioners involved in The House. As a basic classification system it was found to be highly acceptable and made practical sense to all parties consulted. Its ready incorporation into STEP tends to support this finding and provide it with an operational reach.

The operational version of STEP so far developed meets the guiding specifications and intended purpose of the original idea. As with EMER, the type and amount of information to be shared must remain a decision made by respective end-users as contributors and owners of content. Further testing is likely to help confirm ‘proof of concept’ for further investment in its development.

Where the EU’s 2007 Handbook on Major Events recommended the development of ‘a database on all available resources and corresponding contact points’ (and no such database is known to exist as yet), the continued development of STEP would make a welcomed contribution to EU Policy.

EXCHANGING GOOD PRACTICES

Where any practice can be assessed as ‘good’ (see next Chapter on PPPs) there is no real barrier to its exchange between interested parties. All that is required is the will to do so and mechanism or network by which to do so. Pending operational development of STEP with regard to a range of acceptable and available security products, The House itself serves as a voluntary networking mechanism for information exchange on good products and practices among professionals/experts.
4.3 Networking & Training – CEPOL, The House and Expert Meetings

BACKGROUND
The potential of CEPOL (European Police College) as a networking and training tool for experts in the field of major events security planning has always been recognised by what is now The House. The basic idea of a CEPOL based networking and training programme dedicated to the subject of major events security was first accepted by the consortium in 2006. EU-SEC II furthered House support for utilizing CEPOL’s training potential and use as a dissemination tool for related research findings. It is seen as a ready network of institutional contacts that, if used well, can serve as a valuable source of inspiration for command level practitioners and other experts in the field. A roadmap was produced in 2011 suggesting, among other things, an annual seminar organised by CEPOL in collaboration with The House be held on the topic of major event security.

CURRENT STATUS
During 2012/2013 THE HOUSE Project actively progressed the idea of a European Training Curriculum on major events security in collaboration with CEPOL. In conjunction with this User Guide and other relevant documents, the training would also raise awareness and promote the use of House services among relevant national policy makers and practitioners.

Formal CEPOL Cooperation with The House
A formal Memorandum of Understanding between CEPOL and The House was negotiated for 2013 regarding cooperation over a pilot seminar under the umbrella of CEPOL for late 2014. CEPOL sees The House and its services as relevant to support and promote.

Relevant Documents Uploaded to CEPOL Website
HOUSE Project related/produced documents have been identified and uploaded onto the CEPOL webpage. Available to registered users since March 2013 they include (there is a full list at Annex F):

- The IPO Security Planning Model (2007 version) – CTM 1
- Report on Media Management (Oct 2010) – CTM 3
- Report on Common Research Standards (May 2010) – CTM 4
- Strategic Roadmap for Security Research (Mar 2011)
- Coordinating National Research Programmes & Policies (Oct 2009)

Training Needs Analysis Undertaken
Demand for House services, in particular the IPO Model, is high. However, the need of newer European Member States for a more exhaustive course on planning, crowd management, tactical equipment, etc. is beyond current scope. Training by CEPOL and The House is for senior officers and trainers for cascading to their own officers nationally. A continual training needs and availability survey with regard to major events security issues will be incorporated into the STEP and EMER database interfaces for end-users to maintain contribution to for future development.
Training Module Curriculum Drafted

A training module curriculum has been drafted for a two step training course for senior police officer’s to combine a focus on the use of the House and its CTMs/Services with other target content aimed at strengthening European level cooperation over major event security. This includes aspects on the STEP & EMER research tools outlined above, as well as the services outlined in the next Chapter as common standards and for which the relevant supporting documents have been uploaded to the CEPOL website.

It is anticipated that the course will operationalize the House manuals and this User Guide in respect of major event categorizations (see Chapter 2); common standards (see Chapter 5) in the context of different legal and cultural setting across EU Member States; use of best practices, House research and practical experiences (lessons learned).

This two step course will be carried out in pilot seminars, the first in Paris and the second in Lisbon in September 2014. Based on the success of the pilot seminar, it is hoped that this will become an annual seminar to offer training on the use of The House services. Its learning outcomes and objectives for senior officers involved in security planning for major events and European policy makers, trainers, researchers and experts as its target group are intended to be:

- To provide an understanding of the House Project/Manual
- To deepen mutual understanding in an international forum of various police cultures
- To establish a substantial network with other colleagues
- To combine research and practical knowledge within a model

Lectures, discussions, role play, group work and simulation will be used for each of these issues as delivery methods. Case studies, presentations and discussions will contribute to exchange on best practices and help pave the way for mutual assistance/cooperation. Group work will strengthen cooperation and develop networking. Simulation work will allow participants to experiment with lessons learned.

A pre-course assessment (based on a study of selected House documents) will be the means by which participants are asked to reflect on their vision of cross-border/international cooperation – which will then be discussed in a workshop. Discussion and course outcomes will be analysed and uploaded to CEPOL’s Learning management System (LMS) afterwards.

The overall aim of the course would be to improve and strengthen European level cooperation over major event security research and planning among national authorities in the EU.

FUTURE – CONTACTS, EXPERT MEETINGS & STANDING CONFERENCES

CEPOL is a European agency aiming to encourage cross-border cooperation via the organisation of training activities to a common standard and the dissemination of research findings in relation to relevant fields of policing. The House has long recognised the potential of collaboration.

UNICRI/The House and CEPOL should continue to collaborate over specialised training to increase expertise and knowledge on major event security as a topic that legitimately sits within the more general given CEPOL field of ‘public security’. Importantly, the strong interest of CEPOL in having a partnership agreement with UNICRI could be formalised by the Memorandum of Understanding negotiated during 2013.
In addition to the practical elements, the topic of police ethics should also be a priority for all police forces involved in major events security. Major events security planning provides an opportunity to consider and promote the Council of Europe’s European Code of Police Ethics and is the very subject of one of the House Services outlined in the next Chapter concerning common standards.

In this context, expert participants could improve knowledge and operational technique by sharing extensive experiences gained worldwide through several of the most recent major events. Aimed at senior officers, specialists from different origins (e.g. Ministries of Interior, Ministries of Justice, Event Stakeholders and Media) would be among the course trainers. The collective expert knowledge and experience shared by UNICRI and CEPOL would improve European law enforcement capabilities to effectively handle major event security. Under the auspices of the Home Affairs Directorate, such collaborative training between UNICRI/The House & CEPOL would be possible.

**Annual Seminar/Standing Conference on Major Events Security**
Following the Stockholm Programme, the European Council invited the Commission to propose an Action Plan for raising substantially the level of European training and for expanding systematically exchange schemes in the EU. The Plan should propose how to ensure that one third of all police involved in European police cooperation and half of the judges, prosecutors and judicial staff involved in European judicial cooperation as well as half of other professionals involved in European cooperation could be offered European Training Schemes. It also suggested to examine what could be defined as a European Training Scheme, and to give it a European dimension.

In this light, CEPOL, jointly with UNICRI, should be able to organise an annual European seminar dealing with Major Event Security, so that The House can be promoted as a coordinative body. As a standing conference, the seminar would become a regular tool networking and the dissemination of expertise and know-how. This could be developed for the future of House networking & training. (See also section 6.2 of this guide regarding a ‘Standing Committee on Major Event Security’ as an EU policy suggestion).

**Expert Groups & Meetings and Contact Points**
CEPOL would benefit from an updated list of experts specialised in Major Events Security that could be compiled and supplied by The House. This would also support the development of EU policy on Major Events Security and recommendations for expert meetings in its 2007 Handbook.

Concerning the exchanging of experts, it is clear that each Major Event has its own specificities but as these events become more and more transnational, it becomes crucial to share expertise from different countries. Important principles of national sovereignty should not be allowed to present themselves as constant challenges to the encouragement of countries to cooperate.

Promoting contact points in the EU Member States is one of the main stakes ensuring the continued existence of The House. The House can coordinate a network of National Contact Points (NCPs) set up in its current 24 EU Member States, representatives from CEPOL and Europol, and the European Commission. Together, information collection and exchange points constitute a European information network on Major Event Security. This network can link the national information systems of the 24 Member States and their key partners to the House. It can act as a practical instrument for the collection and exchange of data and information.
NETWORKING & TRAINING PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE HOUSE PROJECTS

Although each country has its own approach to major event security planning, there is strong interest for operational guidelines. The IPO Security Planning Model is regarded as delivering an extremely robust training model that has been comprehensively tested and is well accepted by House Partners.

It is widely acknowledged throughout Europe and beyond that the IPO Model provides, in training and development terms, significant opportunities for conceptualising the subject at a strategic level through an understanding of how its different elements work together to produce a comprehensive response (see next Chapter). Furthermore, at a more tactical and operational level, the different elements present themselves as important thematic and topic based training subjects.

Ongoing development of an electronic version of the IPO Model and its capacity to explore a much wider range of subject matter, together with STEP/EMER’s incorporation of training needs identification tools, will greatly assist analysis and future development if supported by project funding for this time of action-based research coordinated by UNICRI.

Planning and delivering major event security is a complex and dynamic exercise in which strong leadership and effective management are required for optimal results. The process of planning and implementing security has an evolutionary and cyclical nature. The capacity to provide training on it at strategic, tactical and operational levels is critical for reasons obvious to its practitioners.

The House is in a unique position to offer a flexible, comprehensive and complimentary range of safety and security training products in relation to major events. Yet there are currently significant shortcomings in such provision, particularly in areas that encompass the multi-dimensional local, national and international matrix of their inherent safety and security risks.

To this end a future project proposal could include exploration of security planning for major events as a multi-agency activity involving more than just the police and national authorities for security. One that necessarily requires the domestic coordination and direction of multi-agency contribution but is carried out on the basis of a common set standards for international cooperation as those already developed as services by The House.
CHAPTER 5: USING THE COMMON STANDARDS

During 2012 and 2013 THE HOUSE Project field tested its four established common standards as ‘Coordination Tools/Methodologies’ (CTMs) with security planners in the planning or evaluation settings of major events hosted by EU Member States participating in the Project (see Figure 5, Chapter 1).

The four CTMs are listed as Common Planning and Evaluation Standards in Figure 3 along with other House services. Briefly described they are:

1. **The IPO Security Planning Model:** A generic security planning blue-print that can be used as a planning/evaluation check list and tailored to each country’s specific needs.

2. **Public Private Partnerships:** Guidelines for assessing, establishing and utilizing best practices in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs).

3. **Media Management Guidance:** General guidelines for police and security planners on the management of police and media relations for major events.


As described earlier (Chapter 1), each were tested and assessed in relation to accepted national practices and their potential impact on coordinating national policies toward common planning and evaluation standards among European Member States. They were also considered and consulted on with security planners as to their potential contribution to the main strategic EU security priorities and relevant policies (see Chapters 3 ante and 5 post).

The results in relation to their use as common standards among National Authorities were reported on in two separate internal Project reports in terms of their application to national planning and evaluation processes for major events security respectively. The findings have been incorporated into this section of the User Guide in support of a fuller description of what each Common Standard is, the main ideas behind its development and how it should be used by prospective service users.

The main message for applying any of these services as common international standards is that they are offered as voluntary tools for use as guidance only. They are not intended to be prescriptive or thought of as mandatory or imposing themselves upon any national authority’s own policies or practices.

They are best used as a common point of reference to facilitate discussion and reflection on national policy development in relation to major events. They provide a common point of international comparison that is neutral and not favouring or threatening any one particular country’s national model.

They are intended to assist international cooperation this way and help move toward a common approach to policing major events based upon shared European values.

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8Reports D2.2 and D2.3 in List of House Project Reports & Deliverables ante.
5.1 The IPO Security Planning Model – Using it for Planning & Evaluation

BACKGROUND

“How, then, may [national] authorities of future major events learn to avoid mistakes of past major events and how do they acquire good practices?”


Premised upon the elusive nature of the international body of knowledge on security and safety requirements for major events, this question drove the IPO programme on Security during major events in 2002. Its main outcome was the 2007 IPO Security Planning Model as a basic consolidation of that body of then otherwise tacit police knowledge.

Whereas before, national authorities tasked with organizing and hosting major events may have had to turn to institutional event organizers such as the International Olympics Committee (IOC) or international football authorities such as FIFA or UAFA for such tacit information, the IPO Security Planning Model now provides a common point of reference that national authorities can turn to.

The Model was built upon three core considerations relating to major events as relatively new phenomena for national authorities to contend with in terms of security planning:

- Complexity: that the challenges of major events should not be underestimated.
- Legacy: that they present opportunities to expand and introduce lasting security capacities.
- Scarcity: that knowledge and expertise on their planning is rare, diffuse and hard to access.

It drew upon the collective experience of security planners for major events in Europe to fill a need identified by Member States around 2006 for an internationally recognised security manual as a common standard covering the main elements of the planning process and guiding principles of security provision at major events.

As an evolving House service for national authorities based upon best practices and lessons learnt in that collective international experience, the IPO Security Planning Model therefore represents a common point of reference against which Member States can review, evaluate and develop their own national models. Importantly, it should be seen as guidelines, or a management checklist, for a planning process rather than generic model of a plan in itself.

Since 2002, an increasing number of national initiatives exist among Member States to develop their own Major Event Security Manuals and standard operating procedures in relation to major event security. The idea is not to replace national models, manuals or guidance with the IPO Model but for it to provide a supporting role when used in conjunction with them. It has the potential to provide the basis of an entire planning policy framework if one wants, or be simply used as a checklist in the planning/evaluation phases. It engenders commonality without compromising national autonomy.

Widely accepted by EU Member States, the IPO Security Planning Model continues to undergo revision based upon its engagement with and feedback from security planners using it in the field.
BASIC DESCRIPTION OF THE 2007 MODEL

Unlike the 2005 Security Planners Toolkit, the 2007 Security Planning Model is not a practitioner’s technical manual but a policy maker’s (or security manager’s) checklist for managing the security planning process of a major event.

It is set against a description of twelve main elements of a generic security planning process (Figure 9). The twelve elements range from leadership and structural management to contingency planning and crisis management. Each element consists of between two and six sub-headings.

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<th>1</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Planning Structure &amp; Management</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
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<td>Media &amp; PR Strategy</td>
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<td>Traffic Management</td>
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<td>Non-Event &amp; Event related Security</td>
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<td>Human Resources &amp; Logistical Support</td>
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<td>Information Technology &amp; Communications</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Integration &amp; Coordination</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Contingency Planning &amp; Crisis Management</td>
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Figure 9: The 12 Elements of the 2007 IPO Security Planning Model

The model itself consists of three main components (Figure 10):

1. A system – for organising those involved in the planning.
2. The deliverables – of security and contingency plans.
3. Risks – of anything that may adversely challenge the plans.

It can be summarised as:

A system that produces deliverables to address existing and potential risks.

The SYSTEM component covers issues concerning the planner’s security capacity, constraints and intelligence. The DELIVERABLES component focuses on security plans for both inside and outside the even venue(s), along with ‘What if’ contingencies for potential threats manifesting themselves as actual harm in an actual breach of security. The RISKS component refers to the combination of potential threats to the event and vulnerabilities of the event to those threats and can be considered in terms of the five ‘threat categories’ outlined in Chapter 2 of this User Guide.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>MAIN COMPONENT</th>
<th>COMPONENT FOCUS</th>
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<td>SYSTEM</td>
<td>CAPACITY, CONSTRAINTS, INTELLIGENCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>DELIVERABLES</td>
<td>INSIDE, OUTSIDE, ‘IF’ CONTINGENCIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISKS</td>
<td>THREATS &amp; VULNERABILITIES</td>
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</table>

Figure 10: The 3 Components & Focus of the IPO Model

The IPO Security Planning model was used in its entirety by the Danish Police in relation to the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit (COP 2009). As a result, the Centre for Police Studies in Denmark adopted the twelve elements as a ‘checklist’ for both planning and evaluation purposes. For reference and user guidance it is reproduced here, along with its sub-headings, as Annex G.

If devolved through national police training centres it would gain wider field recognition and enable practitioners to speak both internally and internationally in common terms when cooperating.
HOUSE TESTING & DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL

During the IPO Model’s 2012/2013 field testing within THE HOUSE Project, it was concluded that the 2007 model now reflects a common planning approach in Europe and that its basic component structure and individual elements are widely accepted by all 24 members of the House Consortium.

Use in Planning

Whilst not directly following the IPO Security Planning Model itself, field test indications are that the planning processes of EU Member States at least cover the same issues as that of the IPO Model. However, although a synergy between the IPO Model and current national practices can be recognized it cannot be said that the practices are necessarily followed by written national policy. This may present a problem for the future preservation of such synergy and collective experience.

Where Denmark has already adopted the model in 2009, and Poland, Lithuania and The Netherlands have made direct reference to it in relation to their recent major event planning processes during 2012, its application as a general planning guide was further echoed in consultation during 2013 with Greece, Malta and Romania. Consideration has been made in the Irish context for the Model’s use as a benchmark for the establishment of a national strategic framework for major events; at the time of writing this manual, a strategic working group has been established to implement this.

Based on the outcomes of its field testing, an updated version of the IPO Security Planning Model is currently being drafted by UNICRI with additional chapters concerning media and public relations, public-private partnerships, and post-event evaluation. To assist its continued synergy with national practices and preservation of collective experiences, its translation into the languages of its intended use is encouraged by the House and is under consideration with regards to base costs.

Use in Evaluation

While evaluation is not yet singled out as a self-sustaining element of the 2007 IPO Model, its importance and relevancy is recognised from field testing as in need of greater prominence in it. What can be said in terms of its use in evaluation is that the Model can automatically fit into any existing evaluation system that a national authority or service user may have. A possible future development for the IPO Model in this respect would be to draft a methodology for a ‘start to finish’ guidebook for end users on ‘The House Evaluation Process’. This could include a real life case-study based ‘Book of Consequences’, demonstrating the effects of good and bad decision making.

As a set of standards, the IPO Model is particularly valuable if used to create an evaluation ‘checklist’ of actions to assist in future measurements and successes, as well as failures, during a specific event. Whilst the 12 element based checklist at Annex A can suffice for the time being, a more detailed tool may be in need of development to enhance the evaluation process and capture the experiences of hosting nations with regard to best practices and lessons learnt for dissemination to others.

An electronic model of the updated IPO Model is currently being developed for such purposes, along with the possibility of integrating it with other House services and databases (e.g. the STEP & EMER services in Chapter 3). Planning activities can then be evaluated and reports stored and shared among authorized persons of EU House Partner countries. The periodic updating of the IPO Security Planning

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9 The intended purpose of the Event-Related Evaluation Report as recommended in Section IV.1 of the EU’s 2007 Major Events Handbook is also to ensure lessons learned or recommendations (e.g. best practices) are made available to future major event security planners and dissemination to others via CEPOL and the ITE. (See HOUSE Project report T3.3 for further detail and discussion as to status of this recommendation in practice).
Model based on evaluated field experiences is what makes it a useful auxiliary tool to existing national mechanisms for major event security planners.

5.2 Best Practices in Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)

KEY POINT
Governments retain primary responsibility for national security and the protection of people and property. It is on this basis that the establishment of any governmental partnership with the private sector concerning any aspect safety and security provision for a major event should be undertaken.

BASIC DESCRIPTION
The House has developed guidelines for assessing, establishing and utilising best practices in ‘Public Private Partnerships’ (PPPs) within national and international EU frameworks as part of the overall security planning process. Drafted as a new chapter, it complements the Leadership element of the IPO Model with regard to contractual agreements between parties to PPPs at major events.

Via seven thematic areas/modules, the original guidance provides thirty recommended phases for consideration as best practice in the security planning process relating to PPPs. As summary headings only, these are reproduced here as Annex H for reference. While field testing during 2012 found this model of PPP practices may not be universally applicable to all EU Member States, two core questions of ultimate responsibility for overall safety and security at a major event and state regulation of privately contracted providers in respect of aspects of it, are sufficiently generic to form the basis of constructive discussion for users of this House service.

So it is the assessment criteria and two core principles – responsibility and regulation – that are outlined here as the basis upon which the service should be used in the interests of developing and maintaining a common standard between Member States in relation to PPPs at major events.

ASSESSING GOOD PRACTICE
What constitutes ‘good practice’ with regard to sharable lessons? This was a question asked and pursued during the EU-SEC II Project. It was answered by reference to the criteria for ‘best practice’ transferability offered by the European Crime Prevention Network’s 2005 publication A Methodology for Assessing Good Practice Projects and Initiatives. In short, this suggests that any kind of practice, in order to be assessed as ‘good’ for sharing with other countries, should simply be:

1) Appropriately formulated (i.e. comprehensively described and documented)
2) Replicable (i.e. easy application across other countries)
3) Successful (i.e. it works in terms of doing what it is intended to do)

For the House, it is the ‘replicable’ criterion that is most important. The adoption or adaption of a practice should not depend too much on matters such as substantial resource inputs; unique legislative frameworks; involvement of individual personalities; or other special circumstances.

Detailed practices should therefore have easy application across all EU Member States. While any practices would have to be compatible with the relevant national legislation of its user, problems of such applicability in the national context can be avoided if the basic ‘replicable’ criterion is followed.
CORE PRINCIPLES – RESPONSIBILITY & REGULATION

Whatever the detail and particularities of local practices for temporary and event specific PPP contracts over security and/or safety provision, the basic nature of the partnership should be understood as being premised upon two core principles concerning responsibility and regulation.

These are best used in workshop format to create policy development discussion in the respective national context of the user and its response to the growth of the private security industry.

Responsibility Principle:
“The organizer of the major event is the one who is primarily responsible for security at the event.”

In theory at least, the principle should apply regardless of the public or private nature of the venue or the event itself. Accordingly, the common expectation of police duties in relation to the event would then be their response to security threats that are beyond the management capacity (or legal competency) of the organizer or available services from the private security sector.

But there is some ambiguity between the terms ‘organizer’ and ‘host’ of a major event. In practice, national authorities are ‘hosting’ a major event but are not necessarily the ‘organisers’ of it. In cases of sporting and many cultural events, for example, the ‘organiser’ is a private entity (e.g. FIFA), quite separate from the national (or municipal) authority as ‘host’. In cases of political summits and state visits, though, the ‘host’ (i.e. the State) is also the ‘organiser’ (e.g. EU Presidencies). Further ambiguity was found in field tests: in certain countries private organisers are in charge of security and safety issues, and the police are only assisting in carrying out the practical aspects and, sometimes, to assess and to evaluate the organizer’s safety planning. In the interest of a developing a common approach across Europe, some clarification and consistency needs to be found.

The emphasis should be that the role and responsibility of the police and national authorities always remains as primary providers of national security (i.e. political security). This applies both within and beyond the event’s specific security needs (i.e. physical security). And that nothing precludes the police and national authorities from any aspect of governance over the provision and planning of security by the event organisers themselves as either public or private bodies.

In this sense, the actual event organisers can be delegated and retain a primary responsibility for ensuring physical safety and security at the event in the terms specified by the ‘organizing/hosting’ national authority. This is regardless of the public or private nature of the event or its organiser.

Operational police responses thus remain focussed on security threats that are beyond the management capacity of the event organizers themselves. For example, where the private organiser of a private event can provide adequate private security guards to cover the physical security requirements of the venue (such as gate control and/or stewarding), but not the containment of an outbreak of public disorder or intervention of a terrorist threat in relation to the event, the police and other security agencies organise themselves to cover such contingencies in the interests of national security that only they have the resources and ultimate responsibility for providing. As good practice, such contingency plans may involve joint training/briefing with the private security sector regarding clarity of roles and how to be of tactical assistance in facilitating evacuation, etc. This would make for good security planning.
Regulation Principle

“Only use regulated private security companies or companies that employ security personnel holding state recognized licences.”

From discussions with House partners during 2012 and 2013, it is clear that the trend for the contracting out of services, historically delivered by police and other state authorities, to private contractors, is widely accepted throughout the EU. And in view of the current global financial situation, it is felt that such a trend is likely to continue. PPPs are therefore highly relevant. So, too, is the need to encourage and ensure an adequate system of licensing and state regulation.

Yet to varying degrees, the concept of Public Private Partnerships in relation to major events security planning remains relatively underdeveloped in some EU countries compared to their level of maturity in other areas, such as contractual arrangements over waste management on behalf of municipal authorities for example. Nonetheless, while still new for some but familiar to others, PPPs have become more relevant to major event security planning over the years one way or another. End users of House service consequently recognize the need to encourage a common framework, or at least some common guiding principles, in this respect. The principle of using only state licensed security guards or regulated security companies can be seen as one of them.

The technical distinction between whether some privately contracted services provide a ‘security’ or ‘safety’ role may sometimes be a source of confusion. However, taking ‘security’ for a major event in its wider sense for House purposes as inclusive of ‘safety’ considerations (see Chapter 2 definitions and ‘Threat Categories’) in the overall planning process, then clarifying the roles and legal competencies of the private service providers concerned can shape a workshop based application of this and the other core principle of ‘responsibility’ as a policy supporting framework for discussion.

EU Member States that currently lack a coordinated training and licensing framework of governance for private security could benefit from discussing and highlighting precisely this need for regulation in the context of any given major event’s security planning needs and the high international media profile it is likely to attract (by definition as a ‘major event’ for House purposes). This is because international media coverage of a major event is likely to expose a hosting authority’s lack of sophistication in the regulation and licensing of the growing private security industry as a matter of public concern and interest.

The establishment of PPPs in major event security planning, regardless of how well or under developed they may be at present, provides a window of opportunity for national authorities to clarify and assert these two core principles as common standards in Europe. The wider effect of this is to help ensure maintenance of a level of democratic governance and accountability over what is clearly a growing and expanding system of security provision in contemporary European society.

REMINDER OF KEY POINT IN USE OF THESE COMMON STANDARDS FOR PPPs:

Governments retain primary responsibility for national security and the protection of people and property. It is on this basis that the establishment of any governmental partnership with the private sector concerning any aspect safety and security provision for a major event should be undertaken.

5.3 Media Management Guidance – Use in Planning & Evaluation

“The media should be given the fullest possible degree of freedom to cover the event thus safeguarding the right to free expression of opinions in accordance with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The media strategy should be geared towards openness and transparency.” (EU’s 2007 Handbook on Major Events, Section III.4).

KEY POINT

The potential for this service is to allow security planners to constructively engage with basic principles of respect for press freedom, as well as explore the relationship of mutual dependency between police and media as information sources. This makes these guidelines unique in comparison to others.

BASIC DESCRIPTION

The service provides opportunity to explore general guidelines for police and security planners on the management of police and media relations for major events. It can be used to review and develop media policies on the basis of practices accumulated by The House over recent years.

In the House context of major events with an international dimension, the level of world media attention that they attract can be seen as both a strategic communications resource and a potential attractor of threats to event security simultaneously. The ability to balance principled democratic values of press freedom with the practical needs of maintaining security, presents planners with the core challenge of their media management policies and practices for their respective major events.

A sample case study appears at Annex I as an example of how the service could be used on this point.

USE IN DEVELOPING GOOD POLICY & PRACTICES

Some may feel that media management is not a priority for major event security planning. Yet from a media perspective an event’s security arrangements and policies (or perceived difficulties with them) can quickly become ‘the story’ rather than the event itself if poorly handled. The guidance can be used as an experience based platform to build good policy on. Core guidance suggests:

1. The police need to be the primary source of information to the media
2. The police need to continuously cultivate media contacts
3. The police need to be flexible in their approach to media relations (no set ‘recipe’)
4. There are minimum requirements for police information to be: timely; accurate, strategic, directed/channelled and for logistics to be supportive and professional.

It is the optimization of police-media relations at a Major Event that is sought in security planning. In this, the building of a relationship of trust is the key to police management of the media. Conversely, unprofessional media management following security incidents can be the cause of further damage to interested parties, including the government. Contemporary media management also requires being fully conversant with the ever evolving online technology of the new media – i.e. social media and the challenges of ‘citizen journalism’. The guidance helps address these new issues. (See also the 2010 British Journal of Criminology article by Greer & McLaughlin in the further reading section of the conclusion).

In all these respects it is perhaps the requirement for a professional police press officer with direct access to the chain of security command that is the most important in avoiding the highly damaging appearance in public of amateurish efforts and behalf of the police and authorities.
MEDIA, ETHICS & EXTERNAL POLICE COMMUNICATION

The 2008 EU-SEC project’s work on ethics included matters concerning media-management. In preparation for use of The House’s updated Media Management Guidance they can be re-iterated and reproduced here as summarised in the 2011 EU-SEC II Manual’s Media chapter.

In a free and democratic state governed by the rule of law, security is noted as a central point of reference for the police in general: they are regarded as the essential guarantor of the State’s internal security. Consequently the police also represent the State’s monopoly of the use of force over the citizen. The police thus have “a clearly exposed function with considerable accumulation of power and, consequently, a huge responsibility in handling this power.” What are understood as professional standards and codes of police ethics are the precautions required to ensure that police measures to guarantee security during major events or elsewhere remain justifiably appropriate and within the democratic rule of law. They are understood as ‘behaviour binding regulations’.

Media Scrutiny of Police Behaviour

The importance of security during a Major Event renders police behaviour and the extent of its containment by regulations and ethical standards subject to close media scrutiny. The quality of the security challenge itself can vary depending on the type, character or complexity of the event in question. It tends to be those with a political connotation, rather than sporting/cultural ones, that are likely to prove the most testing when it comes to upholding questions of police ethics.

For in political events the role of the police is to guarantee and protect the constitutional and legal rights of the involved groups, notwithstanding support or disapproval of the original cause for the event. Demonstrators will expect the police to protect them in exercising their rights and not to be prevented from carrying out activities in relation to them. This demands a highly sensitive strategy from the police, who must meet those expectations with a balance between the freedom of individual rights and the security of people at and around the event and the event itself. Being in accordance with the law for the situation, all operational security measures must also align to universally valid ethical commitments, both conceptually and in practice. Crucially in this regard, the EU-SEC report stresses “the police must operate within the existing system of values and the legal framework to protect legal rights, without imposing its own ideas of the relevance of an event and good or bad attitudes and behaviour of the citizens in the situation” (emphasis added).

In terms of media, communication becomes important in these heightened, exposed, and difficult situations. For the police have to communicate their security role in the specific event as public order maintainers not only to the event organisers and the involved groups of demonstrators, but also the public at large. Moreover, the EU’s basic principle of ‘de-escalation’ (see Chapter 6) in respect of confrontation is one that the police would often be reminded of and ordered to follow in overall guidance to their regular documented policing operation for an event.

From these observations, a number of points on police ethics can be made specifically concerning external police communication through the media, primarily (but not exclusively) in the context of public order policing and the handling of protests at major events of the political type:

Media as an Informal Mechanism of Accountability

Firstly that it is the relationship of the police and the media that needs to be the centre of attention. Within democracies, the original EU-SEC report points out, the media are a fundamental means of democratic control. Media reports have a deep impact on the general mood and attitudes of the public. The role, behaviour and manners of the police especially, as institutions with the monopoly on the use of force, are issues frequently reported on by the media. The police-media relationship therefore requires thorough examination. This understanding should be applied when engaging and using The House’s Media-Management Guidance in the updated IPO Model or the electronic version.

Mutual Police-Media Dependency

Secondly, the police-media relationship is generally as one of mutual dependence – each needing the other but for different purposes. For the police, the most prominent issue at stake is its legitimacy. Depictions of the police in general and reportage of their handling of difficult operations in particular are important for establishing and maintaining police legitimacy. For the police, the media thus function as a means of promoting a (favourable) image of themselves among the public.

The dependence of the media, on the other hand, is based on the necessity of gathering serious and trustworthy information. Journalists depend on the police for first hand details but also have to maintain a certain image of themselves as trustworthy and credible reporters. And it is on their credibility that large circulation and dissemination of their media reports as serious journalism relies. So at a general level there is a mutual dependency at stake for both police and media: police legitimacy and large media circulation.

Tensions of Mutual Distrust

Thirdly, and at a more routine and local level, in some countries traditional police/media confrontation seems to have steadily given way to more collaboration and that police public relations management has seriously improved in recent decades – on the surface at least.

For underneath this general sense of satisfaction some old tensions are still found to prevail and can reveal themselves during media/police workshops. The media can still feel and get the impression that the police are deliberately withholding necessary information. In response, the police maintain that this is not deliberate but due to their need (especially in relation to major events) to ensure that only thoroughly examined information is released. Former problems can therefore still have an impact on present relations and media management measures need to be taken to overcome them.

On the other hand, the media can frequently present a distorted image of the police as either black or white with nothing in between. Public images of the police consequently fail to hold up to the realities of the police when confronted. Thus the behaviour and appearance of the police in the media contains a touch of glamour that is hardly compatible with everyday routine. The roots of this problem however, go to more complex social phenomena and cannot be solved between the police and media in particular situations.

It is enough to say that the police-media relationship can be characterized as one of mutual dependency and cooperation but still requiring improvement in certain respects. The House’s Media Management Guidelines should be used with this understanding in mind.
5.4 Ethical Considerations and New Security Products – Reflexive Use

‘Temporary’ restrictions [introduced for major events such as the Olympics] often prove long-lasting, justified either by new threats or by continuing existing threats, leading to a permanent state of exemption in which citizens are complicit in the erosion of their civil liberties. (Houlihan and Giulianotti 2012: 716).

What distinguishes this forth House service on ethical considerations from the other three is that nothing similar currently exists within EU policy to protect core values of democratic policing and security provision in relation to major events and the windows of opportunity they present for increases in routine resources and investment in technical innovations as new security products.

It recognises the transformational effect that major events can have on policing and security in Europe and aims to safeguard core ethical values via active reflection on them.

QUALITY ASSURANCES FOR ‘NEW SECURITY PRODUCTS’

By its nature, a major event will bring something new into the existing world of security. This will be in response to multiple external and internal demands and pressures – including the international security markets surrounding an event and its security provision. There will be new security products to think about in terms of routine use thereafter.

Practical use of this service as a common standard in planning or evaluation sessions would be as an exercise in first identifying anything ‘new’ in terms of security that has been/will be produced on the basis of either the ‘exceptionality’ or ‘opportunity’ of the event, classifying them using the simple STILT taxonomy (described in Chapter 2). Then, on the basis that they are new practices or products, fully consider what further approval would be required, and from whom, for their routine use after the event, if not during it.

Finally, either for the purpose of routine use or sharing internationally via The House’s STEP database (Chapter 4) or otherwise, subject them to the House’s ‘Quality Assurance’ standard asking that:

*All new security products introduced for a specific Major Event meet existing national standards of approval before further international adoption among partners or further domestic use by its host as routine. This means approval on the basis of both medical (physical and psychological) and ethical assessment.*

The global market for security technology is growing rapidly. The development of ‘stun technology’ for tactical equipment such as ‘stun shields’, for example, is growing. The intended use, or serious potential for misuse, of some new security technologies in inhumane or degrading acts or acts of torture raises obvious ethical concerns over their acceptability in EU countries at least. This House service can assists with the user’s reflection on, and the maintenance of, existing standards and mechanisms of approval for new security technologies in societies that respects Human Rights.

End-users of House services fully support & value this ‘Quality Assurance’ standard as a common management mechanism for security planners to ensure new innovations are checked for approval against existing national standards before further routine use or sharing internationally with others.
STATEMENTS OF COMPLIANCE – THE EUROPEAN CODE OF POLICE ETHICS

Recognising the strident advances in demand-driven security technology, particularly demand surrounding major events, the service also provides a common set of ethical considerations that can be used for active critical reflection at any stage during security planning or post-event evaluation.

From EU-SEC, the House uses ‘ethics’ to mean ‘standards to guide and evaluate conduct.’ Europe has been promoting Human Rights within Policing since 1979. Developed between 1997 and 2000 and formally adopted by the Council of Europe’s Council of Ministers on 19th Sept 2001, The European Code of Police Ethics represents a set of international police standards to be promoted among Member States. Published in 2009 as a toolkit for the legislation of the security sector, it has been used by The House to develop a set of statements reflecting selected articles considered most applicable to major events in terms of development opportunities and security legacy implications.

They are not meant to be simply read through and checked off as ‘complied with’.

In a dedicated workshop or review environment, quality time (a morning, afternoon or whole day) should be taken to carefully and actively consider each of the statements and critically reflect upon the extent of compliance with it. They should be used to prompt constructively critical thought and discussion as to how the event can be used to raise, promote or maintain, or at the very least not harm, the standards promoted by the European Code of Police Ethics that are reflected in the statements.

They can be used as basic templates against which to independently assess the exceptionality of policing and security at an international event in contrast to routine local standards expected of democratic policing domestically. It is not enough to passively assume standards will be maintained. They will not.

The six statements fall under the headings in Figure 11. They are preceded by a general statement intended to prompt initial review and familiarity with the salient articles of the Police Code of Ethics. Each statement can then be more deeply and critically engaged via small group (5-12) discussion. The 2 page document containing the statements appears as Annex J for practical use in such an exercise.

Further reference can be made to Chapter 6 of the 2011 EU-SEC II Manual, which consolidates and applies the research contained in the 2008 EU-SEC Manual with regard to police ethics and the role of occupational police culture in relation to major events. Both are available on the CEPOL website, along with the Code of Ethics. The EU-SEC II Manual provides views as to how the statements can be used in the context of police education and training; organisational socialisation; internal public relations; and operational debriefings. All 66 articles of the Police Code of Ethics are included.

Further general reading: can be found in the book Policing, Ethics and Human Rights (Neyroud 2003). See also Civilizing Security (Loader and Walker 2007) as a scholarly and in depth reader on the meaning of security and its relationship with democratic values.

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11 Taken from the Council of Europe’s 2009 publication International Police Standards (CoE, 2009, pp. 8-12).
CHAPTER 6: THE HOUSE & COMMON POLICY DEVELOPMENT

There are no obstacles to adopting any of the common standards outlined in this User Guide on a voluntary basis, or sharing best practices or exchanging lessons learned in respect of major events. All that is required is the will to do so and mechanism by which to do it. Subject to continued funding, the potential of The House is to coordinate that development for EU Member States.

In the policy development context of the EU’s Stockholm Programme and Internal Security Strategy (Chapter 3), The House consulted with members during 2012 as to the potential contribution of its services to relevant EU policies. Reporting back in 2013, the resulting core policy suggestions are contained in THE HOUSE Project’s D3.1 report and supporting T3.1, 3.2 & 3.3 reports listed in Figure 2 at the front of this manual. Restricted to programme participants (including Commission Services) they may be progressed as future activities of The House. They are summarised here for the potential service user’s reference and possible future contribution.

6.1 Policy Suggestions for Common Planning Standards

THE IPO SECURITY PLANNING MODEL

Consider making the (updated) IPO Model subject of a separate EU Council Recommendation that incorporates reference to the existing EU Handbooks on Major Events and Football.

The House asks for the relevant EU Council Working Parties (on Terrorism, the TWP, and Law Enforcement, the LEWP, respectively) to consider merging commonly applicable areas of the EU Handbooks on Major Events and Football into one Single Security Handbook for Major Events of all types, with the football and other event type specific differences annexed to it.

Consolidate relevant EU policies on Major Events of all types (including football). In particular, the three basic principles laid out in section 1.2 of the 2007 Major Events Handbook to be consolidated as applicable to Football and all event types. i.e.:

**Principles of Legality and Proportionality, De-escalation & Dialogue**

The enforcement of law and order should be guided by the principles of legality and proportionality and moderation, giving preference to the less intrusive approach. Wherever possible, a de-escalating police approach should be chosen based on dialogue, negotiated management of public space and partnership.

**Principle of Respect of Peaceful Protest and Human Rights**

The law enforcement authorities of the Member States responsible for security at major events with an international dimension, in particular political events, must seek to ensure that human rights, in particular the right to freely express opinions and to assemble in a peaceful manner in accordance with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, are fully respected. Interference from persons or groups whose objectives or actions involve violence or other acts of a criminal nature should be prevented to the furthest possible extent.
Principle of Primary Responsibility & Assistance

Although the host Member State is primarily responsible for providing security for the event, given its international character all other Member States and European Union (EU) competent bodies have a responsibility to assist and support the provision of such security.

Phrased as ‘Legality and Proportionality’, the first of these basic principles is echoed in the introduction to the EU’s 2010 Football Handbook (and its 2011 addition) and is expanded in terms of best practices in its Appendix 1. The third of these basic principles is also echoed in both Football Handbooks (which extend their application to other international sporting events) in terms of responsibility and assistance.

What is absent in the Football Handbooks, however, but remains equally as applicable due to the political protests that major sporting events are beginning to attract, is reference to the second principle of respect for peaceful protest and human rights contained in the 2007 Major Events Handbook. The European Convention on Human Rights based reference in the 2007 Handbook on press freedom in its media policy section is similarly overlooked in the 2010/2011 Football Handbooks. Policy convergence and consolidation would help reiterate these basic EU values as common planning standards.

PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

For the core principle of event organiser as having primary responsibility for security (as indicated in Section III.1 of the 2007 Major Events Handbook) to be re-stated, clarified and expanded on so as to communicate the following as common standards of public governance of private security in Europe:

Principle of Organiser Responsibility for the Event Security

That, subject to agreements and arrangements with the police authorities of the organising/hosting Member State, and notwithstanding the organising/hosting Member States ultimate responsibility for overseeing security for the event overall, the actual organiser of the event itself has primary responsibility for ensuring security and safety at the event in the terms specified by the organising/hosting national authority. This is regardless of the public or private nature of the event or its organiser.

That the principle of ‘organiser responsibility’ for event security allows for the operational policing response to remain focussed on security threats that are beyond the management capacity of the event organisers themselves. For example, where the private organiser of a private event can adequately provide private security to cover the physical security requirements of the venue (such as gate control, stewarding) but not the containment of an outbreak of public disorder or intervention of a terrorist threat in relation to the event, the police and other security services organise themselves to cover such contingencies in the interests of national (or political) security that only they have the resources and constitutional responsibilities for providing.

It should be emphasised in EU policy that the role of the police and national authorities remains as primary providers of national security (i.e. political security) both within and beyond the event’s specific security needs (i.e. physical security) and that nothing precludes them from any aspect of security governance concerning the oversight of security provision by the event organisers themselves.

Principle of Private Security to be State Regulated

Accordingly, that in providing for safety and security at the event (regardless of organiser) only state regulated and supervised private security companies that employ security personnel holding state recognized and supervised licences are to be used.
MEDIA MANAGEMENT

That common media guidance within EU policy concerning major events of all types are developed to reflect the practical elements of The House service in this area. That is, to emphasise the need for:

1. Developing international consistency and professionalism in police press-office management (including contact points for cooperation with media) at major events;
2. The police to act as the primary information source concerning security at the event;
3. A professional police-press officer to have direct access to the police chain of command at the event.

That Section III.4 of the EU’s Major Events Handbook on press freedom (see section 5.3) is made a centrally guiding principle of all media strategies.

That professional communications and media experts should assist in reviewing and developing media management guidance (including reference to issues of social media and citizen journalism).

NEW SECURITY PRODUCTS – ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The House ‘Quality Assurance’ standard for ‘new security products’ (see section 5.4) be adopted as a new basic principle in updates to the relevant EU policies for major events of all types (including football).

That active reflection on ethical policing and human rights issues are incorporated into the security planning process and reflected in the EU’s Handbooks. Ethical considerations should be centred on reviewing the compliance of a security plan and its potential security legacies with the European Code of Police Ethics and the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

A good practice that would support the suggested new principle of ‘active reflection’ would be that of inviting representatives from independent civil rights bodies or research institutes to attend planning meetings for the event with a view to observing, monitoring and assessing policing activities while the security operation is actually carried out. This would be a practical application, for example the service’s sixth statement concerning ‘independent research’.

MAINTENANCE OF THE HOUSE NETWORK

That The House consortium is maintained as a long-lasting European tool for policy implementation either through new EU funding programmes, voluntary Member State contribution and commitment of national authorities, or other means, in its development of common planning standards by way of its ‘action-based’ field-led research methodology.

That is, direct engagement with security planners through the provision of House services in web-based format in the context of their operational planning for live major events. An organising theme for such continued engagement could be centred on reviewing the key challenges presented to host authorities by live major events and the security innovations being produced in overcoming them.
6.2 Policy Suggestions for Common Evaluation Standards

Emerging from consultation is the strong suggestion that The House has the potential to both facilitate and add value to the practical implementation of the EU’s current recommendations concerning evaluations of major events security planning and their dissemination among Member States. In pursuit of this, the following ideas are offered for EU consideration as policy suggestions:

TRANSNATIONAL EVALUATION UNIT/EVALUATION TOOL
At NSC #3 in Porto, the idea of an EU driven unit, not attached to any individual country but to a formal EU organ such as Europol or CEPOL, was debated. Its purpose would be to offer hosting Member States independent evaluation of their major event security planning by reference to the House services. The idea was that it could be responsible for collating and reviewing their own House service based evaluation reports as well as those made by hosting Member States, for dissemination to relevant EU bodies, National Police Academies and other Member States as intended by the EU’s Major Events Handbook. It was suggested that this could possibly be done through use of EMER and established contact points and feed into the European Instruction Training & Exercise (ITE) process referred to in the EU policy (i.e. the 2007 Major Event Handbook). This idea was rejected by the partners but instead a compromise of providing Member States with an evaluation tool with which to conduct their own evaluations was preferred for future development. Such an evaluation tool could also be made available to Member States through EMER and the sharing of any information from resultant national evaluations through ITE as mentioned above would be completely at the discretion of the Member States.

STANDING COMMITTEE ON MAJOR EVENTS SECURITY (SCoMES)
Put forward by one of the event hosts was the suggestion of forming a ‘Standing Committee on Major Events Security’ (one could use the acronym SCoMES). This would be similar to that for spectator violence at sports and football events and its purpose would be to connect security planners to the EU policy development mechanism at the strategic evaluation level. It could organise regular and smaller expert meetings on major event security planning issues identified as priorities. It would then ensure the provision of outcomes to the TWP and LEWP (both sat on by Europol) as the relevant EU Working Parties responsible for updating the EU’s Major Events Handbook and Football Handbooks. An annual conference could be held to review developments regarding best practices and lessons learned derived from evaluations of the most recent events and cutting edge security issues. This could be the same annual conference suggested in section 4.3 earlier on Networking & Training via CEPOL.

SINGLE SECURITY HANDBOOK
Taking account of National Football Information Points (NFIP) reservations, and as a central policy suggestion of THE HOUSE Project’s D3.1 report, provisionally outline the basic structure and subject areas of a single security handbook for major events with a European dimension. This would centre on the guiding principles that both ‘major events’ and ‘football events’ have in common in terms of their requirement for international cooperation over security planning for them by Member States.

In short, a synthesis of the common areas of both existing Handbooks as EU policy, with House Service related principles considered as well. This could be the end goal of the above Standing Committee (or similar structure) in the longer-term, the basic elements of which are laid out above in this User Guide.
CONCLUSIONS

The House has developed its method, network and services over a ten year period since 2004. This User Guide has attempted to consolidate the underpinning ideas and main outputs of that development for the practical reference and application of security planners and policy makers.

In conclusion, the following points that have emerged from consortium discussion concerning the continuation of The House as a contributor to the development of common standards and policies for Major Event Security Planning in Europe can be made:

- The **strategic** potential Major Event Security for the development of a common approach to policing in Europe (via international cooperation over its planning) is valid and needs to be further emphasized in EU Policy development.

- The House is an established European network of EU policy stakeholders in the field of Major Event Security and potential supporting mechanism for the EC’s recognition of the need to **share best practices and lessons learned** in that growing field of studies and practices.

This User Guide has been compiled with those views in mind. More particular views expressed by The House include recognition of the following issues that can also be stated here in conclusion:

- The House ‘Major Event’ definition as based on the need for international cooperation is appropriate for strategic EU policy development. Comparison of local definitions is not required.

- The EC can act as a gateway for The House to the relevant EU policy working parties (LEWP & TWP) affecting the strategic convergence of their Major Events and Football Handbooks.

- The strategic objective for policing in Europe rests in a commonality based upon values of the rule of law, democratic accountability and the European Convention on Human Rights.

- The continued development of a common technical language as terminology remains important.

- The importance of understanding the deep-seated historical and cultural differences that are built into and expressed by policing institutions in different EU countries needs to be recognized in EU policy implementation and a ‘ground-up’ approach to commonality allowed for.

- The EU needs a forum for the continued discussion of strategic and tactical issues concerning Major Event Security Planning and that The House has the potential to provide it.

- The sharing of hard (as well as soft) lessons learned and acceptance of constructive criticism between peers is more acceptable and workable if done in confidence and reports restricted.

- More recognition should be made of the fact that Major Event Security Planning involves a multi-agency approach at a transnational as well as international level – e.g. use of transnational EU instruments such as Frontex and Europol.

Via the work of The House and its services, it is hoped that this User Guide serves to mark a point of connection between EU policy makers and practitioners within EU Member States.
Further Reading (selected academic titles)

Mega-Events and Cosmopolitanism: Observations on Expos and European Culture in Modernity (Roche 2011). From their 19th century inception with the 1851 Great Exhibition in London and the French inspired First Olympic Games in 1896 in Athens, argues that overall major events have made (and continue to make) positive contributions to a European sense of culture and civil society premised upon cosmopolitan ideas of world citizenship and humanitarian values. Perhaps sitting with the EU’s strategic goal of making citizenry a tangible reality, this theoretical text usefully recognises major events as historical expressions of a cosmopolitan aspiration in Europe.

Spectacular Security: Mega-Events and the Security Complex (Boyle and Haggerty 2009). Pointing out the security itself has become part of the ‘spectacle’ of contemporary events in the urban setting, observes three dynamics relevant to House services:
1. A move toward a precautionary ‘what if…’ based logic of ‘speculative’ rather than ‘calculative’ security provision among security planners.
2. A ‘semiotic shift’ that puts ‘security iconography’ as part of the urban spectacle of the event.
3. Security legacies that circulate beyond the spatial and temporal frame of the event itself.

Politics and the London 2012 Olympics: the (in)security Games (Houlihan and Giulianotti 2012). Examining the event’s security legacy as increased securitization of the host city and other Olympic event locations, points to a steady blurring of the boundary between external and internal threat, between military defence and civilian policing, and between war and peacetime security. Of significance to ethical considerations as a House service, argues that the Olympic Games and other mega-sports events become opportunities not only to test and refine security technology and strategies but also to assess the level of public acceptance of increased levels of surveillance. Of concern is that the securitization of major events places civil liberties at risk.

Terrorism and the Olympics: Major Event Security and Lessons for the Future (Richards, Fussey et al. 2011). In the context of threat assessment and security planning challenges for the 2012 London Olympics, contains chapters from previous EU-SEC contributors (Stephen Swain and Frank Gregory) on public transport system security and the promotion of major event security within the EU area.

Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security (Wood and Dupont 2006). Criminological texts asking if democratic values are being either advanced and protected, or threatened and compromised by dispersal of security provision and practices beyond the sole governance of the State. Faced with the political implications of security provision at major events and the precedents they may set or advance, the European security planner may wish to be mindful of these academic but scientifically pursued questions.

Public Order Policing, New Media Environments and the Rise of the Citizen Journalist (Greer and McLaughlin 2010). Relevant to media management, provides critical analysis of police media strategies at the 2009 London G20 summit concerning contested representations of protester violence and police violence in relation to the death of a bystander caught up in the event’s security operation and controversial use of public order ‘kettling’ containment tactics.
ANNEX A: ECOSOC Resolution 2006/28
International Permanent Observatory on Security Measures during Major Events

The Economic and Social Council,

Recognizing the increasing importance of major events, such as large-scale sporting events, including Olympic Games, high-level summits and other mass events such as national and religious festivals,

Recognizing also the principle of freedom of assembly,

Mindful of the fact that, owing to their scale and/or high visibility, major events can be a target for unlawful activities, including for terrorism, and can be exploited by organized criminal groups for their illegal activities,

Mindful also that major events offer opportunities for host countries to strengthen their capacity to manage security,

Aware of the need to share information, in full respect of the principle of data protection, on possible threats to the security of major events and to exchange experience and proven practices in addressing such threats,

Welcoming the establishment by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute of the International Permanent Observatory on Security Measures during Major Events,

Noting with appreciation the work done by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute in the framework of the Observatory, such as the development of relevant analytical tools and the organization of expert meetings in China, Italy, Norway, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Spain and the United States of America,

1. Encourages Member States, in particular those planning major events in the coming years, to strengthen their cooperation, including in the framework of the International Permanent Observatory on Security Measures during Major Events, by sharing knowledge of possible threats to major events and relevant practices related to security during such events;

2. Invites the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, subject to the availability of extra budgetary resources, to continue and expand its work on the Observatory, including by providing technical assistance and advisory services on security during major events to Member States upon request;

3. Invites Member States to make voluntary and in-kind contributions to the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute for the continuation and expansion of the activities of the Observatory, and invites the Institute to mobilize funds from the private sector for such activities;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of Member States.

41st plenary meeting
27 July 2006
ANNEX B: The House Definition of Major Event & Additional Elements

A MAJOR EVENT IS AN EVENT

THAT REQUIRES
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

OBJECTIVEY defined in relation to the security threats the event attracts

SUBJECTIVEY defined in relation to the security burden it presents the host

Events typically CHARACTERISED by:
1. PUBLICITY - Large International (world) media coverage
2. POPULARITY - Their historical, political, cultural significance or popularity
3. PARTICIPATION - By large or international crowds, potential target groups, or VIP/dignitaries

Security Plans made in response to the potential of threats, CATEGORISED as*:
1. Accidents/Emergencies/Disaster (as threat to public safety/health)
2. Public disorder (protester/supporter) (as threat to public order)
3. Terrorism (domestic/international) (as threat to national security)
4. Criminality (organised/petty) (as threat to persons/property)
5. Public embarrassment (as threat to the authorities)

*(but not limited to)

They fall into one of four TYPOLOGIES of:
1. Political Events (e.g. Summits/State Visits)
2. Sporting Events (e.g. Olympics/World Championships)
3. Cultural Events (e.g. Carnivals, Festivals, Expos)
4. Other Events (i.e. if unable to use the above)

Generally recognisable in the field through the following QUALITIES or similar:
- For the host country their extra security requirement may be domestic or international
- They tend to be urban in character (if not location) as an expression of global society
- They may be regular or non-regular in spatial and/or temporal occurrence
- They will tend to dominate other security planning concerns
- Their security demand will be extra-ordinary and in excess of routine capacity
- They may produce new security measures that redefine routine policing for the host
ANNEX C – List of EU Policies from Polish Consultation Response

Apart from the relevant EU policies referred to in this guide\(^\text{12}\), the security of major events, in the broad context, has been also described in a number of other documents at the EU level:

1. **European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular at Football Matches** signed on 19 August 1985 in Strasbourg, which regulates issues concerning security of sports events including football matches. In accordance with the provisions of this Convention “Each Party shall apply provisions of this Convention, to both football matches as well as to other sports and sports events in which violence or misbehaviour by spectators is to be feared, taking into account their specific character, as appropriate to the specific requirements of such sports and sports events”.

2. **Joint Action of 26 May 1997 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union with regard to cooperation on law and order and security**, which regulates issues concerning the cooperation in regards with security and public order during football matches as well as other events in a broad sense, i.e.: gatherings as sporting events, rock concerts, demonstrations and road-blocking protest campaigns.

3. **Council Decision on 25 April 2002 concerning security in connection with football matches with an international dimension** (2002/348/WSiSW) and **Council Decision on 12 June 2007 amending Decision 2002/348/JHA concerning security in connection with football matches with an international dimension**, which established the national football information points in each Member States and which regulate the solutions concerning information exchange and police cooperation in the context of providing the security during football matches.

4. **Council Conclusions on strengthening police cooperation with non-EU countries in the area of sports events safety and security**;

5. **2011-2013 EU Work Programme on further measures designed to maximise safety and security in connection with sports events, in particular football matches, with an international dimension and Annual Action Plan implementing the Work Programme**, which include detailed guidelines for improving cooperation in this area;

6. **“Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds”** which includes the guidelines how to manage the safety at the sports arenas.

\(^{\text{12}}\) Namely the 2007 Major Event’s Handbook, 2008 Prüm Decision, 2010 Football Handbook and its 2011 addition, copies of which are accessible from the HOUSE portal and related area of the CEPOL Website.
Recommendations of the Standing Committee on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular Football Matches.

In the framework of the Standing Committee on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular at Football Matches, there are many recommendations concerning hints and providing the course of actions in regards with security in the context of sports events:

- Recommendation No. R (84) 8 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the reduction of spectator violence at sporting events and in particular at football matches,
- Recommendation on alcohol sales and consumption (87/1),
- Recommendation on crowd searches (87/2),
- Recommendation on police co-operation (87/3),
- Recommendation on police co-operation (88/1),
- Recommendation on guidelines for ticket sales (89/1),
- Recommendation on comprehensive report on measures to counter hooliganism (89/2)
- Recommendation on guidelines to the Parties for the implementation to Article 5 of the Convention; identification and treatment of offenders (90/1),
- Recommendation on the promotion of safety at stadia (91/1),
- Recommendation on Article 4 of the Convention: international co-operation (91/2),
- Recommendation on Measures to be taken by the Organizers of Football Matches and Public Authorities (93/1),
- Recommendation on measures to be taken by organizers and public authorities concerning high-risk indoor sports events (94/1),
- Recommendation on the use of standard forms for the exchange of police intelligence concerning high risk sports events (T-RV/97/1),
- Recommendation on Stewarding (99/1),
- Recommendation on the removal of fences in stadiums (99/2),
- Recommendation Rec (2001)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the prevention of racism, xenophobia and racial intolerance in sport,
- Recommendation Rec (2002) 1 on guidelines for ticket sales at international football matches (teams and nations),
- Recommendation Rec (2003) 1 of the Standing Committee on the role of social and educational measures in the prevention of violence in sport and handbook on the prevention of violence in sport,
- Recommendation Rec (2008) 1 of the Standing Committee on the checklist of measures to be taken by the organizers of professional sporting events and by the public authorities,
- Recommendation Rec (2008) 2 of the Standing Committee on the use of visiting stewards
- Recommendation Rec (2008) 3 of the Standing Committee on the use of pyrotechnical devices at sports events,
- Recommendation Rec (2009) 1 of the Standing Committee on the use of public viewing areas at large scale sports events,
- Recommendation Rec (2010) 1 of the Standing Committee on supporters' charters,
- Recommendation Rec (2010) 2 of the Standing Committee on hospitality principles when organizing sports events.
ANNEX D: Guiding Concept and Specifications for EMER

Basic Idea of EMER:
A database of major events hosted in Europe that are formally registered as such by Member States. Registration provides House recognition of an event as ‘major’ at an EU level and access to House services. The register would also form a researchable repository of key facts and figures for future planning purposes.

The House definition of ‘Major Event’ is applied for the purpose of registering an event with EMER. The purpose of this is to assist with EU-wide recognition of other Member State’s events as ‘major’. (The 2008 Prüm Decision’s recognition of ‘major events’ compliments that of the House definition).

Future potential as a central administration system through which international cooperation and assistance over major events security planning in Europe could be requested, coordinated, supported and monitored.

Could also hold basic monitoring and evaluation details in respect of selected aspects of ‘security’ during the event, for research on effectiveness of ‘security products’ used when tested by real ‘threats’.

Registration of an Event:
1) Host country simply registers the event as ‘major’ at any stage during the security planning. (Admin’ body automatically accepts registration request on basis of House definition). Or
2) Admin’ body becomes aware of a country hosting a ‘major event’ by House definition and simply offers the opportunity to register it as such.

Registration Details (kept simple and basic):
- The event itself: Country/date/venue/duration and name of event. Event type (political, sporting, cultural, other). Event organisers name and contact details.
- Its security: Name of national authority responsible for security during the event; the senior officer in command/control of the security during it; key officer for planning security for it.
- Basic nature of potential threats (as per House/IPO threat categories).
- Names of organisations and authorities from whom international cooperation is expected.

Monitoring Details (obtained/submitted daily during the event – most will be a ‘nil’ return):
Any major security incident: YES/NO. Likely/confirmed fatalities: YES/NO
Number of other security incidents: No. of arrests: No. of dead (due to security incident):

Any major safety incident: YES/NO. Likely/confirmed fatalities: YES/NO
Number of other safety incidents: No. of injuries: No. of dead (due to safety incident):

(Though mostly a ‘nil’ return expected, makes events that did suffer a significant security/safety breach more easily identifiable and researchable and thereby potentially hold the most valuable lessons learned).
Reports (obtained/submitted as and when completed):
Immediately before and after the event the following key summary documents (preferably in English as a common language) could be uploaded or noted as being on file for future research purposes:

- Copy of Threat Assessment forwarded for future reference: YES/NO (with source details)
- Copy of Security Plan forwarded for future reference: YES/NO (with source details)
- Copy of Evaluation Report forwarded for future reference: YES/NO (with source details)
- Any legal action pending re security/safety breaches: YES/NO

Where available, these reports can be requested from the host authority for research purposes. The note as to any legal action pending may help identify legal lessons learnt from events.

Evaluation Details:
EMER could help as a database for evaluation in some specific areas concerning cost and the researching of specialist technical equipment available to others (via STEP) for future events.

*Readily available evaluation figures – submitted within a month after the event:*

- Total cost of security provision for whole event in €:
- Total cost of security provision to National Authority €:
- Main items of specialist technical equipment left to authority after hosting event (brief list):

This would complete the file for any registered major event and, in time, provide a valuable coordination resource for both operational security planning and developmental research of Major Event security in EU.

Future Development:
Like STEP, EMER was one of the ideas accepted by the EU-SEC Consortium in 2006 for future development. (In the same way that EMER now integrates STEP), EMER should be made with room to integrate the other three ideas associated with it (but as yet not developed within The House):

- Threat Assessment Research and Evaluation (TARE) – a simple automated post-event survey to evaluate the reliability of threat assessments used for a (EMER) registered event.
- Rolling Integrity Testing and Evaluation Survey (RITES) – simple real-life feedback from vetted event staff on security strengths and weaknesses.
- European Register of Vetted Events Staff (EVES) – perhaps more complex than the other two but in essence a register of cross-border event staff that have already been vetted for earlier events in other countries. Simply aimed as expediting the process.

Note: none of these ideas have yet been developed by The House. They are not represented by the current House CTMs. Besides STEP and EMER only The IPO Model and Networking & Training are derived from the original set of EU-SEC future ideas offered to the Consortium in 2006. Their potential could be reviewed for future joint activity and development within the House framework.

ANNEX E: Guiding Concept & Specifications for STEP

**Basic Idea of STEP**
To support decision making in both planning and procurement processes. A pool of specialist technical equipment that could be made available to cooperating partners for major events.

To contain evaluative information on specialist security technologies and equipment that has been tried and field tested by Member States and major events (i.e. market independent peer-reviews).

Serves as
1) a pool of potentially sharable specialist equipment (subject to availability and logistics)
2) source of independent field operative reviews of specialist equipment

Can use the STILT classification system of security products to help structure the database.

Development of the STEP idea should aim to meet two basic security research functions:
1) Planning – access what equipment is available for loan from which EU Member State.
2) Procurement – access end user comment/review as to operational use and limitations.

**Basic (guiding) specifications for STEP:**
Secure – because data may reveal the operational limits of a national authority’s technology.
Selective – not everything, just that available for loan to others or reviewable for Major Event use.
Searchable – by equipment category, type, make and model (at least).

**Ownership and Maintenance of STEP:**
Owner to be responsible for setting up and servicing STEP database and its promotion to partners.
Contributing partners to have control over their own data (input, amendment, removal, updating).
Owner to initiate updates in conjunction with partner entries to EMER re-equipment legacies.

**Basic (guiding) entry fields envisaged for STEP in the EU-SEC Programme:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>drop down file of EU Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Authority</td>
<td>for major event security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Contact Point</td>
<td>for liaison over international police cooperation on MES – as Prüm, Art 15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributing Organisation/Department</td>
<td>owner of the item of equipment in question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name of liaison officer/officer in charge</td>
<td>for equipment in question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category of equipment</td>
<td>use common ‘catalogue’ categories from the market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name, make and model of the item</td>
<td>separate fields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photograph/image of the item</td>
<td>optional but desirable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year first purchased and cost per item</td>
<td>separate fields – optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of items owned and departmental locations</td>
<td>optional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main operational use</td>
<td>drop file of STILT classification/categories + ‘other’ free text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Event recently use at</td>
<td>drop file EU-SEC categories, plus name, date and venue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field portability</td>
<td>(e.g. hand held, desk operated, driven, fixed, restricted locations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance level</td>
<td>high/low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Review</td>
<td>Free text to cover strengths and weaknesses</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Summarised from 2011 EU-SECII Manual, Chapter 8 ‘Testing the Step Idea (CTM 5)’, pages 74 to 78)
ANNEX F: List of HOUSE Documents on CEPOL Website


COUNCIL RESOLUTION of 3 June 2010 concerning an updated handbook with recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one Member State is involved (2010/C 165/01) http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:165:0001:0021:EN:PDF


ANNEX G: IPO Model Security Planning & Evaluation Checklist

Element 1: Leadership
- All involved properly understand the chain of command
- All involved properly understand their specific responsibilities

Element 2: Planning Structure and Management
- Planning team identifies main branches for planning
- Base planning on identifying best practices and evaluation of previous events

Element 3: Intelligence
- Threat assessment: "What is the likelihood?"
- Vulnerability assessment: "What are the consequences?"
- Risk assessment: Likelihood X Consequences = RISK

Element 4: Media & PR Strategy
- Media monitoring
- Design of public information strategy
- Public reassurance - explanation of momentarily variations from "normal"

Element 5: Venue Security
- Harden secure area
- Search, seal, secure
- Maintain public safety
- Vetting/Accreditation/ticketing
- Access control

Element 6: Border control
- Strengthen routine border control
- Intelligence-led strengthening ASAP
- Enhance information sharing and collection

Element 7: Traffic Management
- Maintain and secure access routes
- Maintain and secure road network in and beyond secure area
- Design proportionate public transport
- Prepare for disruption and blockage of routes

Element 8: Non-Event and Event-Related Security
- Plan to protect people and property
- Plan for event-related sites
- Plan for critical infrastructure
- Plan for "soft" targets
- Promote stakeholder awareness
- Design early warning mechanisms
Element 9: Human Resources and Logistical Support
- Support strategy with adequate personnel
- Provide adequate logistical support
- Enhance human response with equipment and technological solutions
- Plan for withdrawal and return to normality

Element 10: Information Technology (IT) and Communication
- Design effective and secure communication
- Design appropriate and comprehensive control centres
- Design comprehensive flow-charts showing lines of communication & management of data
- Design protection of core communication and plan for communication in emergencies

Element 11: Integration and Coordination
- Integrate, complement and coordinate all planning branches
- Test flexibility and effectiveness of plans
- Test competence of individuals and teams
- Test equipment in prevailing surroundings

Element 12: Contingency Planning and Crisis Management
- Design contingency plans
- Plans shall: Save and protect, prevent further development of emergency, maintain critical services, inform media and restore to normal ASAP while facilitating investigation

Additional elements to be evaluated?

Event:
Date:
Evaluating Officer:
Comments:

This ‘Check list’ acts only as a manuscript and must be supported by written comments on each element and sub-element in the checklist. (Source: Centre for Police Studies, Denmark 2009).
ANNEX H: PPP Guidance: Summary of Recommendations

A. Roles, Responsibility and Accountability
1. Define who is accountable for major event.
2. Define relationship between event owner (client)/event organiser/suppliers/contractors/supporting agencies (police/private security/local councils)
3. Establish strategic lead.
4. Establish who the stakeholders are.
5. Establish Joint Command / Executive Planning Team.

B. Setting the Baseline / Strategic Intention
6. Intelligence requirement / threat assessment.
7. Define scope/footprint of event area.
8. Set initial strategic/executive meeting.

C. Agreeing the Parameters
10. Define areas of responsibility and Agree Memorandum of Understanding.
11. Asset and resource assessment.
12. Budget setting agreement.
13. Agree information / intelligence / communication sharing protocol.

D. Consultation and Development of the Plan
15. Stakeholder / Community Consultation / media engagement.
17. Create security plan (Create tactical plans).
18. Review of security plan (by security committee).
19. All Plans (tactical and security) submitted to ‘Gold’ Commander or Senior Event Executive

E. Preparedness
20. Identify training needs.
21. Table top exercise / Dry run.
22. Identify contingencies.

F. Review
25. Review of overarching plan (tactical and security plans) by Gold-feedback refine agree
26. Final Executive/Gold Planning meeting.

G. Event Day and Organisational Learning
27. Briefings
28. Live event - On-site Management
29. Hot de-brief.
30. Structured de-brief / lessons learnt / organisational learning
ANNEX I: Sample Media Management Case Study & ‘Press Freedom’

‘SMASH ASEM’ DEMONSTRATION, HELSINKI 2006

A professional photo-journalist registered with the Finnish Press and covering the ‘Smash-ASEM’ demonstrations in Helsinki in 2006 for a Finnish magazine, was arrested and convicted for disobeying police orders after continuing to film the demonstration after being told to stop by police.

The demonstration had become heated and police formed a blockade. The journalist claimed he made it clear to police that he was working as a journalist documenting the protest but he was still arrested alongside many other protesters.

In December 2007 he was convicted of disobeying police orders, with the Finnish Supreme Court denying right to appeal in 2009. Even so, the Court recognised his actions as excusable in light of his occupational responsibilities. No penalty was imposed and, consequently, no entry of the conviction made on his criminal record.

The photojournalist took the case to the ECHR, arguing that both the arrest and conviction were a breach of Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (right to freedom of expression). The Court heard the appeal but concluded in a 5-2 ruling that there had been no violation of Article 10 sufficient to warrant a judgement against the Finnish State.

Importantly for this case study, it was noted in the judgement that the journalist had been presented with alternatives at the time, such as moving to the established press area, but that he chose to remain within the blockade zone.

Ultimately, it was the ECHR's opinion that the Finnish courts had struck a fair balance between conflicting duties of the journalist as a photographer and as a law-abiding citizen.

Media Management review point:
Regardless of the final judgement, try putting this example in the context of EU policy recommendations and basic principle of press freedom: During the planning stages, was sufficient consideration given to the location of the designated press area as being in an adequate enough position for the press to properly cover the event? Is it possible that the journalist may not have had need to go outside of the designated press area if it were better located for his needs?

In any case, why can’t a photojournalist be among the demonstrators to cover the event, even if they are getting violent – is it not his own decision regarding safety as long as he/she is not obstructing the police?

Could consideration be given to arranging event recognised ‘PRESS’ vests for professional journalists/photojournalists to wear in order to allow for close proximity working at their own risk? Or to instruct officers not to arrest member of the press who are clearly working and not obstructing?

Despite the ECHR decision, could the relevant EU policy basic principle of ‘press freedom’ be more constructively applied?

13(Source: YLE News, 4.2.2014 ECHR: Photographer’s arrest did not breach right to free expression)
ANNEX J: Statements based on The European Code of Police Ethics

A GENERAL STATEMENT ON ETHICAL COMPLIANCE FOR INITIAL CONSIDERATION

The preparation and implementation of security for major events respects *The European Code of Police Ethics* (as adopted by the Council of Europe 19 September 2001) with regard to:

- a) Articles 1 & 3 on the objectives and legal basis of the police
- b) Articles 13, 15, 17 & 19 on the organisation and structure of the police
- c) Articles 36, 37, 38, 43 & 45 on police action and intervention
- d) Articles 59 & 61 on accountability and control of police
- e) Article 64 on research and international cooperation

EUROPEAN CODE OF POLICE ETHICS (INTERNATIONAL POLICE STANDARDS): SELECTED ARTICLES PERTINENT TO MAJOR EVENT SECURITY PLANNING:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Corresponding number of the six statements for further active reflection on ethical compliance that the article is reflected in.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>The main purposes of the police in a democratic society governed by the rule of law are: to maintain public tranquillity and law and order in society; to protect and respect the individual’s fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined, in particular, in the European Convention on Human Rights; to prevent and combat crime; to detect crime; to provide assistance and service functions to the public.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Police Operations must always be conducted in accordance with the national law and international standards accepted by the country.</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>The police, when performing police duties in civil society, shall be under the responsibility of civilian authorities.</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>The police shall enjoy sufficient operational independence from other state bodies in carrying out its given police tasks, for which it should be fully accountable.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>The police organisation shall provide for a clear chain of command within the police. It should always be possible to determine which superior is ultimately responsible for the acts or omissions of police personal.</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Police organisations shall be ready to give objective information on their activities to the public, without disclosing confidential information. Professional guidelines for media contact shall be established.</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>The police shall not inflict, instigate or tolerate, any act of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under any circumstances.</td>
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<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>The police may use force only when strictly necessary and only to the extent required to obtain a legitimate objective.</td>
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<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>Police must always verify the lawfulness of their intended actions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>The police, in carrying out their activities, shall always bear in mind everyone’s fundamental rights, such as freedom of thought, conscience, religion, expression, peaceful assembly, movement and the peaceful enjoyment of possessions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Police personnel shall, during intervention, normally be in a position to give evidence of their police status and professional identity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>The police shall be accountable to the state, the citizens and their representatives. They shall be subject to sufficient external control.</td>
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<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Public authorities shall ensure effective and impartial procedures for complaints against the police.</td>
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<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Member states shall promote and encourage research on the police, both by the police themselves and external institutions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Corresponding number of the six statements (over leaf) for further active reflection on ethical compliance that the article is reflected in.*
SIX SPECIFIC STATEMENTS FOR ACTIVE REFLECTION ON ETHICAL COMPLIANCE*

Our preparation and implementation of security for this major event respects *The European Code of Police Ethics* as adopted by the Council of Europe 19 September 2001 in that:

1. **Public Accountability (regarding Articles 13, 15, 17 and 59 collectively):**
   The planning, provision and evaluation of security for this major event is the responsibility of an operationally independent and dedicated police command position, accountable to a specified civil authority.

2. **Personnel Identification (regarding Article 45):**
   All security personnel during this major event wear openly displayed and easily readable personal identity numbers (rather than names) at all times. This includes, in particular, police officers in public order situations as well as private security guards and stewards engaged with duties under the security plan.

3. **Public Complaints (regarding Articles 19 and 61):**
   A dedicated public complaints system is set up in respect of this major event’s security operation and evaluative research includes ready analysis and publication of the nature and number of complaints made regarding the management of its security and conduct of individual security personnel during it.

4. **Human Rights Protection (regarding Articles 1, 3, 38, 36, 37 and 43 collectively):**
   Security plans for this event contain a statement verifying the lawfulness of all intended actions within them and their overall compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular those concerning life, use of force, and right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.

5. **Ethical Security Products (regarding Article 36):**
   In requesting threat assessments and developing new security tools for this major event, intelligence or other knowledge obtained through unethical means (in particular torture, inhumane or degrading treatment) is neither sought nor knowingly accepted and planners actively seek assurances from agencies providing such services that their products have not been so obtained (or are intended for such use).

6. **Independent Research (regarding Articles 19 and 64):**
   Recognising that security for this major event can set new policing precedents as well as test ethical boundaries in response to new security threats, independent scientific research on the policing of the event is commissioned from external institutions from the outset of the planning process.

*(The purpose of these statements is to encourage consideration of a major event as an opportunity for reviewing professional policing standards within the common frame of the European Code of Police Ethics).*
REFERENCES


